Russia removes commander of failed operations
Rumors about the dismissal of Russian Eastern Group of Forces (Eastern Military District) Commander Colonel General Rustam Muradov on March 27 generated a muted and cynical response in the Russian information space. The milbloggers claimed that Russian military authorities dismissed Muradov from his position as Eastern Group of Forces commander, but ISW cannot currently verify these claims.[1] Muradov took command of the Russian Eastern Military District (EMD) on October 6, 2022, and has overseen a series of disastrous offensive operations led by EMD elements in western Donetsk Oblast over the past five months.[2] One milblogger claimed that Muradov is on “vacation,” which the milblogger noted is tantamount to resignation. Others claimed that Muradov’s removal is a positive step but stated that Muradov’s replacement is more important than his removal.[3] Some milbloggers noted that Muradov was responsible for significant Russian military failures in western Donetsk Oblast, including the high casualties suffered in the assault against Pavlivka in October-November 2022 and the prolonged and failed effort to take Vuhledar.[4] Independent Russian investigative outlet Vazhnye Istorii (iStories), citing sources close to the Russian General Staff, reported that the Russian General Staff accused Muradov of being inept due to battlefield failures and significant losses in western Donetsk Oblast, including the near obliteration of the Tatarstan ”Alga” volunteer battalion.[5] One prominent milblogger claimed that military authorities are also considering dismissing Western Military District Commander Colonel General Yevgeny Nikiforov, whose forces operate along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line in eastern Ukraine.[6]
ISW cannot confirm the rumors of either Muradov’s or Nikiforov’s dismissals, but it is noteworthy that Russian milbloggers are discussing potential dismissals of commanders associated with areas of operation in which Russian forces have been largely unable to secure substantial gains or have suffered major losses. Russian milbloggers do not appear to be hypothesizing about the removal of either the Central Military District (CMD) Commander Lieutenant General Andrey Mordvichev or Southern Military District Commander (SMD) Colonel General Sergey Kuzovlev.[7] Neither the CMD nor the SMD are heavily committed in critical areas of the front, and Mordvichev and Kuzovlev have therefore likely avoided becoming targets of Russian command skepticism because they are not currently responsible for significant failures. The muted information space response to the reported firings is additionally indicative of broader disillusionment with Russian military command, which milbloggers have argued for months needs systemic overhauls. Many milbloggers have consistently praised former Commander of Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine Army General Sergey Surovikin despite the fall of west (right) bank Kherson Oblast under his command, however. One milblogger claimed on March 27 that Surovikin may be responsible for defending against a future Ukrainian counteroffensive and claimed that Surovikin’s military strategy is better than that of Russian Chief of the General Staff and current Commander of Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine Army General Valery Gerasimov.[8] Russian authorities and some milbloggers have fixated on identifying and punishing individual commanders for the failures of their troops, rather than interrogating and resolving endemic issues in Russian command and control, force structure, and deployment patterns.
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Earlier in the war commanders of failing operations were pushed to the front to deal with the problems and many of them were killed. That has not been happening recently in the cannon fodder operations and human wave attacks. The Russian military is still failing, but has gone back to firing failed operation commanders it appears. So far, I have not seen those ordering these failed attacks getting canned.
See, also:
Military expert explains growing number of drone explosions in Russia
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The drone explosion in Russia’s Tula Oblast is only the beginning of confirmation of ideas expressed by Generals Valerii Zaluzhnyi and Mykhailo Zabrodskyi in an article last September, said Musienko.
“I just want to remind you that there was an article last September written by Generals Zaluzhnyi and Zabrodskyi about increasing capabilities in 2023 to be able to strike enemy military facilities on the territory of Russia — not only in the operational rear, but also on the territory (deep inside) of Russia,” the expert said.
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And:
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UK Defence Intelligence points out that a previous USV attack on Sevastopol on 29 October 2022 reportedly damaged the minesweeper Ivan Golubets and the frigate Admiral Makarov.
Even though the new attacks likely failed to damage any military assets, the USV threat likely continues to constrain operations of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet.
Background: Previously, surface drones were part of a military aid package provided by Germany.
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And:
Russia threatens US with "unique weapon" capable of destroying it
And:
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Though NATO condemned Putin's rhetoric as "dangerous and irresponsible," the alliance also said that it had "not seen any changes in Russia's nuclear posture that would lead us to adjust our own." In other words, NATO signaled that it was monitoring the situation but not taking any major steps in response.
Similarly, National Security Council spokesman John Kirby on Sunday told CBS News the White House hadn't seen anything to indicate Putin was preparing to use tactical nuclear weapons "in any way whatsoever in Ukraine."
"I can also tell you that we haven't seen anything that would cause us to change our own strategic nuclear deterrent posture," Kirby said.
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And:
Car belonging to Russian-appointed police chief blown up in Mariupol
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