Urban Tourniquet--Stopping the bleeding in Baghdad

Dave Kilcullen:

Gated communities in counterinsurgency are like tourniquets in surgery. They can stem a life-threatening hemorrhage, but they must be applied sparingly, released as often and as soon as possible, and they have side-effects that have to be taken into account. They are never a first choice. But, given the dire current situation in Baghdad, the “urban tourniquet” is the lesser of several evils, because it breaks the cycle of sectarian violence that has caused so much damage and human suffering in Iraq.

This cycle typically involves extremists infiltrating a Sunni neighborhood, intimidating the population, setting up a base (often in derelict houses), then using that base to launch attacks on the Shi’a community in surrounding districts. Shi’a militias then retaliate, striking out at the Sunni neighborhood, killing innocent people, provoking blood feuds and further retaliation. The pall of fear, and the external threat, cements the extremists’ hold over the local population. It allows them to pose as defenders of the people – albeit defending against a threat they themselves cynically created to manipulate the people.

If we cannot break this cycle, then we cannot reverse the deteriorating security situation, and whatever else we do at the political or strategic level, the war on the streets will be lost. Thus, this cycle represents a life-threatening hemorrhage that has to be staunched, even at the cost of short-term political pain.

The “gated community” stops the cycle of sectarian violence in three ways.

First, it makes it much harder for terrorists to infiltrate a community. We only establish perimeter security (checkpoints, T-walls, etc.) once the area has been cleared and secured, close relations are established with the population, and we have troops on the ground securing the district in conjunction with the people. Once the gated community goes in, this makes it much harder for extremists to re-enter.

Second, the perimeter controls make it much harder for terrorists to launch attacks from within that district, because they have to smuggle a car bomb or suicide vest out, through a limited number of controlled access points. This reduces extremists’ ability to use gated districts as a base to attack neighboring areas.

Third, if the terrorists do manage to mount an attack, the security controls protect the gated community against retaliation by “death squads”. This reduces fear within the community, alienates extremists from the population (since they can no longer pose as defenders) and emboldens people, who would otherwise be too intimidated, to tip off the security forces to enemy presence.

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He goes on to give some examples. While the media reported that Maliki stopped work on the walls, it did not report that he saw the wisdom of the project and it is back underway. As my regular readers know, I am a big advocate of having adequate force to space ratios in fighting an enemy who uses a raiding strategy. It is all about controlling space and the walled or gated communities make it easier to control space by denying access to those who do not belong. It is a way to protect the population. It works against crooks in this country and it works against terrorist in Iraq. Kilcullen's article is worth reading in full.