The case for staying in Afghanistan

Kimberley Kagan and Frederick Kagan:

Will the United States continue to conduct counterterrorism operations in South Asia? That question is central to any discussion about U.S. troop presence and mission in Afghanistan. The answer can be yes only if we pursue and support the current strategy, retaining roughly 68,000 troops in Afghanistan into 2014 and about half that number thereafter.

Amateurs can discuss imaginary, over-the-horizon “light footprint” strategies. Professionals must consider logistics. Physics and military reality dictate the minimum number of troops needed to have any U.S. presence in Afghanistan without inviting calamities worse than the events in Benghazi, Libya. The presence of U.S. forces in Afghanistan alone permits counterterrorism operations in Pakistan. It’s this simple: Either we keep thenecessary number of troops in Afghanistan or operations against al-Qaeda and its affiliates in Afghanistan and Pakistan cease.

The principal terrorist concentrations in South Asia are in Pakistan’s federally administered tribal areas. Al-Qaeda and affiliated groups have sought safety in Afghanistan primarily in Konar and Nuristan provinces. U.S. forces could target terrorists without maintaining a ground presence in three ways: using armed Predator drones, special mission units or precision-guided munitions dropped from manned aircraft. Without bases in Afghanistan, the tyranny of distance rules out the first two options; the requirement for accuracy and certainty rules out the last.

North Waziristan is more than 600 miles from the nearest coastline; the other sanctuaries are farther. The U.S. Air Force reports that armed Predator drones have a range of about 1,150 miles — not enough to get to Waziristan and back again from the coast, much less to orbit and observe a target. Special mission units would have to parachute from transport aircraft because no helicopter in the U.S. inventory can fly that far. But they could not return because aircraft cannot land in the mountains of Eastern Afghanistan or in Pakistan. Manned aircraft can drop precision weapons on targets in Afghanistan, but they fly too fast to loiter over potential targets. Their bombs hit precisely what they are aimed at, but fast-moving aircraft cannot ensure that the target was actually there. There is no over-the-horizon solution to targeting terrorists in South Asia.

Bases in Afghanistan obviate all these problems. U.S. forces operating from Khost, Jalalabad and Kandahar can strike targets in Afghanistan (or Pakistan) with Predators and special mission units. Such operations have been critical to the success of counterterrorism operations in this region, including the killing of Osama bin Laden (Abbottabad is about 150 miles east of Jalalabad, 750 miles from the Indian Ocean).

The minimum U.S. footprint to sustain counterterrorism operations requires bases near Jalalabad, Khost and Kandahar to reach known terrorist havens (Khost and Jalalabad are less than 100 miles apart but are separated by a 10,000-foot mountain range). Each base requires an airstrip to fly Predators and move supplies by air. Each must also have aircraft ground crews and support the special mission units.

Base security and support impose serious troop requirements. These bases are in dangerous places, and we surely will not entrust the protection of U.S. personnel to local forces as we did in Benghazi. Securing the perimeter would require at least two companies of soldiers (alternating guard duty) and a company-size quick-reaction force — a battalion, in other words. Each base must also have the helicopters needed to move around and conduct operations — at least a combat aviation battalion — and a field medical facility able to handle severe trauma. That adds up to one combat brigade (3,500 soldiers) and one combat aviation brigade (5,000 to 6,000 soldiers).

That’s about 10,000 troops — without counting the supply or command and control of these forces. Even if we supply each base directly by air from outside Afghanistan, with no facility near Kabul, each base still needs logistical elements, probably at least 3,000 to 5,000 combat service support troops. The most idealized version of the limited counterterrorism footprint, therefore, is around 15,000 troops. At that strength we would not be able to advise, enable, support or rely on the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Since they, like our NATO allies, depend on U.S. enablers such as reconnaissance, helicopters, medevac and route-clearance packages, most of their operations would cease.

Thus this footprint would not allow our troops, our allies or the Afghans to maneuver. At best our troops and bases would become isolated islands focused on protecting themselves and irrelevant in the fight against al-Qaeda. At worst they would take losses much greater than we suffered in Benghazi.

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There is more.

To perform just this mission would probably take about 30,000 troops who are likely to be surrounded by a hostile environment if Kabul troops can't deal with the Taliban on their own.  The logistics of keeping the bases open would be difficult and would probably require bribing locals to keep supply routes open.

It is ironic that Afghanistan would become the base for for attacks on Pakistan terrorist camps.  One alternative not discussed because it probably would not be acceptable to the administration is a sustain aerial campaign against the Pakistan camps before we leave the area.  The sustained operations would probably be followed up with special forces troops to mop up remaining enemy enclaves.  Pakistan would clearly not be happy about such an operation, even though it would also be in that countries own interest.

While the Kagans make a compelling case, the real problem is probably a political one in this country.  There is a growing belief that the Afghans are not worth the effort.  Corruption and treachery have made them unpopular in terms of the sacrifice imposed on the troops and the treasury.  We have a leader in Obama, who lacks the capacity to inspire further efforts.  That is going to make the sell of continued operations difficult.  It will probably be up to Republicans to make that sell, if they can.