Anatomy of the Iraqi Army collapse
Saddam and his sons gave conflicting orders and in some cases failed to communicate with their troops as the US forces were closing on them.
When the US forces reached Baghdad, they waivered between denial and irrationality.
"...But the truth was becoming inescapable. By April 7, according to two former soldiers, Saddam and Qusai Hussein had been reduced to commanding the military from a roving convoy of vehicles trying to stay one step ahead of American tanks pouring into the city center that morning.
"A former Republican Guard general and division commander said he met with Saddam and Qusai at the 14th of July Bridge in central Baghdad early on April 7. The two leaders were in separate gold, four-wheel-drive Toyotas, said the general, who answered questions relayed by an aide on the condition that he not be identified, saying he feared arrest by U.S. occupation forces.
"At that moment, the general said, the two leaders realized that most Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard soldiers assigned to defend the main palace complex had deserted.
"Told that U.S. tanks were advancing on the strategic Jumhuriya Bridge, the general said, Saddam Hussein ordered 12 pickup trucks of Fedayeen to the bridge to hold off the column. 'Imagine — a few pickup trucks against two battalions' of American tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles, the general said.
"Later that morning, the general said, Hussein changed cars, getting into an orange-and-white Nissan taxicab.
"Harith Ahmed Uraibi, 24, an archivist at the Republican presidential palace who was also a Baath Party militiaman, said he fled on foot when U.S. tanks overran the palace early April 7. He stumbled upon Hussein's convoy in front of a falafel restaurant near Jumhuriya Bridge. He said the president shouted at him: 'What's going on at the palaces?'
"'I told him, 'Mr. President, everything is finished,' Uraibi said. 'He didn't say anything. His convoy just took off across the bridge, away from the palaces and all the tanks.'"
"...The few commanders who realized how desperate the situation had become were afraid to relay honest battlefield assessments up the chain of command. 'It was well known that President Hussein did not care to receive bad news,' one former general said.
"Others were deluded by the regime's own propaganda. Many commanders said they actually believed Hussein's hapless minister of information, Mohammed Said Sahaf, who brazenly denied that U.S. forces had entered Baghdad on April 7 and described the slaughter of Americans.
"Talal Ahmed Doori, 32, a burly Baath Party militia commander and former bodyguard for Hussein's older son, Uday, recalled turning a corner in his car early April 7 and coming face to face with an American M1A1 Abrams tank posted next to a tunnel in central Baghdad.
"'I was absolutely astonished,' Doori recalled. 'I had no idea there were American tanks anywhere near the city.'
"When he slammed on his brakes, a vehicle behind him smashed into his car, Doori said. Both he and the other driver sped away as the tank swung its main gun toward them.
"After the information minister claimed that Iraqi forces had retaken the Baghdad airport from U.S. troops, two former commanders said, Republican Guard Gen. Mohammed Daash was dispatched to check out a rumor that four or five American tanks had survived the Iraqi counterattack.
"Daash returned to his headquarters in a panic. 'Four or five tanks!' the commanders quoted Daash as telling his fellow generals. 'Are you out of your minds? The whole damn American Army is at the airport!'"
"...Hussein, convinced that Republican Guard units posted south of Baghdad would repel American tanks, had decided not to mine highways or blow up bridges leading into the capital, commanders said. The infrastructure was left intact so that it could be used by Iraqi forces mounting counterattacks. But entire Republican Guard divisions were ravaged, first by coalition warplanes and then by tanks approaching the capital.
"Hussein also was counting on high American casualties and captured U.S. soldiers to turn the American public against the war, commanders said. Video crews and interpreters were standing by to interview any captured Americans, said retired Gen. Juwad Dayni.
"Commanders interviewed for this article said they were issued no orders regarding chemical or biological weapons. And they denied that Iraq ever possessed such weapons.
"Iraqi military planners assumed that Americans would dare not send tanks into an urban area and did not anticipate a direct tank assault on the capital, retired Gen. Rahal said."
"...Several commanders said that American casualties inflicted by Somali fighters in 1993 convinced the Iraqi leadership that U.S. forces had no stomach for a prolonged urban fight — apparently overlooking the fact that the U.S. had no armor in Somalia. The Iraqi leadership prepared instead for an airborne assault on selected regime targets, building a network of defensive bunkers and trenches.
"'We weren't prepared, but it didn't matter because the tank assault was so fast and sudden,' said Gen. Omar Abdul Karim, 50, a regular army commander. 'The Americans were able to divide and isolate our forces. Nobody had any idea what was going on until it was too late.'"
A very interesting article, worth the read.
Saddam and his sons gave conflicting orders and in some cases failed to communicate with their troops as the US forces were closing on them.
When the US forces reached Baghdad, they waivered between denial and irrationality.
"...But the truth was becoming inescapable. By April 7, according to two former soldiers, Saddam and Qusai Hussein had been reduced to commanding the military from a roving convoy of vehicles trying to stay one step ahead of American tanks pouring into the city center that morning.
"A former Republican Guard general and division commander said he met with Saddam and Qusai at the 14th of July Bridge in central Baghdad early on April 7. The two leaders were in separate gold, four-wheel-drive Toyotas, said the general, who answered questions relayed by an aide on the condition that he not be identified, saying he feared arrest by U.S. occupation forces.
"At that moment, the general said, the two leaders realized that most Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard soldiers assigned to defend the main palace complex had deserted.
"Told that U.S. tanks were advancing on the strategic Jumhuriya Bridge, the general said, Saddam Hussein ordered 12 pickup trucks of Fedayeen to the bridge to hold off the column. 'Imagine — a few pickup trucks against two battalions' of American tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles, the general said.
"Later that morning, the general said, Hussein changed cars, getting into an orange-and-white Nissan taxicab.
"Harith Ahmed Uraibi, 24, an archivist at the Republican presidential palace who was also a Baath Party militiaman, said he fled on foot when U.S. tanks overran the palace early April 7. He stumbled upon Hussein's convoy in front of a falafel restaurant near Jumhuriya Bridge. He said the president shouted at him: 'What's going on at the palaces?'
"'I told him, 'Mr. President, everything is finished,' Uraibi said. 'He didn't say anything. His convoy just took off across the bridge, away from the palaces and all the tanks.'"
"...The few commanders who realized how desperate the situation had become were afraid to relay honest battlefield assessments up the chain of command. 'It was well known that President Hussein did not care to receive bad news,' one former general said.
"Others were deluded by the regime's own propaganda. Many commanders said they actually believed Hussein's hapless minister of information, Mohammed Said Sahaf, who brazenly denied that U.S. forces had entered Baghdad on April 7 and described the slaughter of Americans.
"Talal Ahmed Doori, 32, a burly Baath Party militia commander and former bodyguard for Hussein's older son, Uday, recalled turning a corner in his car early April 7 and coming face to face with an American M1A1 Abrams tank posted next to a tunnel in central Baghdad.
"'I was absolutely astonished,' Doori recalled. 'I had no idea there were American tanks anywhere near the city.'
"When he slammed on his brakes, a vehicle behind him smashed into his car, Doori said. Both he and the other driver sped away as the tank swung its main gun toward them.
"After the information minister claimed that Iraqi forces had retaken the Baghdad airport from U.S. troops, two former commanders said, Republican Guard Gen. Mohammed Daash was dispatched to check out a rumor that four or five American tanks had survived the Iraqi counterattack.
"Daash returned to his headquarters in a panic. 'Four or five tanks!' the commanders quoted Daash as telling his fellow generals. 'Are you out of your minds? The whole damn American Army is at the airport!'"
"...Hussein, convinced that Republican Guard units posted south of Baghdad would repel American tanks, had decided not to mine highways or blow up bridges leading into the capital, commanders said. The infrastructure was left intact so that it could be used by Iraqi forces mounting counterattacks. But entire Republican Guard divisions were ravaged, first by coalition warplanes and then by tanks approaching the capital.
"Hussein also was counting on high American casualties and captured U.S. soldiers to turn the American public against the war, commanders said. Video crews and interpreters were standing by to interview any captured Americans, said retired Gen. Juwad Dayni.
"Commanders interviewed for this article said they were issued no orders regarding chemical or biological weapons. And they denied that Iraq ever possessed such weapons.
"Iraqi military planners assumed that Americans would dare not send tanks into an urban area and did not anticipate a direct tank assault on the capital, retired Gen. Rahal said."
"...Several commanders said that American casualties inflicted by Somali fighters in 1993 convinced the Iraqi leadership that U.S. forces had no stomach for a prolonged urban fight — apparently overlooking the fact that the U.S. had no armor in Somalia. The Iraqi leadership prepared instead for an airborne assault on selected regime targets, building a network of defensive bunkers and trenches.
"'We weren't prepared, but it didn't matter because the tank assault was so fast and sudden,' said Gen. Omar Abdul Karim, 50, a regular army commander. 'The Americans were able to divide and isolate our forces. Nobody had any idea what was going on until it was too late.'"
A very interesting article, worth the read.
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