Bad guys run into a conflict of interests

James Robbins:

A few years ago I ran into a former student of mine, a Marine Lieutenant Colonel who had gone directly from the Command and Staff College to General Franks’s planning staff for Operation Enduring Freedom. I asked him if anything he learned at Quantico helped him fight an actual war — as an educator, I’d like to think we made some contribution. The campaign-planning process perhaps? No, he said, that was largely cookie-cutter stuff; you can pick that up by doing it. But he mentioned that he benefited a great deal from the section we did on Thucydides. I was pleased, being a proponent of more classics in the curriculum — “You already got your grade,” I said, “no need to blow smoke.” But he explained that Afghan warlords behaved the same way the Greek city states did — they were a strictly amoral group with no permanent friends, only permanent interests. Today’s friend became tomorrow’s enemy and the next day’s tomorrow’s ally. The path to success in that part of the world was to keep your eye on the interests involved.

This is true with all tribal societies. To operate well in them one must know and understand the patchwork of interests, and see how and when they lead to changes in behavior. Begin with the assumption that long-standing tribes also have long-standing grudges. Lumping the enemy into one category as we often do is counterproductive — by giving them a common adversary we keep them bound together. The key is to wedge them apart, promote disunity, and exploit the preexisting tensions. It is noteworthy in Thucydides that many if not most battles (particularly sieges) are won through acts of betrayal by one faction against another. It is important to know how to create conditions where this dynamic comes into play. It doesn’t mean groups we assist are our friends forever or we condone everything they do. It means that at a specific moment in time, in a specific political situation, interests coincide. We may not even be working together, but we seek the same ends.

Take for example Maulvi Muhammed Nazir. A few months ago he was a Taliban commander based in South Waziristan, pledged to establishing sharia law and waging jihad on NATO forces in Afghanistan. A bad guy, right? Well yes he was and still is, but right now he is doing his best to run al Qaeda and the rest of the foreign terrorists out of his portion of Pakistan. Did he switch sides? Decidedly not. He has always been on one side, his own. And what he is doing represents our best chance yet at getting hold of Osama bin Laden.

The story starts last November when Nazir was named by the Taliban as their local branch manager in South Waziristan, replacing previous ineffective leader Haji Omar. Nazir had a great record in the company, having gotten his start at entry-level during the Soviet war in Afghanistan. He stayed on to back the Taliban government, and only quit Afghanistan when Taliban resistance crumbled. He went underground for three years in Pakistan, emerging in 2004 after a deal was reached with Islamabad giving tribal leaders a measure of local control. His elevation to management in 2006 was reportedly blessed by Mullah Omar personally.

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There is much more.

Robbins explains the hows and whys of the fight between the Taliban and the Uzbek in Pakistan. It is a sign that al Qaeda may have outworn its welcome in the region. That is a good sign and we should accept the red on red action for what it is, bad guys fighting each other.