Baathist were not looking for long term victory
Steven den Beste:
...
"The question is whether the damage will be enough to make the insurgency collapse. I am finding myself increasingly to believe that it will, because the insurgency was fighting a short war. It was operating in ways which made it not be resilient. It was already operating at highly unsustainable levels and may recently have been losing steam anyhow through exhaustion. It's difficult to see how it could recover from this kind of blow.
"Loss of their nominal leader, and his ignominious surrender, will affect morale. All the arrests will make those who are still free become fearful. Worry about what else we might have learned from papers captured with Saddam, or by interrogating those we just arrested, or by interrogating Saddam himself, won't help that any. With every new arrest, more documents will be taken. Lower level operatives who were not compromised may have lost all their upper contacts and have no way to reconnect. Many remaining stockpiles of arms and money will have been captured with so many high level arrests. Others may have been compromised but might be left in place as bait for traps. The Baathist insurgency has suffered massive damage operationally. Its reputation will also suffer massive damage, reducing fear of it and support for it. Because of that, we'll get more and better tips about the insurgency, and the insurgency will have a much harder time recruiting replacements and repairing their organization.
"All of this may be enough to bring about what amounts to another rout. In military terms, a 'rout' happens when unit cohesion fails, and men in a unit cease to try to survive as a unit and concern themselves only with surviving as individuals. In the Napoleonic era or during the American civil war, if a battlefield unit routed it would mean that they would cease to move in formation and cease obeying orders, and would become a disordered mob running for their lives. Many would even throw away their weapons and packs so they could run faster.
"It's something that can cascade. If a few men in a unit all lose heart and break ranks, then if other men in the unit are shaken they might go, too. A unit which sees a friendly unit rout might itself rout. Units which see a lot of friendly units rout almost certainly will go with them."
den Beste on word abuse
" 'Unilateralism' is a term which the transnationalists have used pejoratively to label many of the actions of the US and its closest allies, who should instead of have embraced "multilateralism". Taken literally, the application of those two terms has been nonsense, since America had the support of many nations both in Afghanistan and in Iraq. But they're being used as code words, with new meanings. 'Multilateralism' means submitting yourself to world governance and ignoring your own narrow self interest; 'unilateralism' means a refusal to sacrifice sovereignty and an insistence on acting out of self-interest.
...
"The US had long been viewed as the biggest problem facing transnationalism, for there seemed little hope that Americans would lose faith in the system which had been so successful. There was an ongoing effort by many transnationalists to try to colonize the future by capturing control of the agenda in America's schools and indoctrinating America's children with the basic transnational concepts, but success was only partial, and it had not progressed very far. Transnationalists had hoped that some major setback might shatter American pride and confidence, and the 9/11 attacks seemed to have that potential. It was perceived by transnationalists that most Americans were oblivious to the negative effects that the transnationalists saw the rest of the world suffering because of American policies, and because of the very existence of the American system. Perhaps now that there had been backlash, Americans might wake up, might start to think about what their government had been doing, might feel shame, and might recognize that they had to stop being 'unilateral.' For about a week after 9/11, there was an outpouring of sympathy and support, but that rapidly faded when it became clear that Americans weren't reacting the right way. They were not treating the attack as being a clear consequence of prior American policy, and were not thus acknowledging failure. On the contrary, what transnationalists saw was what they viewed as the worst, most atavistic response imaginable. Not only did Americans not come to doubt the wisdom of their system and begin to consider the obviously more-enlightened possibility of world governance, they rather seemed to become militantly nationalistic, with an emphasis on 'militant.' Their determination and self confidence swelled, and they girded for war.
...
"Again, all the transnationalists could really hope for was disaster. America had yet again acted 'unilaterally' and the transnationalists were forced to hope that events might hand America some sort of symbolic punishment for doing so, some sort of major setback that might finally shatter American confidence and drive.
...
"The transnationalists became increasingly frustrated, increasingly angry, increasingly hysterical, and increasingly afraid. America was directly winning the battles it sought, but it was indirectly defeating the transnational cause."
This is a really long piece that goes on to explain why the transnatioalist want internatioanl body to try Saddam. It is well thought out and worth the read.
Steven den Beste:
...
"The question is whether the damage will be enough to make the insurgency collapse. I am finding myself increasingly to believe that it will, because the insurgency was fighting a short war. It was operating in ways which made it not be resilient. It was already operating at highly unsustainable levels and may recently have been losing steam anyhow through exhaustion. It's difficult to see how it could recover from this kind of blow.
"Loss of their nominal leader, and his ignominious surrender, will affect morale. All the arrests will make those who are still free become fearful. Worry about what else we might have learned from papers captured with Saddam, or by interrogating those we just arrested, or by interrogating Saddam himself, won't help that any. With every new arrest, more documents will be taken. Lower level operatives who were not compromised may have lost all their upper contacts and have no way to reconnect. Many remaining stockpiles of arms and money will have been captured with so many high level arrests. Others may have been compromised but might be left in place as bait for traps. The Baathist insurgency has suffered massive damage operationally. Its reputation will also suffer massive damage, reducing fear of it and support for it. Because of that, we'll get more and better tips about the insurgency, and the insurgency will have a much harder time recruiting replacements and repairing their organization.
"All of this may be enough to bring about what amounts to another rout. In military terms, a 'rout' happens when unit cohesion fails, and men in a unit cease to try to survive as a unit and concern themselves only with surviving as individuals. In the Napoleonic era or during the American civil war, if a battlefield unit routed it would mean that they would cease to move in formation and cease obeying orders, and would become a disordered mob running for their lives. Many would even throw away their weapons and packs so they could run faster.
"It's something that can cascade. If a few men in a unit all lose heart and break ranks, then if other men in the unit are shaken they might go, too. A unit which sees a friendly unit rout might itself rout. Units which see a lot of friendly units rout almost certainly will go with them."
den Beste on word abuse
" 'Unilateralism' is a term which the transnationalists have used pejoratively to label many of the actions of the US and its closest allies, who should instead of have embraced "multilateralism". Taken literally, the application of those two terms has been nonsense, since America had the support of many nations both in Afghanistan and in Iraq. But they're being used as code words, with new meanings. 'Multilateralism' means submitting yourself to world governance and ignoring your own narrow self interest; 'unilateralism' means a refusal to sacrifice sovereignty and an insistence on acting out of self-interest.
...
"The US had long been viewed as the biggest problem facing transnationalism, for there seemed little hope that Americans would lose faith in the system which had been so successful. There was an ongoing effort by many transnationalists to try to colonize the future by capturing control of the agenda in America's schools and indoctrinating America's children with the basic transnational concepts, but success was only partial, and it had not progressed very far. Transnationalists had hoped that some major setback might shatter American pride and confidence, and the 9/11 attacks seemed to have that potential. It was perceived by transnationalists that most Americans were oblivious to the negative effects that the transnationalists saw the rest of the world suffering because of American policies, and because of the very existence of the American system. Perhaps now that there had been backlash, Americans might wake up, might start to think about what their government had been doing, might feel shame, and might recognize that they had to stop being 'unilateral.' For about a week after 9/11, there was an outpouring of sympathy and support, but that rapidly faded when it became clear that Americans weren't reacting the right way. They were not treating the attack as being a clear consequence of prior American policy, and were not thus acknowledging failure. On the contrary, what transnationalists saw was what they viewed as the worst, most atavistic response imaginable. Not only did Americans not come to doubt the wisdom of their system and begin to consider the obviously more-enlightened possibility of world governance, they rather seemed to become militantly nationalistic, with an emphasis on 'militant.' Their determination and self confidence swelled, and they girded for war.
...
"Again, all the transnationalists could really hope for was disaster. America had yet again acted 'unilaterally' and the transnationalists were forced to hope that events might hand America some sort of symbolic punishment for doing so, some sort of major setback that might finally shatter American confidence and drive.
...
"The transnationalists became increasingly frustrated, increasingly angry, increasingly hysterical, and increasingly afraid. America was directly winning the battles it sought, but it was indirectly defeating the transnational cause."
This is a really long piece that goes on to explain why the transnatioalist want internatioanl body to try Saddam. It is well thought out and worth the read.
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