Invalid assumptions lead to mistakes in Iraq

CNN:

If he knew then what he knows now, he might have made some different decisions before the start of the Iraq war in 2003, the outgoing chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff told reporters Friday.

"One of the mistakes I made in my assumptions going in was that the Iraqi people and the Iraqi Army would welcome liberation, that the Iraqi Army, given the opportunity, would stand together for the Iraqi people and be available to them to help serve the new nation," Gen. Peter Pace said.

But "they disintegrated in the face of the coalition's first several weeks of combat, so they weren't here," Pace said.

Had he known that would happen, he would have recommended more troops be sent at the outset of the Iraq war, he said.

In addition, Pace said, if he had been asked in January 2006 whether the United States should build up its Army and Marine Corps contingents in Iraq, he would have said no, because the plan at the time was to build and equip an Iraqi Army and turn over security duties to it.

The force was built and equipped, Pace said, but the February bombing of the Golden Mosque -- one of the holiest Shiite sites -- ignited long-simmering tensions between Sunni and Shiite Muslims, further destabilizing the region and cutting short any plans for U.S. troop reduction.

Thousands of people have died in reprisal killings and bombings since the attack.

Still, Pace said, "Given what I knew at the time, I'm comfortable with the recommendations that I made." Any errors that were made are to be learned from, he added. Watch how Pace details the mistakes made at Iraq war's start »

And he continued to voice his support for the Iraq invasion.

"Twenty-six million Iraqis have the opportunity now," he said. "They are working their way through 3½ decades of being trod upon, held down, no opportunity at all for freedom of expression, for living their lives the way they wanted to, for picking [their] leaders."

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What is missing from this explanation is why more troops were not sent in when we found that the Iraqi army was disintegrating and why we waited 12 months to send in additional troops when we learned that the new Iraqi army was not up to dealing with the situation caused by the bombing of the mosque. The original assumptions are understandable, but the slow reaction to finding they were invalid is still yet to be explained. I think Gen. Pace is a smart guy who probably has a good answer to that question if someone will ask it. I would also like to know why the Army and Marine Corps were not expanded right after 9-11 when it would have been much easier to add recruits.