The Iraqi collapse
The Iraqi army was hollow.
"...The rapid collapse of Iraq's premier fighting forces surprised American and Iraqi military commanders alike. But Iraqi officers from both the regular army and the special forces said the breakdown was due not only to U.S. bombardment but to the hollowness at the core of a military built on mistrust, deception and abuse."
"...Hussein formed the Special Republican Guard, with an estimated 15,000 to 25,000 soldiers, and put his son Qusay in charge. In 1995, he created the feared Fedayeen paramilitary force -- tens of thousands of men originally trained to quell internal uprisings and demonstrations. The Fedayeen answered to Hussein's more ruthless son, Uday. And just after the Palestinian uprising against Israel began in the fall of 2000, Hussein built the Al-Quds Army, a specialized military force that bore the Arabic name for Jerusalem and was ostensibly geared toward fighting the Israelis.
"'There was no coordination between these armies -- they hate each other,' said Brig. Rasheed Islam Joubouri, 56, who spent 34 years in a regular-army infantry unit.
"During the war, the lack of communication and coordination hastened the defeat of the Iraqi forces. A regular-army general in charge of an air defense unit in Baghdad said he was ordered not to activate his weapons because the Republican Guard was responsible for the city's defense."
"...Hussein's system of rewards also spawned an atmosphere of deceit that deluded the president into believing his armed forces went into the war far better equipped and militarily capable than they really were, senior officers said.
"Gen. Yasin Mohammad Taha Joubouri, an artillery specialist with 38 years in the regular army, said he was summoned to a meeting with the president in 1999, who ordered him to help the Defense Ministry build one of the largest artillery pieces in the world.
"The army, with assistance from specialists, designed a cannon with a barrel 210 millimeters -- more than eight inches -- in diameter, a weapon so cumbersome that Joubouri and the other specialists knew it could not work. Still, Joubouri helped build a full-scale model and drafted fake performance records to convince the president that the project was progressing.
"'No one could tell him it couldn't work,' said Joubouri, who said he was still working on the cannon when he left the army six months ago. 'He was giving us awards and presents.'"
Communications weere effectively severed.
"...Most air bases had virtually no defenses, said Saadoun, who was also stationed at Rashid air base. "They just gave us Kalashnikovs, not even antiaircraft weapons. We asked, 'Could you give us [rocket-propelled grenade launchers]?' They said no."
"Two weeks before Baghdad fell, the air base lost communications with its command center a few miles away. Every two days, officers arrived with handwritten messages and verbal reports on the status of the war, Saadoun said. The last messenger arrived two days before Baghdad fell."
The Iraqi army was hollow.
"...The rapid collapse of Iraq's premier fighting forces surprised American and Iraqi military commanders alike. But Iraqi officers from both the regular army and the special forces said the breakdown was due not only to U.S. bombardment but to the hollowness at the core of a military built on mistrust, deception and abuse."
"...Hussein formed the Special Republican Guard, with an estimated 15,000 to 25,000 soldiers, and put his son Qusay in charge. In 1995, he created the feared Fedayeen paramilitary force -- tens of thousands of men originally trained to quell internal uprisings and demonstrations. The Fedayeen answered to Hussein's more ruthless son, Uday. And just after the Palestinian uprising against Israel began in the fall of 2000, Hussein built the Al-Quds Army, a specialized military force that bore the Arabic name for Jerusalem and was ostensibly geared toward fighting the Israelis.
"'There was no coordination between these armies -- they hate each other,' said Brig. Rasheed Islam Joubouri, 56, who spent 34 years in a regular-army infantry unit.
"During the war, the lack of communication and coordination hastened the defeat of the Iraqi forces. A regular-army general in charge of an air defense unit in Baghdad said he was ordered not to activate his weapons because the Republican Guard was responsible for the city's defense."
"...Hussein's system of rewards also spawned an atmosphere of deceit that deluded the president into believing his armed forces went into the war far better equipped and militarily capable than they really were, senior officers said.
"Gen. Yasin Mohammad Taha Joubouri, an artillery specialist with 38 years in the regular army, said he was summoned to a meeting with the president in 1999, who ordered him to help the Defense Ministry build one of the largest artillery pieces in the world.
"The army, with assistance from specialists, designed a cannon with a barrel 210 millimeters -- more than eight inches -- in diameter, a weapon so cumbersome that Joubouri and the other specialists knew it could not work. Still, Joubouri helped build a full-scale model and drafted fake performance records to convince the president that the project was progressing.
"'No one could tell him it couldn't work,' said Joubouri, who said he was still working on the cannon when he left the army six months ago. 'He was giving us awards and presents.'"
Communications weere effectively severed.
"...Most air bases had virtually no defenses, said Saadoun, who was also stationed at Rashid air base. "They just gave us Kalashnikovs, not even antiaircraft weapons. We asked, 'Could you give us [rocket-propelled grenade launchers]?' They said no."
"Two weeks before Baghdad fell, the air base lost communications with its command center a few miles away. Every two days, officers arrived with handwritten messages and verbal reports on the status of the war, Saadoun said. The last messenger arrived two days before Baghdad fell."
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