Essay on "total war"
Steven den Beste:
"The term total war . . . doesn't refer to a maximal effort.
"...The American Civil War was the first industrial-age war, and in many ways it presaged the two world wars. It was fought about fifty years after the Napoleonic wars and about fifty years before the Great War, but overall it was much more like the latter than the former. The trenches of Petersburg were far more similar to the ones in WWI France than the ones used in the siege of Yorktown at the end of the American Revolution.
"In preindustrial warfare, which reached its peak with Napoleon, maneuver and battlefield tactics were the predominant factors. But in industrial era warfare, logistics is the key to victory, and that's why interdiction is the most important tactic in industrial-era warfare, and the reason why the Battle of the Atlantic was the most important battle of WWII.
"You can't fight with what you don't have, and you can't fight with what you do have if it's in the wrong place. Industrial-era warfare is large scale and high intensity, with huge field forces that consume mountains of supply and sustain immense casualties. Thus it is attrition warfare, and the key to victory in an all-out industrial war is to manage the attrition exchange rate so that your enemy runs out before you do. Runs out of men, or money, or oil, or steel, or ammunition, or anything else which is critical. And civilians are also critical."
Den Beste makes some good points on the importance of logistics. However, the industrial revolution changed other aspects of warfare that caused it to be blodier and proned to trench warfare stalemates. While he refers to war of manuever in the Napolanic era he does not analyze how the machinery of war effected the combined arms doctrine that made manuever possible. The nineteenth century has several examples of how cavalry had been eliminated as an offensive weapon. In the Civl War Picket's Charge at Gettysburg was a disasterous slaughter. In teh Crimean War the "charge of the light brigade" was immortalized in poetry as the foolhardy slaugher it was. At this point heavy cavalry had already disappeared with the passing of "edge" warfare and the introduction of gunpowder. By the end of the nineteenth century it should have been clear that light cavalry was also no longer effective.
Toward the end of World War I, machinery was developed that took the place of both light and heavy cavalry in combined arms warfare. The tank took the place of heavy cavary and the airplane took the place of hight cavary. These are the weapons that help break the stalemate. By World War II thses weapons had been refined tothe point that when integrated with infantry made the "blitzkrieg" possible.
Steven den Beste:
"The term total war . . . doesn't refer to a maximal effort.
"...The American Civil War was the first industrial-age war, and in many ways it presaged the two world wars. It was fought about fifty years after the Napoleonic wars and about fifty years before the Great War, but overall it was much more like the latter than the former. The trenches of Petersburg were far more similar to the ones in WWI France than the ones used in the siege of Yorktown at the end of the American Revolution.
"In preindustrial warfare, which reached its peak with Napoleon, maneuver and battlefield tactics were the predominant factors. But in industrial era warfare, logistics is the key to victory, and that's why interdiction is the most important tactic in industrial-era warfare, and the reason why the Battle of the Atlantic was the most important battle of WWII.
"You can't fight with what you don't have, and you can't fight with what you do have if it's in the wrong place. Industrial-era warfare is large scale and high intensity, with huge field forces that consume mountains of supply and sustain immense casualties. Thus it is attrition warfare, and the key to victory in an all-out industrial war is to manage the attrition exchange rate so that your enemy runs out before you do. Runs out of men, or money, or oil, or steel, or ammunition, or anything else which is critical. And civilians are also critical."
Den Beste makes some good points on the importance of logistics. However, the industrial revolution changed other aspects of warfare that caused it to be blodier and proned to trench warfare stalemates. While he refers to war of manuever in the Napolanic era he does not analyze how the machinery of war effected the combined arms doctrine that made manuever possible. The nineteenth century has several examples of how cavalry had been eliminated as an offensive weapon. In the Civl War Picket's Charge at Gettysburg was a disasterous slaughter. In teh Crimean War the "charge of the light brigade" was immortalized in poetry as the foolhardy slaugher it was. At this point heavy cavalry had already disappeared with the passing of "edge" warfare and the introduction of gunpowder. By the end of the nineteenth century it should have been clear that light cavalry was also no longer effective.
Toward the end of World War I, machinery was developed that took the place of both light and heavy cavalry in combined arms warfare. The tank took the place of heavy cavary and the airplane took the place of hight cavary. These are the weapons that help break the stalemate. By World War II thses weapons had been refined tothe point that when integrated with infantry made the "blitzkrieg" possible.
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