Prigozhin tied to rebellion against military leadership
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Putin delivered a brief de facto eulogy of Prigozhin and reportedly deceased Wagner leadership on August 24, and portrayed Prigozhin as his loyal subordinate up until his death, the armed rebellion notwithstanding. Putin characterized Prigozhin as having a “difficult fate” in which he made “serious mistakes,” and Putin noted that he had known Prigozhin since the early 1990s. Putin notably stated that Prigozhin “achieved the necessary results both for himself and what I [Putin] asked him for – for a common cause, as in these last months.” Putin’s comment implies that Prigozhin had been fulfilling Putin’s orders recently and throughout their acquaintance and notably refrains from suggesting that Prigozhin had ever betrayed Putin, but subtly indicates that Prigozhin’s loyalty through the years was not enough to offset the “serious mistake” of launching a rebellion against the Russian military leadership. Putin’s speech largely confirms ISW’s prior assessment that Prigozhin did not intend to oust Putin during his June 24 rebellion and instead saw himself as loyal to Putin while seeking to force Putin to fire the Russian military leadership as he had been demanding.[8] A Russian insider source, citing an unnamed individual who knew Prigozhin, claimed that Prigozhin was confident that Putin would forgive him.[9] Prigozhin likely underestimated how seriously his rebellion had personally humiliated Putin. Prigozhin had also apparently overestimated the value of his own loyalty to Putin. Putin places significant value on loyalty and has frequently rewarded loyal Russian officials and military commanders even when they have failed. Prigozhin’s rebellion was an act of significant insubordination despite his claim that he rebelled out of loyalty to Russia.[10] Putin’s statement was therefore a warning to those currently loyal to Putin that some mistakes are too serious for loyalty to overcome.
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Clearly, Prigozzhin was not loyal enough for Putin and his military leadership. The fact that Prigozhin's criticism of Russian military leadership was not off base was not enough to save him. When you look at the military failures of the Russians in the Ukraine war, it is hard to argue that they have exhibited competence in preparing the troops for war and executing the war. The losses of troops and equipment have been significant in combat with what many saw as an inferior power.
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Even in Russia, Vladimir Putin looked feeble when he cut a desperate deal back in June with the mercenary Yevgeny Prigozhin to stop his astonishing march on Moscow. The Wagner Group had taken the Kremlin, and the world, by surprise: surely such an act could not go unpunished? Yet such was the precariousness of the Russian president’s position that he extended a hand to the man who had humiliated him.
The apparent death, therefore, of Prigozhin, the man dubbed “Putin’s chef”, has led many to argue this is a fundamental reassertion of the Kremlin authority: that the Russian president is back at “full strength”. Perhaps the brutal nature of the supposed assassination – a plane shot out of the sky, or blown up from within – has contributed to this narrative. Other potential centres of authority will see what happens if they betray him. There is no possibility of dissent; no alternative sources of power. Putin is back in charge – or so the argument goes.
But what if the opposite is true? That far from solidifying Putin’s authority, the Russian president may be, if anything, more vulnerable now than he was before?
It is surely not a ridiculous idea. Among ordinary soldiers, there was huge sympathy for Prigozhin’s coup attempt, especially among those who believed that Putin was being too soft on Ukraine. He was the soldiers’ champion, speaking out against the regime’s strategic failures and holding back of equipment.
Furious Wagner supporters, meanwhile, are already saying they will avenge their slain leader: he was the only one in the Russian command in their eyes capable of battlefield success in Ukraine, such as the seizure of the town of Bakhmut – albeit after nine-months of horrific violence. Putin may not even be able to purge Wagner entirely: if he did, where would that leave his Africa strategy?
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The blast wiped out a Russian long- and medium-range S-400 missile defense system known as "Triumph." According to Ukrainian intelligence, the entire system was destroyed, along with all missiles and personnel.
"Given the limited number of such systems in the enemy's arsenal, this is a painful blow to the occupiers' air defense system," the official statement read.
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Defence Intelligence reveals new details of special operation in Crimea
The Ukrainian military damaged four speedboats and killed at least 30 Russians due to the landing of Ukrainian troops near the village of Maiak in occupied Crimea.
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Russians destroy 60-70% of uncrewed surface vessels, but 30% remains dangerous for Russian Navy
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