The surge is working in other areas of Iraq

Jeff Emanuel:

The region to the south and east of Baghdad — home to the Tigris River Valley, to the former terrorist training center and resort town of Salman Pak and to the long-since defunct Iraqi nuclear reactor — has seen little of the Coalition since the initial invasion of 2003. One of several areas the military quickly transited, killing off Saddam Hussein's army before abandoning it entirely, this strategically important region of Shi'a farmers and former Sunni aristocrats with the snaking Tigris is one of the most fertile in central Iraq. It has long since become home to rival factions of various insurgent and sectarian groups. From al Qaeda in Iraq to Muqtada al Sadr's "Mahdi army" (the Jaish al Mahdi, or JAM), insurgents in the area have now spent months and years fighting among themselves and against each other, in the process terrorizing a cowed civilian population which had all but given up on achieving something better.

This was the situation facing the 3rd Brigade of Georgia's 3rd Infantry Division when it arrived this spring in Iraq. The third of the five "surge" brigades, the 3-3 Infantry, also known as "Sledgehammer," was asked to accomplish a great deal in a brief period of time: from hunting down al Qaeda, JAM and others in the area to "interdict[ing] accelerants" — terrorists or materiel — before they can reach Baghdad, plus other tasks such as building rapport with the civilian community and bolstering the Iraqi National Police.

Though undermanned for the scope of their mission and the amount of territory to cover, the 3-3 has made an immediate and notable impact. Many of the effects of their presence are already clear. Al Qaeda, JAM and their ilk have been forced not only to rethink their strategy in an area once theirs for the taking, but now they must do so on the fly, as Coalition-mounted offensive operations target them from the air and from the ground in places they once thought to be secure.

The presence of Coalition forces in the area has lifted the spirits of some of the villagers and tribesmen in the area, who had once all but given up on prospects for improvement. Barely three weeks ago, the first tribal leaders in the southern part of the region contacted a 3-3 unit (Baker Company 1-15, from the 3-3's 1st Battalion) — meeting its commander, a captain and prior enlisted Ranger named Rich Thompson — to discuss establishing their own "Concerned Citizens" brigade. Concerned Citizens, an attempt to sanction the process which led to last year's amazing turnaround in Anbar Province, is a formal program allowing individual tribes, with Coalition blessing, to take up arms and defend themselves against terrorists who threaten them.

The surge brigade, just by being there, has made possible events and benefits that could not happen without the American presence. A prime example is medical care. Only days ago, Coalition forces held a free medical clinic, one of several staged in the area, in the small village of Wuerdiya, which is just north of Salman Pak. It had recently been attacked by JAM terrorists. Clinic attendees were not limited to victims of insurgent attack, however. People with everyday ailments like strep throat, high blood pressure and asthma were able to receive care and much-needed prescription drugs to which they had no access prior to the arrival of the surge brigade. To top things off, soccer balls, school bags and replica Iraqi soccer uniforms were given to the children who came for care. Both the children and their parents left very happy with the Coalition, at least for that day.

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"It's very clear that they want nothing to do with us directly," said Capt. Thompson of Baker Company 1-15. Lt. Col. Jack Marr, the 3-3's 1st Battalion commander, concurred, observing that "They will go out of their way to avoid targeting us with their big operations, and to focus them on the [Iraqi National Police] or another target they perceive to be weaker." An absence of terrorist activity is not — and cannot be — a requirement for the outcome in Iraq (or, for that matter, in the larger war on terror) to be considered something other than a failure. While the Coalition's smart, flexible, adaptive and extremely brutal enemies in Iraq will persist in putting up a fight for as long as their individual cells have members, the continuation of any level of resistance by those who have dedicated their lives (and deaths) should not be the sole factor to evaluate the effectiveness of the surge, as well as of Gen. Petraeus's counterinsurgency strategy.

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It is this fact that seems to escape the opponents of the surge and the proponents of a pull back. The surge does not endanger the troops. It empowers them to bring the people over to our side of the war and forces the enemy into retreat or defeat. Lamar Alexander and the others in the squishy middle need to read this report.