You need the tribes to control Iraq

Washington Times:

Of all the tactical moves Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki made in March to wrest control of southern Iraq from Shi'ite extremists, none was more important than his government's meetings with tribal sheiks.

Behind the scenes, as his troops fought street by street to gain control of the city of Basra, Mr. al-Maliki reached out to Bani Tamim.

Tamim is one of the largest Arab tribes in the Middle East. Its Shi'ite-Sunni mix is especially influential in southern Iraq, where Iranian-backed bands of militants regularly launch attacks on allied forces and impose their will on much of Basra.

Mr. al-Maliki's strategy, U.S. sources said, was to meet with tribal leaders at the same time he was ordering troops into Iraq's second-largest city. He wanted to persuade the tribal leaders to join his risky counterterrorism campaign in which a Shi'ite-dominated government was moving against Shi'ite fighters, some led by firebrand cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.

"They have been working with the Tamim tribe, one of the largest tribes in that area, in terms of strategic engagement. And they've been helping them," said retired Army Gen. Jack Keane, an adviser to Gen. David H. Petraeus, the U.S. commander in Iraq. Gen. Keane was meeting with Gen. Petraeus and other leaders in Iraq as the al-Maliki government was planning its surprise offensive in Basra.

"Maliki worked directly with the Tamim leader," Gen. Keane told The Washington Times. "He worked with him in terms of providing Iraqi security forces to assist them and also some financial support."

Gen. Keane added, "They are getting people to turn in the militias. That was the purpose of it, just like we did with the Sunnis in Anbar and Diyala provinces and other places."

Critics in the news media initially met the al-Maliki offensive with broad skepticism, but later reports acknowledged that government forces performed relatively well in taking control of much of Basra.

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Gen. Keane added, "The most significant strategic objective in 2008 is to stabilize the south and counter the Iran influence in the south. Maliki began that somewhat impulsively, as we all know, but that was the beginning of a campaign that is going to last well into the fall and it's doing fine. Basra is coming along. Maliki is probably the strongest politically he's ever been because he's taking on the Shia extremists."

Critics of the postwar planning say the Bush administration did not place enough emphasis on engaging Iraq's millions of tribesmen, whose loyalty to their sheiks often trumps allegiance to the government.

In his new book, "War and Decision," Douglas J. Feith, who was undersecretary of defense for policy during the Iraq war planning, concedes, "The crippling disorder we call the insurgency was not anticipated with any precision, by either intelligence analysts or policy officials."

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"A key to ending the insurgency is getting Iraqi tribal leaders to decide that it's better for them to join the political process than to engage in anti-government or anti-U.S. violence," Mr. Feith said in an interview.

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The Marines, Mr. Russell said, went so far as to bring American police officers to Anbar province to show them how to impose security, street by street.

Begun in Anbar, the on-the-fly doctrine spread to places such as the northern border town of Tal Afar, which the Army freed of extremist control in 2006.

By 2007, the sheiks of Anbar were renouncing al Qaeda and ordering young Sunnis to fight the terrorist group.

"Maliki is applying some of the same lessons in Basra," Mr. Russell said, " 'I'm sending in troops. The troops are going to stay there and I'm engaging the local people, the tribal leaders.'"

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The key to controlling Iraq has always been the tribes. That is how Saddam was able to survive too. The Marines and the anthropologist figured it out and it has spread across the country. Who knows if the Democrats will ever acknowledge that we are winning, but the facts on teh ground say we are.