The media and the Zinni amnesia

Noel Sheppard:

Have you ever considered the peculiar yet convenient amnesia that regularly strikes members of the drive-by media when it fits their political agenda? Given the development of the Internet, the accuracy and ease of search engines, and the ready access of more detailed media devices such as LexisNexis available for truly inquiring minds, the contagion no longer threatens the general public. But the as yet un-named malady (Rodham’s Syndrome, perhaps?) still remains virulent among those whose at-risk behavior persists.

Heedless of the investigative tools presently at the disposal of all interested in the grand search for information, the at-risk population who are paid to disseminate the news, seem to conveniently forget what has been reported almost as soon as it happens. They appear to be counting on the population to suffer from this same instantaneous mnemonic dysfunction.

No finer example of such media memory lapse has occurred recently than what is transpiring with all the military generals now waxing publicly philosophic about why we never should have gone to war with Iraq.

One of the more prominent members of the hindsight-worshipping crowd is former Clinton CENTCOM commander Gen. Anthony Zinni, who has now conspicuously stated that he never saw any proof that Saddam possessed weapons of mass destruction or was in any way an imminent threat.

Of course, this has been thoroughly debunked by the recent revelation here of a February 29, 2000 briefing by Zinni to Congress, wherein the general made it quite clear that “Iraq remains the most significant near-term threat to U.S. interests in the Arabian Gulf region,” stating quite unequivocally that Iraq either possessed or was aggressively pursuing WMD.

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Still, an even more bizarre oddity concerning the media’s acceptance of Zinni’s current position is another revelation from 2000 that the general actually briefed senior Clinton administration officials concerning a massive military strike to overthrow Saddam.

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Yet, conceivably the most telling statement made by Zinni in this piece was the following:

Containment is what you do when you can’t come up with the popular will to take decisive military action. [emphasis added]

Clearly, Zinni was expressing frustration with containment, which, if you read the entire Tribune article, put him in quite good company, for this passive strategy was certainly not achieving its intended goal. However, as Zinni made quite clear, without popular support for a grander military solution, his options were limited.

By contrast, prior to the March 2003 Iraq invasion, Bush and Company were indeed able to come up with the “popular will” that Zinni spoke of so longingly. In fact, over seventy percent of the nation was behind the incursion when it first began.

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There is much more. This is the type if stuff that Tim Russert usually pelts guests with. It is curious that he overlooked it in his latest interview with Zinni.