The Putin-Xi summit
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Chinese President Xi Jinping met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on March 20 and offered a more reserved vision for Russian-Chinese relations than what Putin was likely seeking. Xi and Putin touted the strength of Chinese-Russian relations in their meeting on March 20, but offered differing interpretations of the scale of future relations in articles they published on March 19.[8] Putin published an article in Chinese state media in which he argued that Russia and China are building a partnership for the formation of a multipolar world order in the face of the collective West’s seeking of domination and the United States pursuing a policy of dual containment against China and Russia.[9] Xi offered a less aggressive overarching goal for Russian-Chinese relations in his article published in Russian state media outlet Rossiskaya Gazeta, in which he noted that Russia and China are generally pursuing a multipolar world order but not specifically against an adversarial West.[10] Xi instead focused heavily on presenting China as a viable third-party mediator to the war in Ukraine whose plan for negotiations ”reflects the unity of views of the world community on overcoming the Ukrainian crisis.”[11] Putin wrote that Russia welcomes China’s willingness to ”play a constructive role in crisis management” regarding the war in Ukraine, but Putin likely was hoping for Xi to adopt a similarly aggressive rhetorical line against the West.[12]
Xi’s refusal to explicitly align China with Russia in Putin’s envisioned geopolitical conflict with the West is a notable departure from China’s declared “no limits partnership” with Russia preceding the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[13] Xi’s rhetoric suggests that he is not inclined to fully give Russia the economic and political support that Russia needs to reverse setbacks in Ukraine. Putin and Xi offered somewhat similar visions for increased Chinese-Russian economic partnership, and it is likely that the two will sign bilateral trade and economic agreements during Xi’s visit, some of which will likely aim to facilitate schemes for sanctions evasion.[14] Xi will also likely offer a more concrete proposal for a negotiated settlement to the war in Ukraine, although it remains unclear what his proposal will entail and how receptive the Kremlin will be to it. The prospects of China supplying Russia with military equipment also remain unclear.
Putin is likely increasing his attempts to rhetorically rally the rest of the world against the West, although it remains unlikely that he will achieve decisive effects through this effort. Putin attended the International Parliamentary Conference “Russia-Africa in a Multipolar World” on March 20 and stated that Russia and states in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America uphold the norms of social principles, morality, and traditions and oppose neo-colonial ideology.[15] Putin’s depiction of an envisioned Chinese-Russian axis against the West and his comments at the conference likely amount to an intensified proposal to non-aligned countries to form a defined anti-Western bloc. Putin likely hoped that Xi would offer a similar vision to augment this proposal, and Xi’s refusal to do so likely weakens the impacts of Putin’s efforts. The attractiveness of a potential anti-Western Chinese-Russian-based geopolitical bloc lies more with China’s economic and political power than with Russia’s declining economic strength and its military power badly degraded by fighting in Ukraine. Russia’s ongoing diplomatic efforts to generate support for its war in Ukraine continue to produce few tangible results, and an intensified effort to rally the rest of the world against the West will not likely be more effective.
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Xi and China have much more to lose at this point than Russia by joining in an anti-West pact. While the US has been pulling back on its trade with China it has not been as drastic as the sanctions against Russia. What the two have in common is their desire for conquest. China still wants Taiwan but is reluctant to do things that would cause the alienation of the rest of the world the way Russia has. Putin's war in Ukraine has been a disaster for Russia both militarily and trade-wise.
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China is everywhere in global politics. China is “ubiquitous,” a retired Senior Colonel Zhou Bo of China’s PLA told me in a recent conversation. On March 10, in an agreement brokered by Beijing, Iran and Saudi Arabia agreed to normalize relations, after seven years of bitter rivalry in a deal that sidelined the U.S. Earlier, on February 24, China put forward a 12-point proposal for peace in Ukraine. On March 20, President Xi Jinping arrived in Moscow, where he discussed the situation in Ukraine with Vladimir Putin. A phone call with Ukraine’s President Zelensky is expected soon, perhaps this week.
In our interview, Senior Colonel Zhou Bo spoke with refreshing candor about what the “watershed moment” means for China and the world. “China is entering the ocean,” he stressed, using a metaphor that I suspect will soon become common. I was particularly interested in his statements on how Russia’s invasion has harmed significant Chinese interests. Dramatically, he also said that “Russia cannot win this war.” It is clear that in Beijing’s view the conflict in Ukraine will continue, that the West has no plan to solve it, and that China expects its role as mediator will only grow. For Beijing, the war in Ukraine is a trigger for new security arrangements in Europe that will have to be made before peace returns.
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I don’t believe so far Russia has regretted this war, but I think they would regret the way they fought the war. They did not fight it well, especially at the beginning when they dispersed their armed forces in attacking from too many directions. The communications and logistical supply were poor; the command chain would start from Moscow, but there was no front commander post. Putting all this together, it was not as good as they wished. But about the war itself it is not as straightforward, because for Putin, this involves the existence of Russia itself.
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Russia has really blundered with its concern about NATO expansion. Its war in Ukraine has made expansion more likely as countries seek to avoid Russian domination that Putin is attempting in Ukraine. The response to Putin's effort has probably made China pause its ambitions of taking Taiwan.
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Russian withdrawal from Ukraine key to implementing China’s ‘peace plan’
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The plan calls for a ceasefire and negotiations but notably omits any mention of Russia withdrawing its troops from occupied Ukrainian territory.
In response, U.S. President Joe Biden dismissed China's position, stating that its implementation would only benefit Russia.
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The announcement by the International Criminal Court that an arrest warrant was issued for Russian President Vladimir Putin caused shockwaves in Moscow. Even before the announcement, the pro-regime propagandists expressed their concerns about the possibility of being charged with war crimes by the Hague tribunal. Nonetheless, many were taken completely off-guard when the charges were announced, since they apparently believed that this turn of events was possible only if Russia lost the war in Ukraine.
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Russia's spring Ukraine offensive may be winding down amid heavy troop losses, munitions shortages
U.S. officials are quietly warning Ukraine to conserve its dwindling supplies of artillery shells and other ammunition, air defenses, and experienced soldiers for a major spring counteroffensive to regain territory from Russian invaders, expected to start in May, once Western armor and weapons are in place. Ukraine is especially running through artillery shells and suffering heavy losses holding on to Bakhmut, a razed town U.S. officials see of limited strategic value.
But Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and other Ukrainians say Russia is using more ammunition and suffering much heavier losses in Bakhmut and elsewhere along the front lines for only incremental, halting gains. "And Ukrainian commanders on the front lines say that they sense that Russian units are hollowed out and could collapse in the face of a strong Ukrainian counteroffensive" in the spring, The New York Times reports. After Russian forces came dangerously close to encircling Bakhmut in February, Ukraine pushed back and has kept open its western supply routes.
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Ukraine is making the case for an upgrade of tanks from the West.
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