A special ops surge in Afghanistan

LA Times:

Reporting from Washington -- In a sign that the U.S. military is scaling back its goals in Afghanistan, senior Pentagon officials are weighing controversial proposals to send additional teams of highly trained special operations forces to narrowly target the most violent insurgent bands in the country.

The proposals are part of an acknowledgment among senior brass that a large-scale influx of conventional forces is unlikely in the near future because of troop commitments in Iraq. It also reflects the urgency to take some action to reverse recent setbacks in Afghanistan.

The idea of sending more special forces has intensified the debate over the best way to fight the war in Afghanistan. As security worsens in the country, many military leaders are increasingly arguing that an Iraq-style troop "surge" and counterinsurgency plan would not work because of the country's rugged geography and a history of resistance to rule from Kabul.

Unlike Iraq, where large portions of the population are urbanized in the wide, flat plains of the Tigris and Euphrates river valleys, much of Afghanistan is mountainous and dotted with remote villages that are hard to reach with large bodies of conventional forces, several Pentagon officials involved in the Afghanistan strategy review said.

"It's a much different place, and to surge forces doesn't necessarily fit," said a senior military official involved in the discussions.

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Advocates of a plan focused on special operations argue that the top U.S. priority in Afghanistan should be preventing the country from again becoming a terrorist haven, an objective that could best be met by targeted attacks on militants in regions near the border with Pakistan.

In addition, the Army's Green Berets are the U.S. military's premier unit for training foreign security forces, making them ideally suited for linking up with the small but increasingly competent Afghan army to improve its ability to secure the country.

But critics in the Pentagon say the special operations approach would repeat many of the mistakes of Iraq; although the units could attack insurgents in trouble spots, they would not be able to hold ground to keep extremists from coming back.

Other military officials note that only 12 of the 36 special operations units already in Afghanistan are being fully used. Many lack the supporting infrastructure -- surveillance drones, helicopter transport and intelligence networks -- in part because it is still needed in Iraq.

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A move to a strategy focusing heavily on special operations would be a significant shift for the U.S. military. The current strategy, which is supported by 32,000 U.S. forces and 30,000 North Atlantic Treaty Organization troops from other nations, aims to stabilize and secure the country and foster a viable central government.

But some military planners doubt that Afghanistan is capable of the progress that Iraq has achieved. "Are we really going to take a Karzai government and prop it up?" asked another senior military official, referring to Afghan President Hamid Karzai. "If you're talking about doing that, I can't see this ever ending."

Although the Iraqi government has frequently proved corrupt and ineffectual, the population is well-educated and skilled, providing abundant human capital once security can be achieved. In addition, Iraq's oil industry and fertile agricultural sector have quickly ramped up since violence declined after nearly 30,000 additional U.S. troops arrived in 2007, a buildup strategy that some have advocated for Afghanistan.

Afghanistan has high illiteracy rates and little economic activity, making an Iraq-style "clear, hold and build" strategy more difficult to execute. The Soviet Union failed to control the country in the 1980s with more than 100,000 soldiers, and some U.S. military officials fear Afghans could see large-scale troop increases as a repeat of that occupation.

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To have a special ops focused strategy, you would need to greatly increase the local militias that would be needed to work with them to control the space. One of the mistakes that many make in dealing with insurgencies is to ignore the importance of controlling space in a way that denies the enemy the ability to move to contact. Traditionally you control space by having a high force to space ratio. The ratio also goes up the higher the density of the population.

There are certain force multipliers that have made this strategy work well in Iraq. First the Iraqi army has greatly expanded ans has become much more effective and they have been used to control space after US forces help to clear it. Then the Sons of Iraq program nailed down the neighborhoods and made protection of the people much easier. Technology has also been a force multiplier. The uses of drones and other surveillance tech has made it almost impossible to plant IEDs without being caught. Snipers have also helped in this regard.

It is clear that special ops troops can work with indigenous forces in a way that disrupts enemy movement and communications, but they need help in controlling space. I think we will still need the additional forces and we need to greatly expand the Afghan army. I also think that the real key for special ops operation will be in Pakistan, if they can get the Pakistanis to let them work with the Frontier Corps and with Pakistan special ops to make them more effective at cutting off enemy maneuvers.