What is needed in Afghanistan?

Ralph Peters:

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We'd need hundreds of thousands of troops and decades of commitment to attempt to nation-build where there's no nation to build. Old-think counterinsurgency theory demands a lot of troops, plentiful resources -- and time.

But we haven't got the troops. Our resources are squandered. And time's running out, with the war-virgin brats on Team Obama squealing, "Are we there yet? When are we going to get there?"

One faction in our military believes that Gates fired McKiernan because he can't fire Petraeus -- yet.

Will McChrystal, our special operator without peer, be allowed to do what's necessary -- and to jettison huggy-bear programs that sound good but don't work? Can he focus on the destruction of our enemies? Can he throw away the book?

McChrystal's boss, Petraeus, remains the key. If this supremely talented man can overcome his preconceptions about the fight we're in, he and McChrystal may be the team that rescues another failing effort. But Petraeus has to think like a Pashtun tribesman, not a Princeton man.

As this column has pointed out repeatedly, Afghanistan's worthless in and of itself. Securing hundreds of premedieval villages means local progress at the cost of strategic paralysis. To fight a mobile enemy, we need to be hypermobile. The dirt doesn't matter.

That's where special-ops come in. Our efforts should concentrate on supporting our black-program professionals. It's their fight. We need fewer troops, but a clear vision and more guts.

McChrystal needs to question all the "givens." And he needs to dismantle the NATO pleasure-palace that only impedes the war effort. Our commitment must be streamlined, not fattened and diffused. We need to focus on what must be done, casting aside what just seems nice to do.

Getting it right in Afghanistan -- and across the frontier in Pakistan -- means digging fewer wells and forcing our enemies to dig more graves. I'll bet on McChrystal to get it right. If he's allowed to.

Afghanistan's long been called "the graveyard of empires." Today, it's becoming the graveyard of reputations. Worried by President Obama's campaign promises to "fix" Afghanistan, the administration's already looking for scapegoats as the situation worsens.

A good soldier sent on the wrong mission, Gen. McKiernan was only the first victim.

I share Ralph's concern about turning the tribes of Afghanistan, but I had similar concerns in Iraq. I think he overlooks the effects of the aggressive attacks on al Qaeda in Iraq after the troop surge gave us enough force to protect key areas and still attack the enemy. Gen. McChristal was responsible for much of the head hunting while Gen. Odinero was attacking the enemy sanctuaries.

The NY Times has had some good reporting on the troops moving into Taliban's turf. I think they can have the effect of "fixing" the enemy in place so that special forces troops can deal with them more effectively.

NATO has not been an effective partner on Afghanistan for the most part. While the Brits are starting to show some aggressiveness they are still undermanned with little expectation that more of their troops are on the way. The Canadians have also been aggressive in their spots, but there are still too few of them to ave an adequate force to space ratio.

The addition of American forces can make a difference as the Marine units have demonstrated. This is a point where I disagree with Ralph. The special forces do have an important role to play, but I think the additional troops can make them more effective.