A weak insurgency in Iraq
Dana Dillon:
..."An insurgency requires several elements to succeed. Chief among those requirements are popular support, then money, weapons, and finally a safe haven to hide and train, and to plan the insurgent campaign. In all areas except arms, the Baathist insurgency is either weak or possesses limited resources.
"...the Baathists lack a credible ideology to inspire new recruits. Returning Saddam to power doesn't generate enthusiasm anywhere in Iraq. The insurgents have not articulated a political ideology or inspired religious fervor; they rely almost solely on Iraqi opposition to foreign occupation. What's more, the ongoing efforts to transition to an elected Iraqi government will only reduce interest among potential recruits to the insurgent cause. There is a healthy contingent of foreign jihadists, but they also lack popular support and do not appear to represent a significant force.
"...the guerrillas' strategies indicate their lack of support. They use some tactics common in the first phase of an urban guerrilla campaign, like sniping, attacking vehicles or buildings with rockets or mortars, and planting explosive devices. But other tactical options are noticeably absent, such as provocative political activity, widespread demonstrations to disrupt government services, or massing crowds to lure occupation forces into traps. These tactics require popular participation, and apparently the Baathist guerrillas cannot generate a sympathetic crowd.
..."Baath insurgents have no safe havens. Although Iran and Syria may sympathize with anti-American forces, and might even offer financial support, there is no evidence that either country is allowing guerillas to operate from their territories. Anti-Baathist Kurds occupy Iraq's mountains, and Iraq's deserts are perfect terrain for maneuvering American units. The only remaining places in which Baath insurgents can hide from occupation forces are cities and urban centers, but these can serve as safe havens only if the guerrillas have popular support."
Dana Dillon:
..."An insurgency requires several elements to succeed. Chief among those requirements are popular support, then money, weapons, and finally a safe haven to hide and train, and to plan the insurgent campaign. In all areas except arms, the Baathist insurgency is either weak or possesses limited resources.
"...the Baathists lack a credible ideology to inspire new recruits. Returning Saddam to power doesn't generate enthusiasm anywhere in Iraq. The insurgents have not articulated a political ideology or inspired religious fervor; they rely almost solely on Iraqi opposition to foreign occupation. What's more, the ongoing efforts to transition to an elected Iraqi government will only reduce interest among potential recruits to the insurgent cause. There is a healthy contingent of foreign jihadists, but they also lack popular support and do not appear to represent a significant force.
"...the guerrillas' strategies indicate their lack of support. They use some tactics common in the first phase of an urban guerrilla campaign, like sniping, attacking vehicles or buildings with rockets or mortars, and planting explosive devices. But other tactical options are noticeably absent, such as provocative political activity, widespread demonstrations to disrupt government services, or massing crowds to lure occupation forces into traps. These tactics require popular participation, and apparently the Baathist guerrillas cannot generate a sympathetic crowd.
..."Baath insurgents have no safe havens. Although Iran and Syria may sympathize with anti-American forces, and might even offer financial support, there is no evidence that either country is allowing guerillas to operate from their territories. Anti-Baathist Kurds occupy Iraq's mountains, and Iraq's deserts are perfect terrain for maneuvering American units. The only remaining places in which Baath insurgents can hide from occupation forces are cities and urban centers, but these can serve as safe havens only if the guerrillas have popular support."
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