A plan of attack against Syria
Timothy D. Hoyt:
This at least has some strategic considerations that direct affect the units and leaders involved in the attacks. The targeting is limited and may not be effective because many of the assets of this unit have already been hidden since the threat of the attacks began. I think the targeting of the people responsible may have some merit even if they go into hiding. I would still prefer to see a highly coordinated attack that would wipe out Assad's air assets and cripple his ability to use any that survive....
The ugly mismatch between ambiguous or highly aspirational ends and the rather limited means the West is likely to use is now a target of zealous criticism. Matching limited means to very expansive ends appears to most analysts to be a recipe for in effectiveness. Comparisons with the "Desert Fox" strike  against Iraq in 1998 are common. The litany of "what do we do next?" Is both persistent and quite reasonable.
The answer might lie in trying to reduce our objectives, and make them more consistent with our available or likely means. If air and cruise missile strikes, of limited duration, are the most likely option, how can we articulate objectives that would allow us to influence the situation on the ground in Syria, provide a means of assessing and demonstrating effectiveness in a reasonable time, AND be consonant with previously articulated policy preferences and concerns?
There is an opportunity here. The primary rationale for a strike at this time is to deter chemical weapons use. Our intelligence about the strike itself, about who ordered it, and about Syrian command and control and military practice is limited. Public reports have stated  that there was a frantic after-the-fact phone call from the Ministry of Defence to the units that launched the strike, and that unit has been identified as the Syrian 4th Armored Division. This provides an opportunity to deter future use—not so much by affecting Assad's mind set (he is, after all, a desperate dictator likely to use any means to stay in power), but rather by affecting the minds of those who might be authorized or inclined to use chemical weapons in the future.
Focus strikes on the 4th Armored Division. Make it clear that the unit is being punished for violating the norm against chemical weapons use. Destroy the headquarters, eliminate as much of the unit as possible, and make the message clear—units which resort to chemical weapon use will face a similar response in the future.
In addition to the military response, however, the West should use the other formidable tools at its disposal to publicly identify and punish the officers in the unit. Put their faces on Facebook and other social-networking sites. Identify them publicly, charge them with war crimes, and retaliate very specifically against their families as well. If they have foreign bank accounts, impound them. If their children study overseas, send them home to Syria. Deny them visas and travel permits and entry into foreign countries, or arrest them and send them home ignominiously and with great publicity.
Deterrence takes place at more than one level. We may have trouble, at acceptable cost, of assuring that Assad and his key cronies will recognize that chemical weapons use will end their regime. It may be easier, however, to convince the generals in the field that the use of chemical weapons will result in a swift, devastating, and personally destructive response. This certainly could be a powerful deterrent if generals are already authorized to use the weapons independently—they will know there will be costs to their forces, their lives, their reputations, and their families. It may even provide sufficient incentive, if the Assad regime chooses to escalate chemical-weapons use, to ignore or misplace an order, and thereby limit chemical weapons use from below, rather than from above.