Pakistan a master of doing the minimum
LA Times:
The Pakistanis have been masters of doing the minimum needed to avoid US reprisals. They were that way before 9-11 and little has changed other than immediately after the attacks the minimum was higher for awhile. The minimum is on the rise again after the failure of the attempts to negotiate with the Taliban.
Pakistan needs to consider how high that minimum is going to be if another successful attack is launched from their real estate. It will probably be more than they can handle.
...There is more.
"Everyone who serves in Pakistan comes back frustrated," a former CIA case officer said. The case officer, like many other officials, spoke on condition of anonymity when describing U.S. counter-terrorism activity in Pakistan because the efforts are highly sensitive and the officials in many cases are not authorized to speak publicly.
Two troubled options define the U.S. approach. One is the present policy of counting on a politically evolving Pakistan to address the problem, which could allow Al Qaeda to operate relatively unmolested for years. The other, unilateral U.S. military action, even counter-terrorism hard-liners acknowledge, might only compound the militant threat.
Asked what might cause the United States to recalculate its present course, one high-ranking U.S. counter-terrorism analyst said, "Obviously, another attack on the homeland."
"Had the plot in Britain in 2006 succeeded, we would not be having this conversation," the official said, referring to an alleged scheme in which suspects were to detonate liquid explosives on transatlantic flights. "I suspect that in the spectrum of Pakistan as ally and Pakistan as territory that needs to be cleansed, we would have moved toward the latter."
To some, such comments underscore a shift in mind-set since the Sept. 11 attacks, a step back from policies of preemptive action despite warnings from the CIA director in March that Al Qaeda’s base in Pakistan represents a “clear and present danger” to the West.
The co-chair of the 9/11 Commission, Lee Hamilton, said, "The similarities between Afghanistan before Sept. 11 and Pakistan today are striking and deeply worrisome.
"At what point do you say we cannot tolerate this anymore?"
...
CIA operatives stationed in spartan compounds across the tribal region provide U.S. funding, equipment and intelligence to their Pakistani counterparts. But officials say it is a struggle to persuade the Pakistanis to act.
On some CIA bases, "it's just well known that nothing is going to be done," said the former CIA case officer who served in the region.
"We'd be like, 'What about this guy? What about that guy? Can we get surveillance? How about targeting him?' " the former officer said. "We'd propose things and [Pakistani officials] would never get back to us."
In other locations, kernels of cooperation have led to occasional arrests or missile strikes on suspected Al Qaeda compounds. But the successes have been fleeting, and the mission unfulfilled.
...
The Pakistanis have been masters of doing the minimum needed to avoid US reprisals. They were that way before 9-11 and little has changed other than immediately after the attacks the minimum was higher for awhile. The minimum is on the rise again after the failure of the attempts to negotiate with the Taliban.
Pakistan needs to consider how high that minimum is going to be if another successful attack is launched from their real estate. It will probably be more than they can handle.
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