Russian conscripts become political problem for Putin

 ISW:

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Putin remains unlikely to deploy newly conscripted troops to participate in combat in Ukraine due to concerns for the stability of his regime. Chairman of the Russian State Duma Defense Committee Andrey Kartapolov stated on March 30 that spring conscripts will not deploy to Russian-occupied territories in Ukraine during the spring 2023 conscription cycle.[5] Kartapolov also noted that Russian forces will not conscript men from occupied territories. Kartapolov‘s statements may be true given that ISW has not observed the Russian military use conscripts on any significant scale on the frontlines since the first months of the war and especially since the sinking of the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s flagship, the Moskva, which had some conscripted sailors aboard.[6] Putin’s use of conscripts during the winter-spring period of 2022 sparked social tensions in Russia, and Putin is unlikely to risk his regime’s stability by deploying newly conscripted servicemen to the frontlines.[7] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Putin even publicly instructed Russian authorities to investigate alleged incidents of Russian conscript deployments to Ukraine on March 9, 2022 (which were technically illegal at that time).[8] Putin likely perceives the political cost of deploying conscripts to the frontlines as being higher than that of Russia’s September 2022 mobilization. Putin did not deploy conscripts from the spring 2022 conscription cycles in response to Ukraine’s September 2022 counteroffensive in Kharkiv Oblast but instead mobilized reservists to stabilize collapsing frontlines. This decision indicated Putin’s policy preference for mobilizing reservists rather than committing conscripts to battle — likely for political reasons — even though conscripts entering the final months of their annual service obligation might fight more effectively than civilian reservists. A prominent Russian news aggregator criticized the Russian conscription system, noting that Russia’s current staffing levels for contract servicemen are insufficient even though Russia has 250,000 available conscripts.[9] The aggregator added that it is “unacceptable” that “half of the Russian army is fighting with all its strength, while the other part is sitting in the barracks.”
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Russian President Vladimir Putin appointed a prominent milblogger and Russian proxy battalion commander as a regional Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) official for occupied Donetsk Oblast, advancing several Kremlin efforts. Multiple Russian milbloggers reported on March 30 that Putin signed a decree appointing former Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Security Minister and current Vostok Battalion commander Alexander Khodakovsky as deputy head of the Main Directorate of Rosgvardia in occupied Donetsk Oblast, making him responsible for Rosgvardia’s special rapid response and riot police (OMON and SOBR) in the region.[10] Khodakovsky announced on March 30 that he received this appointment in early February 2023 and posted a public recruiting ad for Rosgvardia OMON and SOBR units now under his command.[11] Khodakovsky publicly praises Putin and has been a loyal pro-Russian Ukrainian separatist since March 2014.[12] (Khodorkovsky was a Ukrainian SPETSNAZ commander for the Donetsk Oblast Alpha Group under the Ukrainian State Security Service before participating in Russia’s hybrid war against Ukraine in 2014.[13]) Khodakovsky’s appointment is analytically significant for several of ISW’s running assessments:

• Khodakovsky’s appointment indicates a Russian effort to generate more forces from occupied Donetsk Oblast. Putin passed a bill on March 27 removing the upper age limit and other barriers to entry for Rosgvardia recruits from occupied Ukraine.[14] Khodakovsky — a native of Donetsk City — is well connected with Donetsk People‘s Republic militia fighters, veterans, and pro-Russian patriot groups in Donbas, and can help facilitate recruitment drives.[15]
• The appointment advances a Kremlin effort to formalize legacy irregular Russian proxy forces in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and subordinate them to Kremlin-controlled structures.[16]
• Putin may use Khodakovsky’s appointment to ensure that Putin maintains reliable control over new Rosgvardia elements in Donetsk Oblast. ISW assessed that Russian authorities may be conducting a sweeping corruption probe within Rosgvardia, possibly to weed out actors who are perceived to be unreliable to Putin.[17]
• The appointment could help Putin divide and conquer influential communities that the Kremlin does not fully control. Mixed reactions to Khodakovsky’s appointment from various Russian milbloggers’ — notably among Russian military veterans — indicate a significant fracture within the Russian nationalist veteran community.[18] ISW has previously assessed the Russian nationalist veteran community within the blogosphere to be more or less unified.

Khodakovsky’s appointment also indicates that Putin continues to prioritize loyalty over competence in his subordinates. One Russian milblogger criticized Khodakovsky’s appointment and stated that Khodakovsky’s incompetence as the Vostok Battalion commander in 2014 resulted in an especially bad friendly fire incident in which Khodakovsky’s troops destroyed a Russian volunteer detachment, killing 42.[19] Former Russian officer and convicted war criminal Igor Girkin accused Khodakovsky of being a swindler and a “corrupt slug-traitor" and stated that the Kremlin’s “failed personnel policy” of advancing ”traitors, scum, and mediocrity” will lead Russia to ruin.[20] Putin has appointed loyalists ahead of competent people before. Putin replaced relatively competent Army General Sergey Surovikin, who effectively conducted a politically unpopular but militarily necessary withdrawal from upper Kherson in fall 2022, with Putin loyalist and Chief of the Russian General Staff Valery Gerasimov — who green-lit the disastrous campaign plan for the initial full-scale invasion of Ukraine — as theater commander for the Russian invasion of Ukraine in January 2023.[21]

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Russian casualties appear to be having an impact on Putin's ability to recruit within Russia.  His use of an inept commander from the occupied area looks like a sign of desperation.  I suspect that Putin's callous use of troops leading to high casualty counts is probably finally having an impact on force generation.  It also suggests that Russia is seeing more internal problems within the occupied territories where Ukraine has conducted some sabotage efforts.

See, also:

The battle for Bakhmut has turned into a 'slaughter-fest' for Russia, says top US general

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The battle for the eastern Ukrainian city of Bakhmut has turned into a "slaughter-fest" for Russian forces, according to US Gen. Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Milley was asked at a House Armed Services Committee hearing on Wednesday about Russia's failure to capture Bakhmut, despite months of fighting to take it.

Bakhmut is considered the bloodiest battle of the invasion so far.

Milley said in response that he believes "Russians are struggling in a big way" there with command issues, logistics, basic tactics, and troop training.

"They are getting slaughtered, the Russian troops are" he said.

Milley added for the last 20 or 21 days "Russians have not made any progress whatsoever in or around Bakhmut."

"The Ukrainians are doing a very effective area defense that is proving to be very costly to the Russians," he said.
...

And:

 Russia Launches Disinformation Campaign As NATO Gains Strength

On March 23, the historic process of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) enlargement passed a critical milestone as Finnish President Sauli Niinistö signed into law legislation on accession to the Alliance approved by parliament. In response, the Kremlin merely expressed regret about this development and reiterated the absence of any threat from Russia to its North European neighbors (Rossiiskaya gazeta, March 16). The Russian Foreign Ministry described the accession, which will be finalized at the Vilnius summit in mid-July, as “counterproductive” and rushed without “proper public discussion” (RIA Novosti, March 23). This veiled moderation did not camouflage a major failure of Russian foreign policy, which for many decades had hoped to cultivate special relations with Finland, and the profound shift in the geo-strategic situation in Northern Europe caused by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine on February 24, 2022. The urge to deliver a more assertive response came clear in Putin’s announcement of the plan to deploy Russian tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, where specialized storage could be constructed by July 1 (Svoboda, March 25).
...

There is much more about the Russian's rather weak response to events on the NATO front. 

And:

Finland says Russia spy operations weakened in Nordic nation

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“The Russian intelligence station (in Finland) shrank to about half of its former size last year,” SUPO Director Antti Pelttari said, adding that the main reason for the decline were expulsions of suspected spies and visa refusals on the advice of his agency.

The falling number of intelligence officers and restrictions on travel across the Russian-Finland border amid Moscow's war in Ukraine have significantly undermined operating conditions for Russian spies in Finland, SUPO said.
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It is not clear whether the Russian arrest of a Wall Street Journal reporter is related to its loss of espionage assets. 

And:

Russian Air Force drops dozens of winged, guided bombs in front-line zone – Ihnat

He said that enemy aircraft drop guided air bombs without entering the territory covered by Ukraine’s air defense systems.

This is a new tactic of Russian invaders that needs to be fought against, but for that,Ukraine needs Western multirole jet fighters, Ihnat added.

“This is a new threat that has emerged before us... 500 kilogram bombs flying dozens of kilometers...” he said.
...

And:

 Russia is forcing Western companies exiting its market to make a donation to the country — and it's making it harder for them to leave

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Investors who are selling their businesses and are from "unfriendly countries" — those that have imposed sanctions against Russia over its invasion of Ukraine — must donate at least 10% of the sale proceeds to the Russian budget, according to a document posted on Monday by the country's finance ministry.

The new ruling states that such companies have "an obligation to make a voluntary cash contribution to the federal budget" that amounts to at least 10% of what they receive from the sale, according to a Reuters translation.

This donation is on top of a previously announced 50% cut on the sale of their assets, which has to be borne by these investors.
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This will likely make businesses unlikely to make future investments in Russia. 

And:

Evan Gershkovich and Russia’s descent into thugocracy

The Kremlin is tiptoeing closer to a kind of ‘North Koreanization’