Report on Post-Confict Capabilities is flawed
This report seems to operate under the assumption that "post war" problems in Iraq are the result of poor planning, and that future conflicts will face similar problems.
I think both premises are flawed. The problems in Iraq are a direct result of an enemy that chose not to contest the battlefield, but to contest governance. Afghanistan, to date has not experienced problems in governance to the same extent.
This is not to say that no mistakes were made during the end phase of the war. There should have been a plan to seize key buidings and infrastructure that would have not only taken control of the government, but also have prevented looting. In that regard, marshall law should have been imposed immediately to prevent the ali babas from looting in general. This looting contributed to an atmosphere suggesting that no one was in charge. Clearly there were no Iraqis forces that could have effectively stopped the looting contrary to suggestions that it was a mistake to disband Iraqi military and police units, they had already disbanded themselves as part of the enemy plan to make war against governance.
The report's suggestion that the State Department should be in charge of this post war governance phase also ignores several problems. First, is that the State Department has no capacity to deal with an enemy who is making war on governance. The military is still the only branch of government that has the capacity to deal with the war on governance. Second, the State Department employees do not have the same degree of loyalty to the mission that military forces have demonstrated. Many in the State Department opposed the use of force and would have little incentive to see the mission to a successful conclusion. In fact they might be inclined to think that failure would enhance their credibility in future conflicts that might require force.
What the military needs to do in future conflicts is be prepared to seize the mechanics of goverance immediately and prepare to aggressively defend them.
The report suggest that more troops may have been needed for this post war phase of operations. That is something for military planners to consider. It has to be weighed against considerations that make it clear to the population that they are expected to take over governance as soon as possible, including security functions. It has to be made clear to the local population that they will have to take responsibility for governance as soon as possible. It is the difference between liberation and occupation.
It would be a mistake to think that the end of every future conflict will be like what has been seen in Iraq. Setting up a permanent bureauocracy based on the problems of one war is a wasteful way to deal with a problem.
I do recommend reading the report. It is easy to see why both the State Department and the Defense Department may like its recommendations. State gets more power and Defense avoids responsibility for a post war mess. But, an enemy like the one we face in Iraq will still be capable of making a mess, even if they can never win. The enemy in Iraq appears to have a cockroach strategy. They can hang around and make a mess and make people uncomfortable, but they do not have the ability to take over the house, unless we walk away and leave it to them.
This report seems to operate under the assumption that "post war" problems in Iraq are the result of poor planning, and that future conflicts will face similar problems.
I think both premises are flawed. The problems in Iraq are a direct result of an enemy that chose not to contest the battlefield, but to contest governance. Afghanistan, to date has not experienced problems in governance to the same extent.
This is not to say that no mistakes were made during the end phase of the war. There should have been a plan to seize key buidings and infrastructure that would have not only taken control of the government, but also have prevented looting. In that regard, marshall law should have been imposed immediately to prevent the ali babas from looting in general. This looting contributed to an atmosphere suggesting that no one was in charge. Clearly there were no Iraqis forces that could have effectively stopped the looting contrary to suggestions that it was a mistake to disband Iraqi military and police units, they had already disbanded themselves as part of the enemy plan to make war against governance.
The report's suggestion that the State Department should be in charge of this post war governance phase also ignores several problems. First, is that the State Department has no capacity to deal with an enemy who is making war on governance. The military is still the only branch of government that has the capacity to deal with the war on governance. Second, the State Department employees do not have the same degree of loyalty to the mission that military forces have demonstrated. Many in the State Department opposed the use of force and would have little incentive to see the mission to a successful conclusion. In fact they might be inclined to think that failure would enhance their credibility in future conflicts that might require force.
What the military needs to do in future conflicts is be prepared to seize the mechanics of goverance immediately and prepare to aggressively defend them.
The report suggest that more troops may have been needed for this post war phase of operations. That is something for military planners to consider. It has to be weighed against considerations that make it clear to the population that they are expected to take over governance as soon as possible, including security functions. It has to be made clear to the local population that they will have to take responsibility for governance as soon as possible. It is the difference between liberation and occupation.
It would be a mistake to think that the end of every future conflict will be like what has been seen in Iraq. Setting up a permanent bureauocracy based on the problems of one war is a wasteful way to deal with a problem.
I do recommend reading the report. It is easy to see why both the State Department and the Defense Department may like its recommendations. State gets more power and Defense avoids responsibility for a post war mess. But, an enemy like the one we face in Iraq will still be capable of making a mess, even if they can never win. The enemy in Iraq appears to have a cockroach strategy. They can hang around and make a mess and make people uncomfortable, but they do not have the ability to take over the house, unless we walk away and leave it to them.
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