Iraqi army at 75 percent of targeted size

Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch:

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... what I'd like to highlight is the fact that what's significantly different today is the fact that there are 241,000 trained and equipped members of the Iraqi security force working operations across Iraq . And that is 75 percent of the desired end state for the Iraqi security force, and those units are in the fight and on the streets as we speak. And what I continue to be amazed with is the number of operations, company level and above, that are planned and executed and led by the Iraqi security forces, and we're at the point now where a third of the operations during that reporting period were independent Iraqi security force operations. And less than 28 percent were independent coalition force operations. Five hundred twelve company- level operations across Iraq during that reporting period. (See Scorpion below.)

The enemy is still out there, and the enemy still has a stated objective: derail the democratic process and discredit the Iraqi government. And we're in a specifically vulnerable period right now as the national unity government forms and he continues to conduct operations to inflame sectarian violence and drive a wedge between the Iraqi population.

Of note, he continues to target civilians -- 75 percent increase in civilian casualties during this operational period. We're at the point now where if you look at the casualties across Iraq as a result of the operations, 65 percent of them are civilians -- innocent Iraqi men, women and children -- 65 percent. Twenty percent are members of the Iraqi security force and 15 percent members of the coalition force.

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Up in the north we found during that reporting period attacks to be up 1 percent, but we're having significant success in finding weapons caches and in finding and clearing IEDs. During the initial reporting period in the north, 43 percent of the IEDs that were emplaced were found and cleared before they could detonate, and those that did detonate were only 20 percent effective.

Out west operations continue. We found a spike in attacks during that reporting period, but we still see this excitement on the part of the folks in Al Anbar to join the Iraqi security forces, both the Iraqi army and the Iraqi police.

As I've talked about before, the end state for Al Anbar is 11,330 police, and right now they're just over 3,000.

But there are no shortage of recruits in Al Anbar for the Iraqi police or for the Iraqi army.

Attacks down south were up 10 percent, but that was based on a handful of attacks anyway. And in Baghdad -- and I'll concentrate on Baghdad -- during that reporting period, attacks were down 10 percent and VBIEDs were down 50 percent, from 17 the week prior to eight during that reporting period.

There is not widespread violence across Iraq . There is not. Seventy-five percent of the attacks still take place in Baghdad , Al Anbar or Salahuddin. And in the other 15 provinces, they all average less than six attacks a day, and 12 of those provinces average less than two attacks a day. So the idea that Baghdad is the center of gravity for the enemy's operations is indeed a valid idea, but the concern that all of Iraq is experiencing widespread violence is incorrect.

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Effect of failure to agree on government

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The enemy wants to delay this as much as he can. Candidly, there'd be much less opportunity for sectarian violence if the Iraqis could form a national unity government sooner rather than later. So all optimism is that together they will form this government. And when the government is formed -- just like the elections, what we found is when the insurgents, the enemies realize that their efforts are for not, they back off. So when they couldn't stop the elections in January, they backed off. They tried again the referendum in October, backed off. The elections in December, they backed off. And we believe that once a national unity government is formed, then the incentive for the insurgency to incite sectarian violence goes away. So the sooner that happens, the better.

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There was no al Qaeda attempt to infiltrate 421 men into Green Zone security

... We proved the second report to be false, that there was not an incident we can record where 421 members of the al Qaeda Organization were trying to infiltrate the Green Zone. There was indeed information that was provided. There were lists that were exchanged. But in research, based on a conversation you and I had, we found that that is indeed an inaccurate report, and that never happened.

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There is much more from the weekly press briefing. The questions from the reporters continue to suggest a lack of comprehension of warfare and the setting of unreasonable standards by the media. If you want a sense of the incompetance of reporters in Iraq, read this entire briefing and compare it to the reports filed. Also look closely at the questions asked by the reporters.