Ukraine partisan operations against Russian troops

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As Russian manpower (too few and untrained) problems increased, so did Ukrainian Partisan activity in Russian occupied Ukraine, which now covers 110,000 square kilometers. This includes Crimea, which Russia took in 2014 and declared part of Russia. Not all inhabitants of Crimea, which comprises a quarter of the occupied territory, agree because there has been increasing partisan activity in Crimea for nearly six months. The Ukrainian government does not say anything specific about this because that could endanger the partisans and their operations. Some proof of government support comes from commercial satellite photos or rare reports from the Russians. Known support techniques include low night-flying helicopters and, if coastline is available, small boats used at night.

Currently partisan violence is most widespread and frequent in Kherson province, which is due north of Crimea. Russia is losing ground there at a rapid pace because there are less than 200,000 Russian troops in Ukraine, few of whom have much training beyond a few days with assault rifles some were never allowed to fire, and pretty much uniform desire to be anywhere but Ukraine. Partisan groups are usually led by someone with military experience and months of operating as a partisan. Most partisans are local and operate in areas where they grew up. That means lots of local support for the partisans and little help for the Russian soldiers. This has resulted in Russian forces deliberately withdrawing from Kherson City and the west side of the Dnieper River. The Russians are no longer forcing Ukrainian civilians to retreat with them. Getting across the rover is difficult with all the bridges destroyed and Ukrainian forces constantly and accurately attacking Russian boats or barges trying to move troops to the east bank or supplies in the other direction. Russian troops are short on essential supplies like ammunition and other items of military equipment. Staples like food and warm clothing can be taken from Ukrainian civilians. This situation indicates that the Ukrainians are receiving timely updates on where the Russians are trying to cross in boats. That’s because of the partisans, whose most valuable mission is reporting on what the enemy is up to so more powerful allies can act on that. Only in extreme situations do partisans themselves attack alert and well-armed troops.

Russia added another incentive to being or supporting partisans by increasingly exiling Ukrainian civilians to Russia. There, it is hoped, the Ukrainians will be “Russified”. With the Russians continuing to lose in Ukraine, the Russification of Ukrainians is not likely to happen because the partisans actively attack the Russians who are doing it and maintain records of who was deported and when as well who was killed or wounded while resisting deportation. These reports go to the Ukrainian government, which passes them on to UN war crimes investigators. These UN personnel are kept busy because each liberated town reveals additional evidence of Russian brutality. Reluctant Russian recruits sent to Ukraine are less prone to such bad behavior because they also wish Russian soldiers were gone from Ukraine, starting with themselves.

The main priority for the partisans is to disrupt Russian military operations. This often means attacking supply convoys or damaging roads, rail lines or bridges. For this the partisans need explosives and often help in preparing and placing the bombs. This is where the clandestine supply efforts by the government come in. Ukrainian armed forces have a section devoted to partisan support, including sending in supplies and often technical experts. Some of these flights take out badly wounded partisans. Partisans are often equipped with long-range radios and instructions on how to use them without being detected or having messages intercepted and read. The partisans have been getting better at this while Russian countermeasures diminish. The Russian ability to organize and carry out large scale anti-partisan operations is gone in most of the occupied territories.

Ukraine has also received covert in-country training and support from NATO nations with special operations troops who specialize in supporting partisan operations. This is primarily the United States and Britain, which were doing this in Ukraine since 2014 and more discreetly since early 2022. NATO also provides the partisans with timely satellite or aerial photos of Russian operations as well as special equipment for some attacks.


Ukraine has a long history of partisan operations. During World War II, Russian and Ukrainian partisans played a role in defeating the Nazi invaders, who had some initial local support until they graphically demonstrated their genocidal intent towards all Slavs. When the Nazis were driven out of Ukraine, many of the Ukrainian partisans continued fighting the Russians. Some of these partisan groups remained active into the 1950s. That was ten years after the Nazis were driven out of Ukraine. In early 2022 Russia claimed it was liberating Ukrainian from neo-Nazi groups. Russian troops soon discovered that they were the Nazi invaders and the Ukrainians still had lots of partisans with long-memories and determination to defeat the new Nazis.

One reason for the continued Ukrainian counteroffensive was the early appearance and growth of partisan forces in occupied territories and their ability to communicate with and support their government. Two months before the Ukrainian counter offensive began in late August, Russia openly denied the extent of the resistance in Kherson, calling armed partisans local bandits and gangsters. Video proof got out of Kherson, often in the form of video or audio of Russian troops stationed in Kherson complaining to friends and family back home about the partisans.
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Several months after the 2022 invasion began in February, the high casualties suffered by front line troops meant a lot of the troops occupying Crimea and Donbas were sent to the front, where most became casualties. At the time Russia needed fewer troops in Crimea because they had withdrawn most of their warships, aircraft and shipyard workers to Russia. Despite that, Ukrainian partisans have been more active in Crimea, destroying military aircraft with seeming impunity. Similar attacks are made on prominent Russians in Crimea and Ukrainian collaborators. In Donbas ethnic Russians and their Ukrainian collaborators are also under attack and departing for Russia or, if Ukrainian, quietly switching sides. Donbas used to be a good source of Russian troops but heavy casualties and Ukrainian offensive and partisan activity in Donbas has put an end to Russian recruiting efforts there.
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There is more.

The partisan operations explain what is going on beyond the Ukraine offensive and why Russia is still retreating further.  I suspect they also explain some of the operations in Crimea such as the attack on the main bridge into the Crimea region.  The partisans also were effective in helping Ukrainians in the region resist Russian efforts to enlist them in the Russian army.