The Shinseki myths survive

Jamie McIntyre:

In fairness to Gen. Eric Shinseki, he's never said "I told you so."

But many others have elevated his now-famous February 2003 testimony to the level of Scripture.

Shinseki was right, they say, when he told the Senate Armed Services Committee a month before the invasion that something on the order "several hundred thousand troops" would be necessary to keep order in a post-invasion Iraq.

At the time, that observation drew loud scoffs from then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and from his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, who dismissed the prediction as "wildly off the mark."

Still, Shinseki wasn't advocating 300,000 troops be dispatched into Iraq. In fact, he said specifically that the forces mobilized in the region to that point were probably enough, and he made it clear he would have defer to the combatant commander, Gen. Tommy Franks.

"I would have to rely on combatant commanders' exact requirements," he said.

But pressed by Sen. Carl Levin, D-Michigan, to make an off-the-cuff guesstimate, Shinseki said "it would take a significant ground force."

Since that day, critics of the war have lauded Shinseki's prescience and his willingness to speak truth to power. Watch: Obama nominates Shinseki to top Veterans Affairs post »

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It's an appealing narrative, but the facts as we know them are not nearly so complimentary to the retired Army chief.

You see, Shinseki never made any recommendation for more troops for Iraq. In fact, as Army chief of staff, it wasn't really part of his job to take part in direct war planning.

But as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he did owe the president his best military advice. And if he felt strongly enough that the advice was not being taken, he could have resigned.

According to senior military officers who were in the pre-war meetings, Shinseki never objected to the war plans, and he didn't press for any changes.

When the joint chiefs were asked point-blank by then-Chairman Gen. Richard Meyers if they had any concerns about the plans before they went to the president, Shinseki kept silent.

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And it's true that in retrospect, many U.S. commanders believe there should have been more troops sent to Iraq, even though it's far from clear that would have prevented the insurgency and sectarian violence that the Pentagon failed to anticipate.

But the idea that Shinseki was a strong advocate for a bigger force and that no one listened vastly overstates his role.

It's one of those Washington myths that are almost impossible to dispel -- like the popular misconception that Shinseki was fired for standing up to Rumsfeld.

That myth is so pervasive, the authoritative Associated Press repeated it again Saturday night, saying "Shinseki was removed from [his] post after challenging the Bush administration."

He did not stand up to Rumsfeld, nor was he fired.

There's no question that Shinseki was on the outs with his civilian bosses, especially Rumsfeld.

Shinseki ordered that all soldiers wear black berets, a move that infuriated the special forces community, for whom the berets were a badge signifying their elite status. Rumsfeld, according to aides, was particularly miffed that Shinseki spent so much effort changing the Army's head gear, when the nation was at war.

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Shinseki became a prop for the anti war movement who used his off the cuff statements in response to Levin's question as weapon in their argument against the war. It is very telling that when President Bush decided to send more troops to Iraq, the very people who had been arguing that he had not sent enough opposed the surge of troops. They really wanted to argue that we should not go to war period.

It is also telling that even after the surge, we did not have half the level of troops that Shinseki said would be necessary, and they won the war. In fairness at that point we were able to use Iraqi forces to fill the gaps and by then there were enough trained Iraqi troops to make the surge viable. However the original Phase IV plan also contemplated using Iraq troops, but that was made moot by the order to disband the Iraqi army.

As I have said before, I think Shinseki can do a good job in his new post and I wish him well. It is too bad that there are not more reporters like McIntyre who will set the record straight on what really happened with Gen. Shinseki. Shinseki was not responsible for the myth and he may suffer when those who were find out.