Internal weakness of Russian military exposed

 ISW:

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The Kremlin now faces a deeply unstable equilibrium. The Lukashenko-negotiated deal is a short-term fix, not a long-term solution, and Prigozhin’s rebellion exposed severe weaknesses in the Kremlin and Russian MoD. Suggestions that Prigozhin’s rebellion, the Kremlin’s response, and Lukashenko’s mediation were all staged by the Kremlin are absurd. The imagery of Putin appearing on national television to call for the end of an armed rebellion and warning of a repeat of the 1917 revolution – and then requiring mediation from a foreign leader to resolve the rebellion – will have a lasting impact. The rebellion exposed the weakness of the Russian security forces and demonstrated Putin’s inability to use his forces in a timely manner to repel an internal threat and further eroded his monopoly on force. Prigozhin’s rapid drive towards Moscow ridiculed much of the Russian regular forces – and highlighted to any and all security figures, state-owned enterprises, and other key figures in the Russian government that private military forces separate from the central state can achieve impressive results. Wagner’s drive also showcased the degradation of Russia’s military reserves, which are almost entirely committed to fighting in Ukraine, as well as the dangers of reliance on inexperienced conscripts to defend Russia’s borders. The Kremlin struggled to respond quickly in the information space and residents in Rostov-on-Don residents did not oppose Wagner and in some cases greeted them warmly – not inherently demonstrating opposition to Putin but at minimum acceptance of Prigozhin’s actions.[48] Finally, the Kremlin’s apparent surprise at Prigozhin’s move does not reflect well on Russia’s domestic intelligence service, the FSB. Prigozhin consistently escalated his rhetoric against the Russian MoD prior to his armed rebellion and Putin failed to mitigate this risk.[49] We cannot and will not speculate on the concrete impacts of Prigozhin’s rebellion and the Kremlin’s weak response and are not forecasting an imminent collapse of the Russian government, as some have done. Nonetheless, Prigozhin’s rebellion and the resolution of the events of June 23 and 24 - though not necessarily the Prigozhin/Kremlin struggle writ large - will likely substantially damage Putin’s government and the Russian war effort in Ukraine.
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The war in Ukraine has already exposed much of the military weakness of Russia.  It was a war that Putin and many in the West thought would be over in a matter of days with the fall of Ukraine.  That did not happen and Russian forces have been bogged down and put on the defensive in recent months in Ukraine.  The attempts to support the war in Ukraine further weakened internal controls within Russia.  The Russian troop losses have been significant requiring reinforcements and have tested Russian reserves.  This left Putin with fewer options to deal with the Prigozhin rebellion.  The fact that he needed Prigozhen's forces in Ukraine, to begin with, was some evidence of Russia's internal weakness.

See, also:

 Prigozhin’s attempted coup will change Russia forever

Regardless of whether or not Yevgeny Prigozhin stands down his coup, the chaos in Russia has seen the country cross a rubicon. The Russian state will emerge both more militarised and fascistic whatever happens. It may be true, as Mr Prigozhin claimed, that “not a drop” of blood was spilled on his march to Moscow, but nothing positive will emerge from the truce. Either Prigozhin’s freikorps will claim more power or Vladimir Putin’s crackdown will be hideous. A more nationalist Russia results either way.

Rather than Russia somehow returning to “normal” the coup has confirmed the country in the image of the puppet Donetsk and Luhansk people’s republics in occupied Ukraine, where warlords, mercenaries and mass mobilisation rule. The attempted overthrow of the state has shown that our lingering assumptions about what we have long called Putin’s Russia need to be re-assessed. Power abhors a vacuum and it was only for so long that the weirdness of Putin’s semi-isolation in the Kremlin would go unchallenged by men on the front line like Prigozhin.

Indeed, the coup marks the definitive turn of a page in Russian history: from an era of oligarchs such as Roman Abramovich, still a lingering presence at the start of the invasion, to the era of warlords with private armies, like Prigozhin. Their numbers have mushroomed since the assault on Kyiv and now include battalions linked to the Russian energy giant Gazprom.
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And:

 Russia is still on the verge of disintegration, even if Prigozhin turned his men back

This is the beginning of the end for Vladimir Putin regardless of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s decision to turn around last night. That may seem an odd thing to say. But Putin’s power rests on projection, on propaganda, on the image of invincibility. Now, all of a sudden, the curtain has been snatched back, revealing the Wizard of Oz as a small, mediocre, frightened man.
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Look closer, though, and that unity begins to look provisional. The siloviki, the strongmen around Putin, sense his vulnerability, and are making alliances in preparation for the transition. The generals and admirals who hold the other half of the nuclear codes could still be manoeuvring. Perhaps nine of Russia’s regions and republics could be ready to call independence referendums, having had enough of a Muscovite clique which seizes their natural resources, conscripts their young men, and offers them nothing in return.
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And:

 Ukrainian intelligence predicts more conflicts in Russia after RDK raids into Belgorod Oblast

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As a result of the raids by pro-Ukrainian groups, the Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK) and the Freedom of Russia Legion, on the territory of Belgorod Oblast, the Russian General Staff was forced to redeploy army units from the occupied territories of Ukraine and from the deep rear to the border areas of Russia.

Now, the Russians are conducting active filtration activities in these areas, involving the FSB and the police.

Yusov emphasized that all RDK raids are an internal Russian process. And according to the HUR's estimates, based on many indicators, it is possible to predict that conflicts inside Russia will only intensify. They will occur not only in border areas, as Yusov explained, but conflicts have the potential to emerge across Russia, and have various facets: religious, ethnic, political, and economic.
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And:

 Flights leaving Moscow sell out as Wagner troops descend, and unconfirmed reports say Putin might have left the capital for St. Petersburg

And:

 Media: Jets belonging to Russian elite leave Moscow

And:

 Mass riots by prisoners in Moscow's remand prisons reported

Amid an armed confrontation between Wagner PMC and Russian Defense Ministry troops, mass prisoner riots have broken out in Moscow's Vodnik and Butyrka pre-trial detention centers, Russian media Avtozak LIVE and SOTA reported on June 24.
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And:

 Russia mutiny: Rebel Wagner leader 'to move to Belarus' after calling off advance on Moscow to avoid 'bloodshed'

The Kremlin says criminal charges against Yevgeny Prigozhin will be dropped and none of the Wagner Group fighters will be prosecuted as part of the deal to end the armed mutiny.