Ukraine defensive operations slow Russian advances
The Ukrainian defense of Bakhmut is likely a strategically sound effort despite its costs for Ukraine. While the costs associated with Ukraine’s continued defense of Bakhmut are significant and likely include opportunity costs related to potential Ukrainian counter-offensive operations elsewhere, Ukraine would also have paid a significant price for allowing Russian troops to take Bakhmut easily. Bakhmut itself is not operationally or strategically significant but had Russian troops taken it relatively rapidly and cheaply they could have hoped to expand operations in ways that could have forced Ukraine to construct hasty defensive positions in less favorable terrain. One must also not dismiss the seemingly “political” calculus of committing to the defense of Bakhmut lightly—Russian forces occupy more than 100,000 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory including multiple Ukrainian cities and are inflicting atrocities on Ukrainian civilians in occupied areas. It is not unreasonable for political and military leaders to weigh these factors in determining whether to hold or cede particular population concentrations. Americans have not had to make such choices since 1865 and should not be quick to scorn considerations that would be very real to them were American cities facing such threats.
Ukrainian forces have previously employed a similar gradual attrition model to compel Russian operations in certain areas to culminate after months of suffering high personnel and equipment losses in pursuit of marginal tactical gains. Russian troops spent months attempting to grind through effective Ukrainian defenses in Severodonetsk and Lysychansk in the early summer of 2022 and captured Lysychansk only after a controlled Ukrainian withdrawal from the area.[1] The capture of Lysychansk and the Luhansk Oblast administrative border, however, quickly proved to be operationally insignificant for Russian forces, and the ultimate result of the Ukrainian defense of the area was the forced culmination of the Russian offensive in Luhansk Oblast, leading to the overall stagnation of Russian offensive operations in Donbas in the summer and fall of 2022. Ukrainian defense of Bakhmut will likely contribute to a similar result—Russian forces have been funneling manpower and equipment into the area since May 2022 and have yet to achieve any operationally significant advances that seriously threaten the Ukrainian defense of the area. ISW continues to re-evaluate its assessment that the Russian offensive on Bakhmut may be culminating but continues to assess that Ukrainian forces are effectively pinning Russian troops, equipment, and overall operational focus on Bakhmut, thus inhibiting Russia’s ability to pursue offensives elsewhere in the theater.
The West has contributed to Ukraine’s inability to take advantage of having pinned Russian forces in Bakhmut by slow-rolling or withholding weapons systems and supplies essential for large-scale counteroffensive operations.
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The slow rolling of equipment to Ukraine is likely a reflection of the west's own concerns about its equipment and armament inventories and the cost of replacement. There is clearly some movement by some NATO allies to provide armor for a coming Ukraine offensive. The US, however, is resisting the delivery of its main battle tanks, while Britain, Germany, and others are offering some of their tanks, and the numbers being discussed are not that large. Meanwhile, Russia has had to resort to some of its antique battle tanks because of early losses in the war. The effectiveness of the US and NATO anti-tank weapons early in the war was significant in slowing Russian operations.
ISW also reports:
The Sun reported that US intelligence estimates total Russian military casualties in Ukraine as 188,000 as of January 20, suggesting a possible 47,000 Russians killed in action in less than a year of fighting.[18] The historical ratio of wounded to killed in war is 3:1, suggesting that Russian casualties in Ukraine thus far are close to the total US deaths in the Vietnam War.[19] The US National Archives estimates that the total US battle deaths in Vietnam is roughly 58,000 across eight years of fighting.[20] Soviet forces suffered 15,000 deaths across nine years of war in Afghanistan, a threshold that the UK Ministry of Defense assessed Russian casualties surpassed in May 2022 after just three months of hostilities.[21]
The attempts of Putin to increase mobilization and the use of prisoners as a mercenary force do not appear effective to date. As I have noted before, probably the main accomplishment of using mercenaries has been to reduce the prison population within Russia without improving the Russian position in the battle space. Not counted in the battle casualties is the number of people who have fled Russia to avoid being sucked up in the mobilization. I suspect the losses in this area have also impacted the Russian economy and war effort.
See, also:
Mobilized Russian soldiers sent to frontline without food, equipment, says Luhansk governor
And:
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US officials also released an image, dated November 18, which they say showed rail cars travelling between Russia and North Korea to supply rockets and missiles for the Wagner Group.
"The arms transfers from are in direct violation of United Nations security council resolution," said Kirby.
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And:
Leopard 2: Inside the German beer-balancing tank and why Ukraine desperately wants them
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