Basra lessons learned

Max Boot:

CRITICS of the Iraqi army's recent assault on militias in Basra have focused on the Maliki government's motives. But the real concern should be the competence - or lack thereof - it displayed.

Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies writes that the "fighting, which the government portrays as a crackdown on criminality, is better seen as a power grab, an effort by [Prime Minister Nouri al-] Maliki and the most powerful Shiite political parties to establish their authority over Basra and the parts of Baghdad."

Vali Nasr of Tufts University says "that Maliki is completely irrelevant. The real show is between Hakim and Sadr." That would be Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, head of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq and its militia, the Badr Organization, vs. Moqtada al-Sadr, head of the Sadr Trend and its militia, the Jaish al Mahdi.

It is usually a safe bet to look for hidden motives in the morass of Iraqi politics - but in this case there is a danger of being overly sophisticated. The Iraqi army was ordered down to Basra by Maliki, not by Hakim or anyone else. The prime minister flew down himself to supervise its operations.

And whatever his motives (and what politician doesn't take politics into account in making any decision?), Maliki has right on his side.

Militias have been the bane of Iraq since 2003 - and nowhere more so than in Basra. The failure of British forces to keep the peace ceded control of this vital port to warring groups of thugs.

Ordinary Iraqis are thoroughly sick of these desperados and anxious for their elected leaders to get rid of them. That is what Maliki has tried to do in Basra - and he should be applauded for his willingness to take on not just Sunni but also Shiite militias.

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Maliki tried to repeat in Basra the success he enjoyed last August in confronting the Jaish al Mahdi in Karbala. Back then, the Iraqi Security Forces defeated Mahdist gunmen and forced the volatile Sadr to declare a cease-fire that was widely seen as a defeat for him.

But this cease-fire does not look like a victory for the government - because its security forces failed to dislodge the Mahdists from their bastions in Basra. Worse, they triggered an Iranian-orchestrated counter-attack that resulted in heavy rocketing of Baghdad's Green Zone as well as fighting in Sadr City, Hilla and other Shiite enclaves in the capital.

On the plus side, the Iraqi army once again showed its willingness to fight - and it was impressive to see it shift a division's worth of combat power to the south on short notice with minimal coalition help. The army and other security forces also managed to keep control of Karbala, Najaf and other parts of the Shiite heartland where some Sadrists rose up.

Yet there seemed to be little planning behind the Basra assault. The army was not given an opportunity to "prepare the battlefield" - that is, put into place before the main assault everything from logistics and fire support to a persuasive message for the media.

Maliki's worst failure was the lack of an "information operation" to get out his side of the story. As a result, what should have been seen as a long-overdue law-and-order campaign by the lawfully elected government has instead been depicted both inside and outside of Iraq in the cynical terms enunciated by Cordesman and Nasr.

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The recent fighting will be cited in our domestic politics to discredit the US "surge" - but it actually reinforces the rationale behind the American strategy. Iraq's government is starting to do the right things - from passing reconciliation legislation to challenging militias. And its security forces are displaying more moxie.

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This is a thoughtful take on events. It looks at the political objectives of the various parties, but it still overlooks the real estate aspects of the operation. It is there that Maliki has improved the situation of the government. Sadr has ceded some strategic real estate which will make the governments ability to control the oil supplies much more effective. The political battle will continue, but think if Sadr were really winning that battle he would be in Iraq and not Iran.

Oliver North has some facts about the operation you probably have not read in the Times or Post.