Russians starting to admit shortcomings in their army

Christian Science Monitor:

The global perception of the Russia-Georgia war this summer is that an armored juggernaut of old Soviet military proportions rolled over its puny rival after a five-day conflict.

But the view from Moscow is different. Many Russian military experts are still shaking their heads in dismay over a catalog of delays and mistakes that plagued the Russian Army's thrust into South Ossetia.

"The war made it clear that we have all kinds of shortcomings in equipment, training, battlefield coordination, and intelligence," says Alexei Arbatov, a military expert with the Carnegie Center in Moscow.

The Russian Army's questionable performance has prompted urgent debate here over Russia's need for a modern, mobile, professional army capable of rapidly responding to challenges that might erupt along Russia's long borders with its unstable post-Soviet neighbors. In fact, the August conflict is giving fresh impetus for a 30 percent jump in defense spending, and a military modernization plan.

It comes on top of years of accumulated oil revenues, and an increasingly patriotic public mood.

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The fresh increases, announced by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin in late September, are in addition to a special $200-billion procurement program aimed at restoring the country's degraded strategic forces.

Mr. Arbatov argues that Russia's military problems run deeper than just two decades of neglect. "There is no political leadership over military organization. Nor is there any democratic control. The system needs to be changed," he says.

Russian forces entering South Ossetia lacked even basic intelligence regarding Georgian artillery positions and troop deployments, which led several of their leading units into costly ambushes. In one surprise attack, the 58th Army's senior commander, Gen. Anatoly Khrulyev, was badly wounded and had to be evacuated.

In a desperate effort to get information, the Russians sent an electronic reconnaissance version of the Tupolev Tu-22M Backfire bomber over the battlefield and it got shot down. In all, Russia lost four planes, including three Sukhoi Su-25 attack fighters to unexpectedly effective Georgian air defenses. Some Russian commanders reported using cellphones to communicate with their units when their own radios failed.

Additionally, the tanks deployed by the Russian Army did not have night sights for their guns, and the reactive armor designed to protect them from Georgian antitank weapons proved unreliable.

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The military now hopes to get a new generation of conventional weapons, including attack helicopters, strike fighters, and multipurpose troop carriers similar to the US Army's Bradley fighting vehicles. "Russia doesn't even have some of the equipment that Georgia deployed, such as unmanned reconnaissance drones," says Vladimir Yevseyev, an analyst at the independent Center for International Security in Moscow.

Russia's controversial system of military conscription could also prove a casualty of the war. Professional soldiers bore the brunt of the fighting while ill-trained recruits, who serve only one year, were mostly kept off the battlefield. "The recruit soldier is fading away. We need professional soldiers, with serious training," says General Yevstasyev.

Under a $200-billion long-term program initiated last year, Russia will renew its land-based arsenal of intercontinental missiles, build a fleet of nuclear submarines designed to fire advanced Bulava-3 underwater-launched missiles, add to its force of strategic bombers, and build many new warships, including up to six aircraft carriers. President Medvedev has pledged to finalize plans for a full makeover of the strategic forces by December.

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This story outlines some of the deficiencies I have commented on since the war with Georgia. It also demonstrates a continuing strategic muddle in the thinking of the Russian defense apparatus. Wasting money on strategic weapons when there is no real strategic threat is only going to make Russia less efficient in dealing with local conflicts like the one in Georgia.

The primitive APC that I have discussed here is just one of the deficiencies of the force sent to Georgia. The lack of UAV's puts Russia behind most armies in the world. The army it sent to Georgia would have lost a confrontation with NATO forces back when those weapons were new.