Taking on St. Shinseki

Jeb Babbin:

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Months before Sept. 11, as Rumsfeld began the transformation of the Pentagon, he ran into contumacious obstructionism from the army and its then-Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki. Shinseki dug his heels in and refused to change much of anything about the Army. Shinseki went as far as to go behind Rumsfeld’s back to the Senate where his political mentor (and long-time family friend, Sen. Dan Inouye of Hawaii) and others backed his play.

But for the political cover Sen. Inouye gave Shinseki, he might have been fired then and there. Civilian control of the military means people such as Shinseki cannot be allowed to play the back-channel political games he played again and again. Shinseki stayed, and the Army went on to spend billions on the Stryker armored vehicle, a Cold War style peacekeeping vehicle that is too big and too heavy to be moved by a C-130 tactical airlifter without being partially disassembled.

And then came Sept. 11. The Secretary of Defense became the secretary of war and the transformation he had brought to the Pentagon had to be continued under fire. Still, the Army resisted.

Shinseki balked at striking at the Taliban. For the record, our forces slashed into the Taliban around Oct. 5, 2001, less than a month after Sept 11. But — aside from Rangers and Army Special Forces — the Army stayed home. Shinseki wanted at least six months to assemble and move an enormous Soviet-like force into Afghanistan and the president wasn’t having any of it. This is why Shinseki retired in 2003 with a festering grudge against Rumsfeld.

And then Rumsfeld did the unthinkable. Instead of replacing Shinseki with one of his like-minded underlings, Rumsfeld looked for someone who would fight. Gen. Peter Schoomaker, a Special Forces vet, was brought out of retirement to transform the Army in the middle of a war. And he did it. But in the process Rumsfeld, Schoomaker and his team shook up a lot of people.

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You will note that the special forces types have not joined the anti Rumsfeld chorus. Shinseki's confrontation on Afghanistan was not with Rumsfeld as Babbin implys. It was with Gen. Franks and the Centcom staff. Franks describes it in his book American Soldier starting on page 275. As Franks grew agrier about the second guessing on his staff's plan, he finally issued a challenge to the joint chiefs. He told them that the plan was done in coordination with the component commanders that they had appointed to his staff.

... "Look. You guys each have a three-star (general) who commands a service component for me, and represents the service expertise we need to put together a joint plan. It's best to let those guys know your ideas. And then trust them to work for all of us to build a cohesive approach, rather than a patchwork of service interests."

"If you don't trust those three-stars to represent you and assist me in joint war-fighting, you should replace them."

"Yesterday in the Tank, you guys came across like a mob of Title Ten motherfuckers, not like the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Thanks for hearing me out."

Later when questioned by Secretary Rumsfeld to "explain what that was all about yesterday?" Franks said:

"I work for you and for the President, not the Service Chiefs. They were fighting for turf yesterday. If this continues, our troops--and the country will suffer. We should not allow narrow-minded four-stars to advance their share of the budget at the expense of the mission."

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Rumsfeld backed Franks. It really came down to a chain of command issue. Centcom was in charge of the operation not the chiefs. Rumsfeld is still getting grief for backing his commander in the field instead of the Title Ten m............