Transnational spinners on Lybia
Steven den Beste:
...
"The idea that this was somehow a triumph of diplomacy and soft power pressure (e.g. sanctions), as is variously claimed by China, Russia, France, and Solana at the EU doesn't stand up to the light of day. Why was it the British (and indirectly the Americans) that Libya contacted, not China or Russia or France or the EU or the UN? Why did Qaddafi begin his diplomacy last March, and not earlier or later? And why the final agreement now, rather than last August or next August?
"They really have no choice but to try to spin it this way, but it doesn't convince any who are willing to look at it with an open mind. And you can detect just a hint of a feeling that somehow this is cheating. They were the ones advocating diplomacy while we seemed to be violent brutes looking for someone to crush; it hardly seems fair that we were the ones to pull off such a major diplomatic achievement and not them.
"Based on reports, it looks as if Qaddafi first made contact with the British just after the Americans and British abandoned attempts to deal with the UN and made the decision to attack Iraq without formal UNSC authorization. In other words, Qaddafi called London once it became clear that the UN was not capable of preventing America from going to war. That's when negotiations began.
"Was it coincidence that the negotiations were concluded only days after Saddam was captured? Probably not. Likely there were a few final sticking points, and when Saddam was found, and was so totally disgraced by his condition, circumstances and lack of resistance, Qaddafi felt a chill wind blowing down his spine and gave in.
"Why did this happen? What was different? It isn't too difficult to figure it out.
"What was different was that someone had finally gone beyond diplomacy and soft power and was poised to crush a dictator who had been doing the same kinds of things that Qaddafi had been doing. Qaddafi didn't want to be the next crushee.
...
"Why did he call the British, rather than the French or the Russians or the EU or the UN? That's another interesting piece to the puzzle. What has developed over the last couple years is that Blair and Bush are doing a superb good-cop/bad-cop act. Blair is the good cop, the 'reasonable' one. Unlike Australian PM John Howard, Blair has leftist/internationalist credentials, and has positioned himself to be the only world leader with such credentials who has significant influence with Bush and who has some ability to restrain or deflect Bush. Bush is the bad cop, the cowboy, the moron, the devout Christian, the one with blood in his eye, who also happens to be commander in chief of the most powerful military in the world and appears very willing and perhaps even eager to use it against those he dislikes.
"That characterization of Bush is facile and wrong, of course; but he has that reputation in many places and it has actually served us well. Those who oppose Bush keep underestimating him, for one thing. But it also makes Bush a nearly ideal 'bad cop,' a barely controlled danger who can only be restrained by the 'good cop,' Tony Blair, through persuasion.
...
"The Weasels are trying to use a triumph of the threat of force as a demonstration of why you don't need threats of force. But it won't work, because they can't explain why they themselves could not do what Blair's government actually did, and why this agreement happened when it did. They can ignore the 'coincidence' of events in Iraq, but no one else will."
Steven den Beste:
...
"The idea that this was somehow a triumph of diplomacy and soft power pressure (e.g. sanctions), as is variously claimed by China, Russia, France, and Solana at the EU doesn't stand up to the light of day. Why was it the British (and indirectly the Americans) that Libya contacted, not China or Russia or France or the EU or the UN? Why did Qaddafi begin his diplomacy last March, and not earlier or later? And why the final agreement now, rather than last August or next August?
"They really have no choice but to try to spin it this way, but it doesn't convince any who are willing to look at it with an open mind. And you can detect just a hint of a feeling that somehow this is cheating. They were the ones advocating diplomacy while we seemed to be violent brutes looking for someone to crush; it hardly seems fair that we were the ones to pull off such a major diplomatic achievement and not them.
"Based on reports, it looks as if Qaddafi first made contact with the British just after the Americans and British abandoned attempts to deal with the UN and made the decision to attack Iraq without formal UNSC authorization. In other words, Qaddafi called London once it became clear that the UN was not capable of preventing America from going to war. That's when negotiations began.
"Was it coincidence that the negotiations were concluded only days after Saddam was captured? Probably not. Likely there were a few final sticking points, and when Saddam was found, and was so totally disgraced by his condition, circumstances and lack of resistance, Qaddafi felt a chill wind blowing down his spine and gave in.
"Why did this happen? What was different? It isn't too difficult to figure it out.
"What was different was that someone had finally gone beyond diplomacy and soft power and was poised to crush a dictator who had been doing the same kinds of things that Qaddafi had been doing. Qaddafi didn't want to be the next crushee.
...
"Why did he call the British, rather than the French or the Russians or the EU or the UN? That's another interesting piece to the puzzle. What has developed over the last couple years is that Blair and Bush are doing a superb good-cop/bad-cop act. Blair is the good cop, the 'reasonable' one. Unlike Australian PM John Howard, Blair has leftist/internationalist credentials, and has positioned himself to be the only world leader with such credentials who has significant influence with Bush and who has some ability to restrain or deflect Bush. Bush is the bad cop, the cowboy, the moron, the devout Christian, the one with blood in his eye, who also happens to be commander in chief of the most powerful military in the world and appears very willing and perhaps even eager to use it against those he dislikes.
"That characterization of Bush is facile and wrong, of course; but he has that reputation in many places and it has actually served us well. Those who oppose Bush keep underestimating him, for one thing. But it also makes Bush a nearly ideal 'bad cop,' a barely controlled danger who can only be restrained by the 'good cop,' Tony Blair, through persuasion.
...
"The Weasels are trying to use a triumph of the threat of force as a demonstration of why you don't need threats of force. But it won't work, because they can't explain why they themselves could not do what Blair's government actually did, and why this agreement happened when it did. They can ignore the 'coincidence' of events in Iraq, but no one else will."
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