Iran overplays its hand

Amir Taheri talks about the rise of an Arab alliance directed against Iran's attempt to dominate the region. He sees the recently brokered deal between the Palestinians as undercutting Iran's ambitions. I have my doubts about that aspect of his column but the rest of it makes some sense in terms of the interest of the six plus two group, the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, plus Jordan and Egypt.

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As always with alliances, this bloc formed in response to a clear and present danger. The perceived threat comes from the Islamic Republic of Iran - which can't decide whether it is a nation-state or a revolutionary cause.

The Mecca accord is a blow to the Islamic Republic's investment in Hamas and in Islamic Jihad in the hope of overthrowing President Abbas and extinguishing any chance of talks with Israel. Iran's president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, had designated the Palestinian territories as part of Iran's turf in an eventual war with Israel and the United States; with the Mecca accord, Tehran loses that part of its imagined power.

Back in 2004, with the United States apparently bogged down in Iraq, the "revolutionary cause" advocates in Tehran moved onto the offensive. They argued that America would run away, first from Iraq and then from the whole region, burying dreams of a Pax Americana - so that Tehran could then impose a regional Pax Khomeinista as a first step toward claiming the leadership of Islam.

The first move was to turn Syria into a client state; the next, to trigger last summer's war between Israel and Hezbollah. The perception that Israel was humiliated in that conflict enhanced Iran's prestige as a power capable of, one day, wiping "the Zionist enemy" off the map.

But then Tehran overplayed its hand by ordering Hezbollah to try to seize power in Beirut. The specter of a "Shiite Crescent," first evoked by Jordan's King Abdullah II and dismissed as hyperbole, suddenly appeared real.

After some initial hesitation, the 6+2 nations decided to draw a line in the sand on Lebanon: Tehran would not be allowed to seize power in Beirut. The group's determination made it possible for the broader international community to also rally behind the government of Prime Minister Fuad Siniora. By the end of January, it had become clear that Tehran's bid in Beirut, although damaging Lebanon, had no chance of sweeping Hezbollah into power.

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Ahmadinejad may have to rethink his dismissal of the Gulf states as "gas stations, not real countries." The 6+2 is emerging as a real force. It has much scope for expansion by including such moderate Arab states as Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. Somewhere down the road, Iraq , too, will join. Both Afghanistan and Pakistan are already undeclared allies of the 6+2, as is Turkey.

The Islamic Republic, by contrast, has no allies outside Syria - and no prospect of attracting any.

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He goes on to list three more significant mistakes that galvanized the group into action. I have strong reservations about the Mecca deal. I think Hamas got much more than Fatah in this deal, which seems to be to the benefit of Tehran. However his larger point appears to be correct. By trying to dominate Lebanon, the Palestinians and Iraq, Iran has made itself a target with no real allies and many opponents. It is still a small dog who likes to bark and make noise, but the resistance to its efforts is bearing fruit.