Obama's policy against terrorist is to accept losses in the homeland
President Obama was, last week, forced to publicly ask (and answer) the question: Would calling the violence that has swept America–indeed the West–by the name “radical Islam” do anything to help defeat ISIL? It’s a straw-man question, ready for him and his fellow travelers in liberal globalism to burn with the answer, “No, it wouldn’t.”This comes from the fact that the Democrat leadership hates the Re[publicans more than they hate the people trying to kill us. With ISIL they are just trying not to lose, because that would be politically bad for them. But they are not willing to do what it takes to utterly destroy them and stop their killing through mass murder attacks in the US. They find those mass murder attacks useful in pushing their agenda against the 2nd Amendment.
In fact, Obama asked the wrong question, and he did it on purpose. The president created a false dividing line between foreign enemies and domestic ones, with domestic enemies falling into a category of “hate” and “shooting” crimes, while anything related to the word “Islamic” is placed outside our borders. This keeps him from having to answer the more pressing question: What is he and his administration doing about domestic Islamic terror?
The answer is chilling because it involves a principle called “acceptable loss.” In military terms, the principle means when a commander has to decide which option among available choices will lead to winning the objective, while frequently minimizing losses. Even in wartime, political considerations influence–and frequently override–purely military or investigative use of raw intelligence (read CIA analyst John Ehrman’s takedown of historian Joseph E. Persico’s book Roosevelt’s Secret War).
What this means is that the president, and in general the intelligence community, certainly knew that ISIS (which he calls “ISIL”) and its 9/11 predecessor al Queda have what the Brookings Institute called “differing threat profiles.” Without quoting large passages from this think-tank paper, I will summarize: Al Queda favored large, spectacular operations planned in complete secrecy by directly controlling terror networks. ISIS seeks to control territory and export its ideology–I will quote a small piece:The Islamic State’s strategy is to control territory, steadily consolidating and expanding its position. Part of this is ideological: it wants to create a government where Muslims can live under Islamic law (or the Islamic State’s twisted version of it). Part of this is inspirational: by creating an Islamic state, it electrifies many Muslims who then embrace the group. And part of it is basic strategy: by controlling territory it can build an army, and by using its army it can control more territory.ISIS relies much more heavily on–and is much more successful using–social networking to recruit and direct attackers on the West. These are usually people who move in and out of their host or home countries to areas where ISIS has a presence. Therefore, we can reasonably assume the government knew of Tashfeen Malik, Syed Rizwan Farook, and Omar Mateen–of course they knew.
The administration, and the Democratic Party in general, accepts these losses in pursuit of what it considers a higher value objective: the elimination–of severe erosion–of the Second Amendment in the United States. It’s a given that they can’t (at this time) repeal the Second Amendment, but I don’t think that’s their short or even medium term strategy. It could be a very-long-term goal, like capturing the enemy’s capital and its government’s unconditional surrender.
The short-term goal is to achieve some construct for the bypass, elimination, or erosion of other Constitutionally-guaranteed rights that defend the Second Amendment. So if the government can suspend the Sixth Amendment, which guarantees due process, from applying to the Second Amendment, that’s a huge win. Even if those protections are suspended for a small group of people at first, it’s a hole–a tear–in the fabric of our guaranteed rights. A few Supreme Court decisions (cherry-picked to coincide with the right mix of justices) and that hole becomes stare decisis, legal precedent for the next decision.