The 4th ID and Turkey and the Fedayeen in Anbar
Chester has some interesting speculation along with The Belmont Club on why we did not get access to launch through Turkey.
My own opinion is that the granting of permission was too much of a political problem for the Turks. We did not have the votes in the Turkish parliament to get the approval.
There has been some statements by US forces representatives that our failure to secure that approval made it more difficult to destroy the Fedayeen in western Irag. After reading Tommy Franks' book American Soldier I understand better why that statement was made.
Contrary to most press reports, including recent ones in the NY Times, we did develop a very effective means of dealing with the Fedayeen on our march to Baghdad. Analyst at Centcom noticed that the Fedayeen had a pattern of launching attacks then returning to "puddle" around Baath Party or Iraqi intelligence facilities in the towns in which they operated. While news reports would indicate that these buildings were being attacked by precision bombings, Centcom did not disclose that they were targeting the "puddling" Fedayeen when they struck these places. The strikes were always done when the Fedayeen "puddle" was at its largest.
You also have to consider the effectiveness of Gen. Franks deception campaign which led Saddam to believe that the major attack was coming from the west through Turkey or Jordan. The Iraqis persisted in this belief even while US forces were gathering at the Karbala Gap. One of the reasons for this belief by Saddam et.al. is that Franks had hinted at such an attack with Arab leaders who he knew were in daily contact with Saddam. It should also be noted, with all the excitement about the Russians passing information to Iraq during the war, one of the critical pieces they gave them was a report that the 4th ID would be off loaded at Acuba, Jordan after the Turkey rejection where they would then launch their assault. This was consitent with the deception that Gen. Franks had made earlier.
Because Saddam believed that the major thrust would be coming from Jordan, it is logical to assume that he stationed more Fedayeen in the Anbar region. Since that area was not on the invasion route, we were unable to take advantage of the "puddling" Fedayeen effect in that area, and today's insurgents did not come under direct attack during major combat operations.
Since the Russian information corresponds so closely with Gen. Franks deception campaign, it is possible, that it could have been part of that campaign. If it was not it worked good enough to have been. The parts of the Russian information that were accurate, were probably already available to Saddam by watching the cable news programs on the war, where the former generals and colonels speculated on the invasion route and the enemy forces they would meet. This included the attack through the Karbala Gap.
That we did not address the Fedayeen puddles in Anbar after Baghdad failed, is a three year problem that we have only recent come to grips with.
Gateway Pundit has a long post with photos of the Russians getting awards from Saddam in early March 2003. While the Russians deny they gave the information to Saddam, apparently the documents refute that denial. Perhaps they do not want to admit how helpful they were to the US deception of Saddam.
My own opinion is that the granting of permission was too much of a political problem for the Turks. We did not have the votes in the Turkish parliament to get the approval.
There has been some statements by US forces representatives that our failure to secure that approval made it more difficult to destroy the Fedayeen in western Irag. After reading Tommy Franks' book American Soldier I understand better why that statement was made.
Contrary to most press reports, including recent ones in the NY Times, we did develop a very effective means of dealing with the Fedayeen on our march to Baghdad. Analyst at Centcom noticed that the Fedayeen had a pattern of launching attacks then returning to "puddle" around Baath Party or Iraqi intelligence facilities in the towns in which they operated. While news reports would indicate that these buildings were being attacked by precision bombings, Centcom did not disclose that they were targeting the "puddling" Fedayeen when they struck these places. The strikes were always done when the Fedayeen "puddle" was at its largest.
You also have to consider the effectiveness of Gen. Franks deception campaign which led Saddam to believe that the major attack was coming from the west through Turkey or Jordan. The Iraqis persisted in this belief even while US forces were gathering at the Karbala Gap. One of the reasons for this belief by Saddam et.al. is that Franks had hinted at such an attack with Arab leaders who he knew were in daily contact with Saddam. It should also be noted, with all the excitement about the Russians passing information to Iraq during the war, one of the critical pieces they gave them was a report that the 4th ID would be off loaded at Acuba, Jordan after the Turkey rejection where they would then launch their assault. This was consitent with the deception that Gen. Franks had made earlier.
Because Saddam believed that the major thrust would be coming from Jordan, it is logical to assume that he stationed more Fedayeen in the Anbar region. Since that area was not on the invasion route, we were unable to take advantage of the "puddling" Fedayeen effect in that area, and today's insurgents did not come under direct attack during major combat operations.
Since the Russian information corresponds so closely with Gen. Franks deception campaign, it is possible, that it could have been part of that campaign. If it was not it worked good enough to have been. The parts of the Russian information that were accurate, were probably already available to Saddam by watching the cable news programs on the war, where the former generals and colonels speculated on the invasion route and the enemy forces they would meet. This included the attack through the Karbala Gap.
That we did not address the Fedayeen puddles in Anbar after Baghdad failed, is a three year problem that we have only recent come to grips with.
Gateway Pundit has a long post with photos of the Russians getting awards from Saddam in early March 2003. While the Russians deny they gave the information to Saddam, apparently the documents refute that denial. Perhaps they do not want to admit how helpful they were to the US deception of Saddam.
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