Should Republicans go ahead and add Supreme Court Justices to head off Democrats

The non growth of the antiwra movement

James Robbins:

"Antiwar Fervor Fills the Streets,” the Washington Post headline blared, “Demonstration is Largest in Capital Since US Military Invaded Iraq.” Sounds like something big. We have heard a lot about the antiwar movement lately — rapidly growing, burgeoning, mushrooming (I’m sure some of them are). Reading the enthusiastic Post story you’d get the idea that we were back in the Sixties, the Golden Age of protest. This is the flip side of the Vietnam analogy; if Iraq is Nam, then today’s protesters are the SDS and the Yippies. Same slogans, same love beads, same tie-dye and sandals. But the same impact? No way, man.

Let’s check the numbers — the body count, if you will. Officials estimated turnout for Saturday’s rally in Washington at 100,000, a respectable number. However, that’s how many turned out for the October 26, 2002, antiwar rally five months before the war in Iraq began. Similar numbers were on hand for the January 18, 2003, demo, and that was in 20-degree weather. So it’s hard to see how Saturday’s turnout constitutes a sign of growth in the movement. Compare those flat-line figures to the standard set by the Nam-era protesters. The April 17, 1965, SDS protest attracted 25,000 people, at the time the largest antiwar rally ever in D.C. Three times that number gathered on October 21, 1967 — this was the one where Abbie Hoffman tried to levitate the Pentagon. The November 15, 1969 “New Mobe” rally brought in over 250,000. That is a respectable growth curve, a tenfold increase over four years.

Moreover, Saturday’s 100,000 turnout is anemic compared to other recent examples of street theater. The April 25, 2004 March for Women’s Lives (more here) attracted 500,000 (organizers claimed 1.15 million), and last year’s demonstrations in New York during the Republican National Convention were also in the half-million range. This was in line with the June 12, 1982, Central Park Nuclear Freeze rally. And for really effective mobilization it’s hard to beat the Million Man March, actually 800,000 strong, about the same number that turned out for the June 8, 1991, Desert Storm Victory parade.

The post Tet polls mixed dissatisfaction by people who wanted to win the war and by those dissatisfied because they wanted to lose the war. I think the same is true with the Iraq war. The approval ratings on the war tend to go up or down with the perception that we are winning or losing. The media has been selling the perception that we are losing pretty hard lately and that would tend to make both sides register dissattisfaction. A better poll question would be to ask whether they want to win or lose in Iraq. Don't let either side slide by with dissatisfaction.

Even Rowan Scarborough of the Washington Times says that some in the Pentagon are doing a sober assessments after their optomism following the elections. At the time I attributed the decline in enemy activity after the election to the enemy's making a maximum effort prior to the election which expended his resources of human and vehicle bombs. He needed to to rebuild his inventory and that is what he is expended now. The enemy thinks he is on a mission from god with griviances going back to the 12th century. He is not going to lose heart and quit. He must be destroyed.

We are infact doing a pretty good job of destroying the enemy in Iraq. The successful operation in Tal Afar as well as those in Mosul have shrunk the enemy's area of operation. Focused has now shifted further south along the Syrian border and along the river valley to Ramadi.

Bill Roggio reports:

The Coalition continues to conduct targeted strikes on al Qaeda in the Qaim region along the Syrian border. A safe house in the town of Al 'Ushsh, which is about two miles from Qaim, was destroyed. Abu Nasir, who according to CENTCOM was believed to be “a senior al Qaeda in Iraq foreign fighter facilitator and the alleged new al Qaeda in Iraq Emir of Karabilah” was among an estimated twenty terrorists killed in the attack.

Abu Nasir's tenure as al Qaeda Emir of the Qaim region was short-lived. He follows in the footsteps of Abu Ali, who was confirmed killed during a targeted airstrike in Haditha on September 18. Command in the Qaim region, like that in the Mosul region, is becoming a difficult job to retain.

Coalition intelligence in western Anbar appears to be improving, as senior al Qaeda leaders and large cells have been the targets of numerous successful operations. Col. Stephen Davis, the commander of the Marines Regimental Combat Team 2 states that the recent push along the Euphrates is the direct result of intelligence gains; “The buildup is driven by the fact that intelligence pulls us where the threat is… We always go where the intel drives us.”

The life cycle of the various "Emirs" has shortened to a matter of days in some cases because of improved intelligence. This is particularly true in the Qaim area where Zarqawi has alienated one of the Sunni tribes. Read all of Roggio's report.

(This is the third time I have tried to post this item. The first two were frustrated by the power going off.)