Mullahocracy has Iran on brink of collapse

 Telegraph:

Last week, the Supreme Leader of Iran held a public meeting with the senior commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), urging them to remain steadfast and vigilant in the face of ongoing challenges.

Those watching the broadcast saw a leader who appeared tired and less enthused about the prospects of the regime he had led with an iron fist for the past 34 years.

Caught between political discontent and a flagging economy, the year following the death in custody of Mahsa Jina Amini has not been good for the Islamic Republic. With the prospect of protests reigniting on the anniversary of Amini’s death, Khamenei clearly thought it useful to stiffen the backbone of those tasked with maintaining order.

Yet the IRGC, long considered the shock troops of the revolution, are not as content with their lot as they used to be. Protected from the winds that regularly buffet the regime, members of the IRGC can normally expect to reap economic benefits from their privileged position. The last year has cast that benefit into question.

Moreover, with an ailing Supreme Leader, many commanders are already on manoeuvres preparing for the succession struggle, and Khamenei’s steady decline means that procrastination, which has always been a hallmark of the system, has reached stultifying levels.

Members of the IRGC are frustrated for two more reasons, both indicative of the long-term malaise affecting the regime. The first is that many of the young people protesting last year were their own sons and daughters who clearly have not bought into the regime’s ideology.

The second and arguably more fundamental problem is that of the prolonged economic decline which frames the seething political discontent. In leaks from IRGC commanders it is clear that the financial largesse that literally oiled the political system is waning, and that junior officers and guardsmen are seeking alternative means of income, including the selling of state secrets.

Quite why this is happening in a country as rich in mineral resources as Iran is frequently put down to sanctions. But sanctions are simply the salt rubbed into the self-inflicted wound of monumental mismanagement.

Iran is far from a poor country, but it is enormously corrupt. Consequently, as anyone who has tried to work in the country will tell you, the greatest sanctions on the Iranian economy are effectively imposed by the system itself. The problems are structural.

Prior to the revolution, the emphasis of Iran’s planners was on manufacture and the development of an industrial base. The Shah, anxious that his country would not be able to rely on oil as a source of income, was determined to diversify.

The revolution effectively put paid to such long-term planning, ideology became increasingly dominant in the regime’s outlook and it has since operated on the basis of a permanent revolution.

The result has been an unvirtuous circle of political volatility and economic crisis sustained by periodic uplifts in oil sales which merely serve to disguise the structural problem and defer any solutions.
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The leadership of Iran appears bereft of people with business sense and management.  Their prayers do not appear to be answered under the current regime.