Electronic warfare in Europe

 Yahoo News:

Russia launched a barrage of 40 cruise, aero-ballistic, and ballistic missiles at Ukrainian cities on Jan. 13. Eight of them were shot down, while more than two dozen exploded before reaching their intended targets, largely due to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW). Ukrainian Air Force spokesman Yuriy Ihnat subsequently urged local authorities to invest in civilian-grade EW infrastructure to counter Russian aerial attacks.

In an interview with NV on Jan. 18, Oleh Katkov, Editor-in-Chief of Ukrainian outlet Defense Express, commented on the attack and analyzed how electronic warfare could affect enemy missiles and drones.

NV: Do you think that electronic warfare systems can, at least theoretically, really affect the missiles used to attack Ukraine?

Katkov: Not even just theoretically, but practically so. But for this, we must understand what kind of missile, with what type of guidance and what kind of electronic warfare system we are dealing with. After all, electronic warfare is a huge number of various electronic warfare means and countermeasures. Therefore, it’s difficult to speak in general terms. We must analyze each type of Russian long-range weapons and be specific.

Read also: Russia suffers major equipment losses as Ukrainian forces strike Zoopark radar and Repelent-1 electronic warfare stations

Let’s start, for example, with Iranian-made kamikaze drones. The main navigation system in the Shahed-136 drones is satellite-based [GPS, GLONASS, etc.]. Without it, this UAV has only a primitive inertial guidance system, in fact an autopilot, which has an estimated error margin of 5%. That is, if the UAV flies through a continuous field of electronic warfare systems that jam and interfere with satellite navigation, in this case, at a range of 100 km, the drone will strike 5 km away from its intended target.

If we consider, for example, a cruise missile, it’s a much more expensive and advanced long-range weapon than the Iranian drones. In addition to satellite navigation, which is only one of the systems on board, it also has an inertial system that helps the missile independently calculate where it is in the air based on all the parameters it can measure about itself [altitude, acceleration, etc.], as well as the TERCOM and/or DSMAC [terrain-based trajectory correction] system.

When it’s about, for example, the Russian Kh-101 cruise missile [in service with the Russian army since 2002], it has a DSMAC system operating, independently orienting it during the flight as it scans the terrain below and compares it with reference images, which are stored in its memory and have an exact reference to the coordinate system. Due to this, cruise missiles can generally fly without satellite navigation. At the same time, it’s impossible to affect the DSMAC system [with electronic warfare] as the missile flies by and [autonomously] scans the terrain below, and then compares this image with the reference one. As shown by the Ukrainian General Staff’s research, the latest version of the Russian Kh-101 missile had a single camera replaced by three smaller cameras with different viewing angles. Thus, the missile actually takes photos of the surface it flies over.

The missile can also be equipped with the TERCOM [trajectory correction] system. In this case, the missile measures the height of the terrain below and compares them with the reference signature, which also has a specific reference to the coordinates. This process is not optical, and therefore can be interfered with by EW, but the interference must be constant and uninterrupted.

NV: So realistically, it’s only possible to disrupt the satellite communications of Russian cruise missiles with electronic warfare?

Katkov: Yes, it’s possible to affect satellite navigation in a certain way, and the missile can get confused and go off course to avoid flying into the areas where it has a link to the DSMAC or TERCOM trajectory correction systems.

But the enemy probably understands this since a cruise missile is a rather expensive weapon and will unlikely rely strictly on satellite navigation.

NV: Recently, Moscow started using more of its ballistic missile arsenal to attack Ukraine.

Katkov: As for ballistic missiles like Iskander [in service with the Russian army since 2006], they have both inertial and satellite guidance systems, and it’s assumed they have a homing guidance system operating at the final leg of the trajectory, either via radar or optical homing heads. And therefore, taking this into account, once a ballistic missile is in flight and locks a target, it’s difficult to affect it with electronic warfare.
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Electronic warfare and drones have changed the face of battle in Europe and will probably continue to do so.  It is already forcing Russia to change some of its weapon systems used in Ukraine.