How we improved in Iraq

Trudy Rubin:

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The security progress of recent months results largely from a new military and political strategy that reverses the haphazard, incoherent U.S. Iraq policies of the last four tragic years.

In October 2003, when I first met Petraeus when he was commander of the 101st Airborne based in the northern Iraqi city of Mosul, he was implementing a counterinsurgency strategy with this central principle: Winning over local Sunni tribal leaders was a higher priority than military action. The sheikhs were given economic aid and jobs to get the economy restarted, and their men were hired into a new local security force.

Back then, though, there was no coherent U.S. political military strategy for the whole of Iraq. In Anbar province, the Sunni heartland, the U.S. focus was on military attacks, and tribal leaders were treated crudely and brusquely; in fall 2003, I heard several complain bitterly when I visited Anbar. They soon became supporters of the insurgency and al-Qaeda in Iraq.

Now Petraeus has made a new army counterinsurgency doctrine the basis of the military approach in Iraq, a doctrine that stresses flexibility and winning the support of local people. He says that U.S. commanders and troopers "get it," that "we are finally seeing the cumulative impact of changes in our [new counterintelligence] manual. Mission rehearsals in California used to [simulate] mechanized forces colliding in the Mojave desert." But now the exercises simulate the challenge of dealing with Iraqi villagers and townsmen, with "thousands of Iraqi speakers playing roles."

We can now see the new doctrine in action. When tribal leaders in Anbar turned against al-Qaeda in Iraq because it had started persecuting local Sunnis, and when these sheikhs asked for U.S. backing, an army commander in Anbar took a chance and agreed to support them. (In 2006, U.S. commanders rebuffed similar requests.) Now the U.S. support has become massive.

Petraeus credits the Anbar movement, known as "the Anbar awakening," with creating a "dramatic shift. There was a critical mass of popular opposition to al-Qaeda in Anbar, and it rippled down the Euphrates Valley and around Baghdad." Now tribesmen do most of the policing in Anbar, and about 70,000 tribal fighters are assisting U.S. forces in Baghdad and elsewhere.

But the general recognizes the fear of the Shiite-led government that these groups could morph into violent Sunni militias, or be infiltrated by members of al-Qaeda. "You work very hard to get them transitioned into the Iraqi police," he said. For the large numbers who don't qualify, "we're developing a lot of programs, a civil-service corps." U.S. funds will pay for this Sunni job corps at first, but the Iraqi government has pledged about $150 million to match the U.S. funding.

Petraeus said the program "saves double the cost per month in the number of U.S. military vehicles not lost to insurgents, not to mention the lives." He is also trying to win Sunni hearts and minds by hastening the release of thousands of Sunnis detained in U.S. prisons.

But to co-opt the insurgency and prevent renewed fighting, there must be political progress. The whole purpose of the surge was to open a window of space and time that would permit sectarian Iraqi leaders to reconcile and help heal the country. That scenario would enable sizable U.S. troop withdrawals. But Iraqi political leaders have yet to oblige.

Petraeus said, with excess generosity, "the political piece is sputtering along. None of this is smooth."

But he added that, though top political leaders have not passed "benchmark" laws, "there is reconciliation in many provinces in a way not yet reflected at the top." One hope is that the Anbar Awakening may morph into new, nonsectarian political groupings more willing to deal with Shiite leaders than the current Sunni political parties.

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If the current Iraqi leaders do not pass the "benchmark" laws, they will be passed by new leaders after the next election. The real reconciliation process is taking place on the local level and it will eventually percolate up as trust is built at the local level. This is a fair description of the counterinsurgency strategy and how it works.