What to do with the Pakistan Taliban sanctuaries

Ralph Peters:

When the conflict in Iraq was going badly, critics repeatedly suggested parallels with the Vietnam War. None of the comparisons held up. But Afghanistan is different: One tragic parallel makes a decisive success almost impossible to achieve.

The problem is that our enemies have a sanctuary across the border in Pakistan — just as the North Vietnamese army enjoyed havens in Laos, Cambodia and north of the demilitarized zone above South Vietnam.

We dropped bombs then, as we sometimes do now (though in far lesser numbers today), but a ground enemy has to be defeated on the ground. Troops must pursue the enemy to his last stronghold to eliminate the threat.

At present, the Taliban, al-Qaeda and their affiliates can muster their forces in Pakistan, cross into Afghanistan, make deadly mischief, then withdraw to fight another day. It's a savage game of hide-and-seek that keeps Afghanistan's poorest provinces unsettled, blocking development and inflicting terror on those who simply want to live in peace.

The answer seems obvious: Send our ground forces into Pakistan. Democratic Sen. Barack Obama has suggested that, as president, he'd do this. But the obvious answer is the wrong answer.

I've been up in Pakistan's northwest frontier. Our enemies can hide in some of the most rugged terrain on earth — far more difficult than anything in Iraq. Vast, lawless reaches of ungoverned territory belong to Pakistan in name only. Extreme Islamic law prevails — and it's growing harsher. A military move across the frontier would have to be big, it would be resisted bitterly and our troops would have to remain indefinitely.

And that's only the beginning of the challenge. While Iraq has more than 27 million Muslims, some of whom like us, Pakistan has nearly 163 million, and anti-Americanism has been brewed to a vicious heat by generations of Pakistani politicians. Were we to cross the border in force, popular sentiment would demand a military confrontation with us, which Pakistan's army doesn't want but wouldn't be able to avoid.

Beyond that, a crucial issue goes ignored by just-send-in-the-troops advocates: Our forces (and NATO's) in Afghanistan depend on Pakistan's ports, roads and rail network for re-supply. Were Pakistan to shut the gate, the flow of everything from fuel, ammunition and spare parts to food and bottled water would slow to the inadequate trickle that aircraft could deliver. Logistics problems could break our forces without a shot being fired.

The only alternative would be to bring in our supplies through Iranian ports — and Tehran's not about to allow that.

What can we do? Intensify what we're already doing: Rely on intelligence, special operations and selective airstrikes for now. As long as we throw well-aimed punches and leave, Pakistan's government will complain publicly but will accept our actions privately — and be glad of them.

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I have made the point before that we are fortunate that al Qaeda chose to make Iraq the central front in their war with us. Peters points out how the Afghan Pakistan terrain is much more favorable to an insurgency.

The strategic defeat we imposed on al Qaeda in Iraq has them reeling back into Pakistan and Afghanistan. To defeat them in Afghanistan we need to get a better handle on the avenues of approach into the country from Pakistan. We also need to improve our intelligence in the FATA of Pakistan.