Negotiations not in Ukraine's interest

 Nataliya Bugayova:

US policy should recognize that the Kremlin’s intent regarding Ukraine is maximalist, inflexible, and will not change in the foreseeable future. The West should stop expending resources trying to change a reality it does not control and focus on what it can shape plenty: denying Russia’s ability to wage a war against Ukraine.

Negotiations, ceasefires, and peace deals are not off-ramps but rather on-ramps for the Kremlin to renew its attack on Ukraine in the future under conditions that advantage Russia. They are means to the same ends—full control of Ukraine and eradication of Ukraine’s statehood and identity.

The vital US interest in preventing future Russian attacks on Ukraine can be best achieved by denying Russia the capability to carry out those attacks. The immediate requirement is preserving Ukraine’s momentum on the battlefield—accounting for a possible renewed offensive from Russia this winter—to ensure that Ukraine secures the most advantageous position possible. The West should also eliminate Russia’s ability to attack Ukraine in the future, including by denying Russia a military foothold in Ukraine from which to launch attacks, resisting "peace" deals that the Kremlin will use to buy time to reconstitute its forces, not empowering the Russian defense industrial complex with access to Western markets, and committing to building Ukraine's defensive capabilities over the long term.

Persistent Intent

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s intent toward Ukraine has not changed and likely never will. Putin’s intent will most likely outlast him—by design. Russia will use any territory it keeps in Ukraine to stage future attacks.

Putin’s goals in Ukraine always exceeded countering NATO or forcing Ukraine into neutrality. Despite Western assumptions, Putin has never been content with the territorial gains he made in Ukraine in 2014 because control of Ukraine, not its territory, has been his goal. The Kremlin has made clear in word and action over the past 20 years that it will accept nothing less than full control over Ukraine.

Putin has tried to gain control over Ukraine in increasingly extreme ways: by trying to dominate Ukraine’s politics in the 2000s and early 2010s; via military intervention in 2014 and the manipulative peace frameworks that followed.[1] He failed. He then resorted to a full-scale invasion in 2022, including a genocidal campaign to eradicate Ukrainian identity and statehood—an effort he is unlikely to abandon. [2]

Putin is preparing Russia for a long war. He was explicit on December 7 that the “special operation” will be “lengthy.”[3] He is likely setting conditions for additional mobilization.[4] He is orienting the Russian defense industrial base to support a prolonged war effort; his success in that effort may be limited, but his intent has been clear.[5] Russian authorities plan to prepare children for military service.[6]

Putin is doubling down on his maximalist objectives in Ukraine despite battlefield setbacks. Rhetorically, Putin is balancing between the extreme and moderate elements in his power circles, but he continues to push Russian forces to pursue offensive operations at extreme cost and to spotlight ultra-nationalists in his regime, such as Wagner Group sponsor Yevgeny Prigozhin.[7]

The Kremlin's intent to control Ukraine will likely outlast Putin, by design. Putin is indoctrinating his goals into Russian formal structures, legislation, information space, and society.[8]

Russian elites largely subscribe to this intent, differing only in their approach. Some seek complete victory in Ukraine at any cost.[9] Others seek victory but not at the expense of the remainders of Russia’s power, which they seek to preserve for selfish and ideological reasons.[10]

Anti-Ukraine and anti-West sentiment within the Russian population—already significant as demonstrated by the population's explicit or tacit support of the war—will likely only grow as Kremlin propaganda intensifies, Russian battlefield losses accrue, and Russians who oppose the war attrit under growing repression.[11]

The inflexibility of the Kremlin’s intent goes beyond Ukraine. Russia’s goal to completely subordinate the Belarussian military likewise remains unchanged.[12] This effort has been impeded by Russian setbacks in Ukraine, which provided Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko room to maneuver. If Russia solidifies its gains in Ukraine, the Kremlin will most certainly try to complete the absorption of Belarus and—critically—link its military gains between Ukraine and Belarus. Moldova has been also high on the Kremlin’s list for years.[13] Over the long term, the Kremlin could try to link its territorial gains beyond Ukraine by integrating other territories that Russia illegally occupies, such as Transnistria. This would impose dramatically different military posture requirements on NATO, which would be especially challenging if the US is required to act in the Pacific.

Putin’s goals regarding the United States have not changed either. Putin made clear in a recent speech that he still intends to "collapse the Western hegemony."[14] Stabilizing Russia’s gains in Ukraine would provide the Kremlin with additional bandwidth to pursue this goal.

For these reasons, the West’s attempts to change Putin’s mind on Ukraine via negotiations and efforts to "reset" the relationship with Russia always had little chance to succeed. The West’s actions have been a factor but never the core driver in Putin’s foreign policy.[15]

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There is much more.

 Bugayova is writing at ISW.  While Putin is now forced to admit the Russians are in a long slog in Ukraine, the early days of the way seen in Russia and the West as a likely Russian victory.  That is certainly no longer the case.  The Russians underestimated both Ukraine and the support it is getting from the US and its NATO  allies.  The western powers now see the war as an opportunity to weaken the threat posed by Russia on Europe.  Indeed, Russia is a much weaker conventional threat to NATO than it was before the war.  Military losses by Russia in Ukraine have been significant and have exposed ineptitude from Putin on down to troops in combat.  Since it is not a rational war and is one of aggression it will be difficult to resolve it through negotiations.  While Ukraine and NATO have frustrated Putin's military they are not close to breaking his will or that of his supporters within Russia.