Russia maintains its goals in Ukraine despite setbacks
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A long war is not an inherent Kremlin goal, but rather the Kremlin’s adaptation in pursuit of its maximalist objectives in Ukraine. The Kremlin’s plan for a quick war has failed. The Kremlin’s intent to control Ukraine and eradicate its statehood remains unchanged — a goal presently beyond Russia’s means given Ukraine’s resistance. The Kremlin is thus setting conditions for a protracted conflict. The Kremlin is explicit about its intent to reconstitute Russian forces and prepare for new offensives under better conditions to accomplish Russia’s maximalist objectives in Ukraine, rather than halting following the failure of the Kremlin's initial plans and setbacks in 2022.[2]
The Kremlin’s ability to sustain a long war in Ukraine is not a given — it disproportionately depends on whether Russia gets the time and space to rebuild its capabilities. Russia’s ability to reconstitute its military capability is currently constrained. The Kremlin invaded Ukraine with insufficient resources which it has further exhausted to secure only limited gains. The Kremlin is trying to replenish its resources but is still pursuing half-measures below full national mobilization to regenerate its forces and mobilize its defense industrial base.[3]
Enabling further successful Ukrainian counteroffensives will deny the Kremlin a breather to replenish its resources, will further deplete Russia’s offensive potential, and eventually enable Ukrainian forces to expel Russia from Ukraine.
Space and time, on the other hand, could enable the Kremlin to reconstitute its capabilities. Space means Ukrainian territory Russia gets to use as a staging ground for further aggression. Time means a breather on the battlefield resulting from a premature cessation of hostilities or a slowed Ukrainian counteroffensive due to insufficient Western aid.
[Space] The US cannot avoid a long Russian war in Ukraine without helping Ukraine liberate its territory. Deprioritizing territory — as some argue[4] — only increases the risk of a long war. Territory is a core part of Russia’s capability to sustain this war, alongside manpower and equipment. Russia will use any territory in Ukraine as a staging ground to launch attacks on Ukraine, in this invasion or in any later effort. Like Crimea and Donbas, any territories that Russia holds in Ukraine will become Russian military bases in perpetuity. We know this is the Russian strategy because we are living it. This has already been a long Russian war in part because the Kremlin was allowed to keep its illegal gains in Ukraine in 2014. If the current lines hold, imagine how much further Russia could advance in future years after reconstituting its forces.
[Time] Metering Western support to Ukraine increases the risk of a long war. Momentum matters. Interruptions to Ukraine’s momentum provide a triple advantage to Russia: a chance for Russian forces to stabilize the frontline and reconstitute; lessened domestic pressures on Russian President Vladimir Putin; and a chance for the Kremlin to seize the narrative in the international — and particularly Western — information space. We already observed these effects when Ukraine was not able to exploit Russian battlefield setbacks in December-January through a third successive counteroffensive operation, in part due to insufficient Western aid.[5] This allowed Russia to stabilize its defensive lines, add weight to its offensive in Bakhmut, and prepare additional offensive operations in Luhansk Oblast.[6] Western support trailing Ukraine’s battlefield needs is how this war becomes lengthy and costly.
[Time] Planning to resource only the next Ukrainian counteroffensive — but not follow-on Ukrainian operations — increases the risk of a long war. Some argue that the West should help Ukraine’s next counteroffensive phase and use its results to bring Russia to the negotiating table.[7] This approach is flawed given the importance of terrain to the Kremlin’s strategy. The Kremlin also has shown no interest in real negotiations, and the next Ukrainian counteroffensive alone is unlikely to change that.[8]
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Sustaining Ukraine operations is not a given in the US and in the West. Unlike Russia, the West needs the political support of voters and the longer the war lasts the more it will become a factor. Russia sensed weakness after Biden's precipitous retreat from Afghanistan leaving behind equipment that had to be replaced. There are already rumblings of opposition to the expenditures in the US. Joe Biden is not a popular politician. It is certainly not a given that he will win the next election.
However, I think the best way to get political support for the war is to demonstrate that it has weakened the threat posed by Russia to the US and the West. At this point, Russia is clearly a weaker conventional power than it was before it started the war. Its ability to sustain operations is more than a matter of replacing its horrendous troop losses. Its ability to replace equipment losses is not a given and it has resorted to buying ammo from second-rate powers such as Iran and North Korea is limited. Replacing mechanized equipment is an even bigger challenge for Russia. Its lack of it has increased its troop losses and ability to sustain offensive operations. Sanctions have also impacted Russia's ability to rebuild its mechanized forces. It may be easier for the West to sustain the sanctions than to keep funding Ukraine operations.
Russia has so far been able to contain its anti-war movement. It is not clear that the US and the West will be able to do the same.
See, also:
Black Sea won’t be safe for at least 20 years due to Russia’s actions, top admiral says
The Azov and Black Seas will only be considered safe if Ukraine regains control over all its territories, the admiral told the Black Sea Security Forum in Bulgaria in an online speech.
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He emphasized that “Russia’s imperial ambitions extend not only to the Black and Azov Seas, but also to the Baltic and North Seas — and the Pacific Ocean.”
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Meanwhile, Biden is reducing the US Navy.
And:
Russia's Defense Ministry braces for major defeat in Ukraine, expert says
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According to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, citing data from the Pentagon, Russia does not have enough personnel to maintain full control over all temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine.
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And:
Russians cut throats of Ukrainian prisoners after interrogations
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"People who are prisoners of war... there’s no point keeping them because we’ve got all the information out of them. There’s no point keeping them any longer. So... they need to be disposed of."
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And:
Authorities MIA after explosions rock Russia’s St. Petersburg
And:
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The Federal Security Service, or FSB, is worried that domestic banks don't have enough foreign currency, the leaked intel assessment said.
In addition, officials at the FSB — which is the main successor agency to the Soviet Union's KGB — also urged that any business deals between Russia and China be kept secret due to the risk that the US could impose secondary sanctions on Chinese firms.
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And:
Russia has removed all military equipment from northern Crimea base – Radio Liberty
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Russia's economy is facing a record worker shortage amid losses in Ukraine and mass exodus
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Several factors may be contributing to the situation. Russia's population has been shrinking for years, and its so-called gray economy has expanded to surpass other major industries.
But Russia's war on Ukraine has delivered a major shock to the workforce. The military mobilized 300,000 troops last year and plans to mobilize hundreds of thousands more this year.
And about 200,000 Russian troops have been killed or wounded while fighting in Ukraine, with some estimates putting losses at 500 troops a day.
Meanwhile, nearly a million Russians may have left the country for various reasons, whether to escape the military mobilization or flee Western sanctions that have caused economic distress within the nation, according to the Washington Post.
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