Anbar is for real and it is about reconciliation

Frederick Kagan has a long piece at NRO on the significance of the President's visit to Anbar province. This is but a brief excerpt:

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One major problem with the current discussions about Iraq in Washington is that they focus so heavily on the congressionally mandated “benchmarks,” initially discussed in 2006 by the Bush Administration. Those benchmarks address the Iraqi central government, and particularly the Council of Representatives — the Iraqi parliament — almost exclusively. As a result, political developments that occur outside the CoR tend to be discounted in this debate, and so the shift in Anbar itself has been devalued inappropriately as it does not seem likely to lead rapidly to the passage of legislation in Baghdad.

But the turn of Anbar is not simply an isolated local phenomenon with no significance in the larger political struggle in Iraq. On the contrary, it is an event that may well have profound long-term consequences even more important than the passage of any given piece of legislation. The Anbari rejection of AQI deprived Anbar’s leaders of the single most effective fighting force they had in attacking the Shia-led Iraqi government and attacking or defending against its militias. If the Anbaris had thereupon asked for the creation of a local, autonomous or semi-autonomous security force that would be a de facto tribal militia, there would have been cause for concern about their intentions. But they did not. Instead, Anbar’s tribal leaders have been offering their sons by the thousands as volunteers in the Iraqi police army. An entirely new training center was built in a couple of months in Habbaniyah, near Fallujah, which has just graduated its first couple of classes of Anbari recruits to join the ISF. The Anbari police will naturally stay in their areas, but they will not have the technical or tactical ability to project force outside of Anbar — they cannot become an effective Sunni “coup force.” Anbaris joining the Iraqi army, on the other hand, are joining a heavily Shia institution that they will not readily be able to seize control of and turn against the Shia government. In other words, the turn in Anbar is dramatically reducing the ability of the Anbaris to fight the Shia, and committing them ever more completely to the success of Iraq as a whole.

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The Maliki government is unquestionably twitchy about working with many of the Sunni grassroots movements, and with good reason. A lot of the new Sunni volunteers for the ISF were insurgents, and Iraq’s Shia, still traumatized by four years of Sunni attacks, are naturally nervous about taking former insurgents into their security forces. Nevertheless, they are doing so. The creation of the new training center at Habbaniyah, the acceptance of 1,700 Sunni recruits in Abu Ghraib — a very touchy issue because of the proximity of Abu Ghraib to Baghdad — efforts to repair sectarian imbalances within the two Iraqi Army divisions in Anbar itself, the Iraqi government’s acceptance of the establishment of “concerned citizens” groups all around Central Iraq, including in Baghdad, and a variety of other initiatives all indicate a surprising degree of willingness by the current Iraqi government to work and talk with former enemies.

The Sunni, of course, don’t trust the Maliki government any more than it trusts them, and herein lies a key point for American strategy. Right now, American forces are serving as the “honest broker,” the bridge between Sunni and Shia. Both sides trust us more or less, and are willing to work with us; neither trusts the other completely. If we remove this bridge now, it is unlikely that the Iraqis will be able to continue on a path to real reconciliation. But we are working hard every day to help them create their own independent reconciliation structure that will be able to stand on its own. President Bush’s visit to Anbar was a statement. Maliki, Talabani, and Adel Mehdi’s joining him there was a statement. The promise of additional U.S. aid to Anbar is a statement. So is the promise of additional Iraqi aid. This is a process that is ongoing and will take time to work, but it depends unequivocally on the continued presence of American forces and a continued American commitment to Iraq.

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There is much more, but this cuts to the heart of the arguments over what is happening in Iraq. It is the real world the Democrats want to avoid in their desperation for defeat. It is good to see so many intelligent people joining me in my analysis of the grass roots reconciliation that is taking place in Iraq. This bottom up movement is the best hope for success for Iraqis and the US effort. The Democrats and al Qaeda are the primary parties opposed to it.

Hillary Clinton is still talking like her delusions of being able to end a war would be something within her power should she be elected. However, the enemy has a vote in when the war is over and this one is not going to stop fighting us just because she orders a retreat from Iraq.

Wretchard at the Belmont Club also comments on "... how much better grassroots efforts are working than those directed at the top...."