Russia reinforce troops near Bakhmut, engages in religious repression in occupied area

 ISW:

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The reported Russian reinforcements to the Bakhmut area suggest that Russian forces are continuing to concentrate offensive capabilities there despite an assessed wider effort to reprioritize operations to prepare for potential Ukrainian counteroffensives. Russian forces have also recently transferred elements of the 6th Guards Motorized Rifle Division (20th Guards Combined Arms Army, Western Military District) to an unspecified area north of Bakhmut, likely from positions along the Svatove-Kupyansk line.[10] The movement of Russian forces from other sectors of the front to the Bakhmut area is likely a response to persisting Russian concerns about the stability of frontlines in the area amid Wagner Group’s continued degradation in the offensive to capture Bakhmut.[11] These concerns were likely more pronounced in recent days that saw limited Ukrainian gains around Bakhmut and may have prompted further Russian concentration on the tactical offensive effort in the area. The reinforcements are also likely meant to enhance Wagner’s ability to capture the remainder of Bakhmut rapidly and present a Russian tactical victory before possible setbacks during a Ukrainian counteroffensive operation. ISW assesses that the Russian military command likely decided to reprioritize operations and sustainment efforts in recent weeks to prepare for potential Ukrainian counteroffensive operations, although the continued concentration on Bakhmut may suggest that immediate tactical concerns could be undermining the larger effort.[12]
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Russian forces reportedly shut down another Ukrainian evangelical Christian church in Mariupol likely as part of a wider systematic religious persecution campaign in occupied Ukraine. Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko reported that Russian forces seized the Ukrainian Christian Evangelical Church of the Holy Trinity in Mariupol and are using the church to house 10 to 30 Russian servicemen.[34] ISW reported on April 9 that Protestants suffered two-thirds of all of the reported religious repression events in occupied Mariupol.[35] ISW identified that Russian occupation officials most commonly persecute members of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and Protestants, particularly evangelical Baptists.[36]
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The Russians' attempt to take Bakhmet remains a mystery.   It remains a meat grinder for its troops while not enhancing their strategic objectives in Ukraine.  Pushing more troops into that area while anticipating a Ukraine offensive does not appear to be a sound objective.  A tactical victory there would not be particularly meaningful.

The attack on religious groups is likely because it sees them as gatherings of resistance to Russian occupation and because religious freedom is inconsistent with their Russification efforts.  There have been attempts to suppress religious freedom within Russia too.

See, also:

Most brutal fights near Bakhmut and Marinka; three Russian electronic warfare stations and two munitions warehouses destroyed – General Staff

The enemy forces focus their primary efforts on the Lyman, Bakhmut, Avdiivka and Marinka fronts. Forty-four combat clashes took place there during the day. The defenders continue to destroy Russian warehouses and equipment.
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And:

 Ukraine's Armed Forces advancing near Bakhmut for 3 days, Russians in stupor – Ground Forces Commander

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"Dear brothers, dear heroes, today you are creating the latest history. This is another chapter in our war, and it began just three days ago, when you launched an offensive. By your actions, you have stalled the entire Russian army because the Russians do not know where the offensive is, where our general offensive is, or what is happening near Bakhmut, which they already considered theirs and said that it was already actually surrounded. Moreover, now the situation is completely different."
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According to Syrskyi, the defenders of Bakhmut use the "active defence" principle, thus destroying the Russian plans, who still have "more resources".
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And:

 Army of Drones in action: Ukrainian UAVs destroy Russian Zmei Gorynich demining systems

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Quote: "The Army of Drones of the 59th Mechanised Brigade named after Yakiv Handziuk and powerful Pegasus kamikaze drones in action. These UAVs were purchased thanks to your donations through United 24.

The result is the destruction of two enemy UR-83P demining systems, the so-called Zmei Gorynich. As well as [the destruction of] 1,300 kilograms of TNT. "

Details: According to Fedorov, the Russians used the systems to clear the fields for the offensive and destroy the shelters of Ukrainian soldiers.

"Now Zmei Gorynich is a pile of rubbish," summarises the deputy prime minister.

Background: According to Armiya Inform, the UR-83P Zmei Gorynich demining system is usually delivered to its destination by wheeled vehicles.

With a total mass of just over 1.8 tons, it is capable of throwing a UZP-83 charge weighing 1,380 kilograms at a distance of up to half a kilometre. The detonation of such a bomb can create a passage in a mine barrage with a length of more than 110 metres and a width of 6 to 12 metres.
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And:

 Yes, Russia Is Using Ancient Tanks in Combat in Ukraine. But Not as Tanks.

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... sources in the Russian military say that T-54s are indeed being deployed into combat—supposedly used not so much as tanks, but as armored artillery vehicles firing indirect shells at distant targets.
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The post states a company of T-54Bs and T-55s (ordinarily 10 or 13 tanks in the Russian military) was transferred to an artillery regiment active in southern Ukraine. Despite a T-54 ordinarily requiring a crew of four (commander, driver, gunner, loader), the post claims these T-54s were operated by crews of three, presumably due to the limited need to simultaneously move and shoot. Reportedly, the crews were drawn from both the artillery and tank branches—instead of just the latter—and received just one week of training. Elsewhere, he posts that there already exist artillery firing tables for the T-54/55 and their 100-millimeter guns.

A picture posted later shows a T-54 concealed in a muddy wilderness area with a two-layered “cope cage” of armor over the turret, probably in the hopes of protecting against attacking drones and anti-tank missiles with tandem charges.
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Subsequent posts by the same blog indicate that Russia originally intended to use slightly less outdated T-62M tanks in the artillery role, but that those ended up being assigned to frontline units with an assault roles.

The technical condition of the T-62Ms—which have been modernized with reinforced BDD laminated BDD armor on the front turret, and were mostly dispatched to the Kherson region—is described as being at “bottom level.”

Tarasenko writes that many T-62Ms were left behind during a personnel rotation and ultimately abandoned when Russia withdrew from the west bank of the Dnieper River in November 2022, leaving them to be captured by Ukrainian forces.
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And:

 Tank assault didn’t work for Putin. Zelensky’s armoured fist will hit much harder

The broad Russian offensive of February 2022 was a failure: but that failure was due to the weaknesses of Vladimir Putin’s Russia. It should be viewed in that light rather than a lesson in modern manoeuvre warfare.

Russian military failure in the field was down to four factors.

Firstly there was overconfidence. Based on the successful takeover of the Crimean peninsula in 2014, the Russian expectation was for a swift collapse of Ukrainian resistance and a level of cooperation and collaboration by the Ukrainian population that would make the “special military operation” – as the Russians call it – more of a liberation. That overconfidence was also based on a population estimate of the number of Russian speakers and an assumption that “if they speak Russian, they must support us”.

For that reason, the Russian advance was meant to be a combined all arms operation to swiftly overwhelm the Ukrainians and seize their centre of gravity, the city of Kiev, decapitating the leadership and creating a benign and permissive environment for the Russians to absorb the territory. But things did not play out that way.

The second failure factor was deep levels of theft and corruption at every level. The Russian military on paper was a modern and potentially effective machine with some logistic vulnerabilities, but overall fit for purpose. In the real world, money spent on providing rations for Russian troops was in fact stolen, and out of date dog food was substituted for high calorific combat rations. Some of the money to buy tyres for wheeled combat vehicles was spent on Chinese knock-offs that perished in the sub-zero temperatures, and the rest of the budget pocketed. The explosive in the reactive armour on many of the Russian tanks was stolen and replaced with sand and in the field, vital supplies and spares were sold off. As recently as last month a Russian colonel was caught selling off seven T-90 tank engines.

The third factor was the sheer incompetence of the Russian military leadership. Russian operational security was compromised, and where the paratroopers and special forces of the VDV airborne landed they were ambushed and slaughtered with losses as high as 90 per cent.

By feeding in their armoured brigades piecemeal, the Russians provided an ideal target for the hit and run tactics of the Ukrainians, well supplied from early on with handheld NLAW antitank weapons from the UK. This protracted slaughter saw much of Russia's new class of “kontraktniki” professional soldiers killed, wounded or captured. From then on, poorly trained cannon-fodder replaced them in the fight against an increasingly experienced enemy. Mass attacks by armour into well sited antitank screens and human wave attacks into a storm of artillery and small arms fire – like something from the worst parts of WWI – further depleted the already thin manpower resource.

The fourth factor was logistic failure at every level. Poor lines of communication meant logistics were woeful. Tanks ran out of fuel and were abandoned. Units ran out of food and simply surrendered. Ammunition was fired off so quickly that stocks ran out. Newly manufactured ammunition – which the UK assesses is being used now – has a failure rate of up to 50 per cent, doubtless due to corner-cutting so that money can be stolen.
865
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And:

The Offensive Before the Offensive: Ukraine Strikes Behind Russian Lines

And: 

Russians suffer from lack of doctors in occupied territories