Putin's Ukraine miscalculations

 Andrew Stuttaford:

...

Putin’s decision to invade was almost certainly made easier by the thought that he could get away with it. He underestimated the extent to which Russia’s earlier aggression had unified what was left of Ukraine, as well as the improvement in Ukraine’s now battle-hardened army, which had also been buttressed by some $2.5 billion in aid from the U.S. He seems to have believed that Ukraine was so rotten that its people would fall gratefully into his arms. He was wrong.

Putin also failed to anticipate the strength of the Western response. It is hard to blame him. To be sure, some NATO members had increased military spending in the years after 2014, but otherwise relatively little had changed. Russia remained a valued business partner, and, critically, it continued to be a key supplier of natural gas to Europe, a role that, if anything, became more important as the continent put the pursuit of decarbonization ahead of energy security. Meanwhile, the White House was being run by the team that had presided over the scuttle from Kabul. If Moscow’s plans for a quick takeover had succeeded, it was reasonable to expect that protests and another round of sanctions would be followed by a return, especially by the larger Western European countries, to business as usual.

But Ukraine tore up Putin’s script. The Russian invaders may have shown themselves to be remarkably incompetent, but the Ukrainian resistance was far fiercer and far more effective than predicted. Russian dreams of an early knock-out faded, meaning that, unlike in 2014, the West was not presented with a fait accompli. Moreover, the invasion raised the obvious concern that Russia might well turn its attention to NATO’s eastern borders if Ukraine fell and was then successfully subjugated. There was thus a clear strategic case for helping Ukraine defend itself. And, vitally, the spectacle of Russian aggression and Ukrainian resistance, not to speak of the overnight transformation of a somewhat unimpressive (and not particularly popular) Ukrainian president into a charismatic war leader, had given an enormous boost to political support for Western aid, even if it was at the cost of an energy crunch at home.
...

What lies ahead, therefore, is likely to be a war of attrition on two fronts. There is the battlefield, but there is also the war of attrition effectively being fought between the Russian and Western economies. The West is much, much richer, but it is democratic. Most of its voters currently favor supporting Ukraine, but for how long? While Europe has dodged the worst of the crisis once forecast for this winter in the aftermath of the cut-off of Russian gas, it did not do so cheaply (Germany alone has spent nearly $500 billion dealing with the effects of the energy squeeze), and there are clear signs that the continent’s higher energy costs are beginning to drive heavier industry elsewhere. What’s more, there may well be another scramble to refill gas-storage reserves for next winter. Competition for imported liquefied natural gas will be stiff, and, unlike in 2022, Russian gas will be missing for all of 2023, meaning that more gas will have to be found to replace it than last year. The idea that renewables will fill the gap is laughable, and Europe’s rushed and reckless “race” to net zero has left it with fewer alternatives to which it can turn. If Europe is faced with a harsh energy crunch in the winter of 2023–24 after what it has already been through in the last twelve months, it is easy to see how its support for Ukraine could start to erode. Indeed, here and there it already has.
...

Russia is a much weaker power than it was considered to be before it launched its unprovoked war in Ukraine.  If the US ignores the anti-energy policies of Biden and the left in this country, it can take care of much of Europe's needs along with other countries.  Russia has also sustained higher casualties than Putin ever anticipated and is now fighting with raw recruits in many cases.  It is scrounging for weapons from second-rate powers like Iran and North Korea.