Russian command and control problems leads to casualties

 ISW:

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Complaints from Russian milbloggers indicate that Russian forces continue to rely on cell phones and non-secure civilian technologies for core military functions—serious breaches of operational security (OPSEC).[50] Several milbloggers criticized the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) for attempting to restrict the use of cell phones and Telegram and accused military leadership of being out of touch with the value of technology in modern warfare.[51] Fundamental OPSEC practices prohibit soldiers‘ use of insecure personal devices for military functions. However, the inability of the Russian MoD to provide, integrate, or generate support for secure, effective military alternatives indicates the inadequacy of the Russian military industry and the Russian MoD. Milblogger critiques of fundamental OPSEC practices indicate significant discipline issues and a disconnect between Russian commanders, Russian MoD policy, and the common soldier. Separate milblogger criticism of MoD efforts to place responsibility for military failures - such as the January 1 Ukrainian strike against a Russian Base in Makiivka - on poorly disciplined troops who use personal devices has likely further decreased the legitimacy of the Russian MoD’s OPSEC policies among many Russian soldiers to the detriment of Russian forces OPSEC and overall effectiveness.[52] Ongoing discussions within the Russian nationalist community suggest that Russian officials are losing credibility among line soldiers and failing to dispel even basic OPSEC myths.[53] The Russian military’s reliance on a scrambled blend of hastily-trained mobilized forces, convicts, volunteers, and militia groups with inconsistent command structures is likely contributing to the decline in professionalism in the Russian military.

Russian milbloggers continue to call attention to Russian command and control failures due to the appointment of newly mobilized civilians to leadership roles.[54] A milblogger claimed on January 21 that such “completely incompetent” officers command platoons exclusively of mobilized soldiers.[55] The milblogger questioned why Russian forces would even bother creating new units of mobilized men at all while existent conventional units remain understaffed and suffer continued losses.[56] The milblogger claimed that Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) and Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) forces attempted to create units comprised entirely of mobilized soldiers months before Russian forces did so and that these units’ poor performance demonstrated the failure of such an idea.[57] Russian milbloggers correctly assessed that Russian reliance on poorly trained, newly-mobilized recruits for command positions, as opposed to drawing commanders from Russia’s diminished officer cadre or promoting experienced soldiers and NCOs to NCO and command positions, severely hinders the effectiveness of mobilized forces. The inexperience of mobilized soldiers serving in command positions likely contributed to the poor decisions that enabled a highly destructive Ukrainian strike on a Russian base in Makiivka on January 1, as ISW has previously reported.[58]
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Russia appears to lack enough secure communication equipment for the troops and also has elevated troops to leadership positions for which they are not qualified.  The combination of the two is leading to increased casualties.  It looks like the Russian central command is desperate to get troops into combat who are not prepared for it.  This just compounds the problems they have had since launching the ill-advised invasion of Ukraine.