With decline in combat operations troops move to training Iraqis

Michael Gordon, NY Times:

With violence in Iraq on the decline and a quarter of American combat brigades scheduled to leave by July, commanders plan to give the remaining brigades an expanded role in training and supporting Iraqi forces, according to officials involved in a confidential military review of the next phase of the American troop deployment.

The plan, not yet in final form, is intended to transfer more of the security burden in Iraq to the Iraqis without giving up the gains that the Americans have made in recent months in pacifying the most violent areas and weakening the Sunni insurgency.

The approach is strikingly different from the plans advocated by many United States politicians, including some Democratic presidential contenders, who have called for a rapid withdrawal of American combat brigades from Iraq — the very units that American commanders see as playing a central role in the transition toward Iraqi control.

It is intended to supplement the longstanding American efforts to recruit, equip and advise Iraqi forces by strengthening their ability to deal with a diverse array of threats. The plan also reflects the vision of American commanders of the evolving role of American combat units after President Bush’s troop reinforcement plan runs its course next summer.

Under the approach, some American combat brigades due to stay behind would slim down their fighting forces and enlarge the teams mentoring Iraqis. Within a 3,000-member brigade, for example, one or two battalions might help train the Iraqis while the rest would be retained as quick-reaction forces to back up the Iraqis if they ran into stiff resistance.

The precise arrangements would vary depending on the threats and the quality of Iraqi forces in specific regions, and brigade commanders would have considerable leeway in deciding how many soldiers to commit to mentoring. But the shift toward training would be gradual, reflecting what commanders say have been lessons learned from the failure of earlier, overhasty efforts to transfer responsibility to the Iraqis.

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Transferring security to the Iraqis was at the core of the initial United States strategy in Iraq. Gen. George W. Casey Jr., General Petraeus’s predecessor as Iraq commander, voiced optimism last year that the Iraqi military and police might be just 12 to 18 months from assuming the main responsibility.

But efforts to quickly transfer authority often backfired. In Diyala Province, for example, Iraqi Army commanders carried out a sectarian agenda, detaining local Sunni leaders whom American commanders were trying to engage, and failing to curb the inroads made by Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, a largely Iraqi insurgent group that American intelligence officials say has foreign leadership. After much of Baquba, the provincial capital, fell under insurgent control, the American military was forced to mount an offensive in June to reclaim the city.

American military officials assert that the situation has changed, which may make it easier for the Iraqi forces to assume more of a security role. Partly as a result of the American troop reinforcements and a new counterinsurgency strategy, violence has subsided, making security more manageable. Many Sunnis now reject Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, and thousands have volunteered in local neighborhood watch organizations.

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In Mosul, only a single battalion of American troops — in concert with a large number of Iraqi soldiers and police officers — helps provide security for a city of more than a million. Still, considerable challenges remain. The Iraqi Army has only about half the noncommissioned officers it needs. Another important weakness, said Maj. Gen. Benjamin R. Mixon, who recently completed his tour as the senior American commander in northern Iraq, is that Iraqi military training has been focused on developing the skills of individual soldiers, not on fighting as a unit.

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There is much more. Gordon hits on a very important reason not to rush again. NCOs become the backbone of a military fighting force and you cannot create them overnight. Usually they have a minimum of three years experience on up to 20 or more years. You cannot wave a wand and give people that experience.

It has also become obvious that Casey's plan for transferring responsibility to Iraqis was too aggressive and was a failure when al Qaeda responded by increasing its mass murder attacks on Shia non combatants which resulted in reprisal attacks by Shia militia. With the US having tamped down al Qaeda forces through the surge and the counterinsurgency strategy, the Shia militia no longer have the excuse for attacking Sunnis.

In recent days al Qaeda has focused its activity on fighting former Sunni insurgents. That is probably a loser strategy too, since it is not going to endear them to the only Iraqis who have supported them at all.