Anthropology and Insurgents
Insurgents, Terrorist and Militias, The Warriors of Contemporary Combat by Richard H. Shultz and Andrea J. Dew makes sense out of the tactics and strategies of tribal fighting from Somalia, Chechnya, Afghanistan and Iraq. I highly recommend the book.
The book looks at how traditional intelligence work is inadequate when faced with tribal societies who have their own fighting "doctrines" that bear little relation to traditional western order of battle analysis.
One of the factors examined is the differences between nationalism based on abstract principles of civic responsibility and those based on ethnic and religious identity. Most of the current problem areas are in states based on the latter.
Somalia is given as the first example. While the intervention in Somalia was based on humanitarian considerations, that intervention had a very different look from the perspective of the warring factions. On CNN and in other western media the famine was presented as a tragic by product of the war between the factions in Somalia. If they had a better understanding of the Somalia warrior culture they might have recognized that the famine was a deliberate logistics strategy to starve an enemy and deprive him of the ability to continue fighting.
By bringing food to the starving the US and the UN were in effect intervening on the side of the party being starved and it should have been no surprise that the other side would react to prevent the successful completion of that intervention. This was the lead up to the Black Hawk Down incident which caused the US and UN withdrawal.
I would add that an intervention in Sudan and Darfur would have similar consequences, because the famine is also man made. Any intervention in such a situation should be with a well supplied force that would be adequate to defeat the warring party that is creating the famine.
In Chechnya the Russian faced irregular forces with "a social structure that generates an informal military hierarchy and decentralized fighting organization, local commanders with legitimacy and authority to impose discipline on their soldiers and a capacity to mobilize rapidly." Like most of the tribal units described in the book they have a knack for strategic ambushes that were capable of destroying Russian units who blundered into the traps.
In Afghanistan hitting supply columns was one of their more devastating tactics.Between 1985 and 1987 the Mujahideen conducted more than 10,000 ambushes many in the same locations. The book notes how the tribal societies of Afghanistan fought each other until an outside force invaded. They immediately joined together to fight the outside force. The descriptions of the failed British efforts and that of the Soviets differs mainly by the route of invasion and retreat.
The decentralized character of the insurgency made it impossible for the Soviets to concentrate on command and control.
One of the more interesting aspects to me, that is not really covered in the book directly, is that the Taliban are employing the same tactics and strategy but it is not working this time. Against US or NATO forces the Taliban ambushes usually wind up leading to a lot of dead Taliban. The Taliban has had some success in using non combatants as human shields, but even that tactic is alienating the population from the Taliban with the villagers not wanting them around.
The section on Iraq probably gives the clearest explanation of the factions fighting the insurgency. The media should read it and get a better idea of the dynamics that is currently underway with the surge. One of the interesting facts is that Saddam was losing his war with Iran until he went to the tribal leaders to get help recruiting people to fight. He also turned to the tribal leaders after the Gulf war to help him hold off the forces trying to overthrow his rule.
These tribal leaders have been described by the US military as "Iraqi rejectionist." The other major groups are the Former Regime Elements, i.e. Saddam's enforcers, and al Qaeda. One of the reasons it sometimes appeared that we were fighting several different factions was because the Iraqi rejectionist were made up of several different tribes operating independently. It should be noted that these are the people who have been rallying to the side of the US against al Qaeda starting last fall in Anbar province and now spreading through out the Sunni areas.
It should also be noted that there are two Shia factions that have been a factor at times especially after the bombing of the mosque with the gold dome. I would note that they were not really fighting against the Iraqi government, but were usually going after Sunnis perceived to be part of the insurgency. This led many in the media and some politicians to call the fighting in Iraq a civil war. If it was it was a rarity for civil wars since none of the forces were actually attacking government forces on any organized basis.
The book concludes that in planning interventions in societies like those described in the book the following considerations are required:
If you are interested in winning the wars we are currently fighting, you will want this book in your library.
The book looks at how traditional intelligence work is inadequate when faced with tribal societies who have their own fighting "doctrines" that bear little relation to traditional western order of battle analysis.
One of the factors examined is the differences between nationalism based on abstract principles of civic responsibility and those based on ethnic and religious identity. Most of the current problem areas are in states based on the latter.
Somalia is given as the first example. While the intervention in Somalia was based on humanitarian considerations, that intervention had a very different look from the perspective of the warring factions. On CNN and in other western media the famine was presented as a tragic by product of the war between the factions in Somalia. If they had a better understanding of the Somalia warrior culture they might have recognized that the famine was a deliberate logistics strategy to starve an enemy and deprive him of the ability to continue fighting.
By bringing food to the starving the US and the UN were in effect intervening on the side of the party being starved and it should have been no surprise that the other side would react to prevent the successful completion of that intervention. This was the lead up to the Black Hawk Down incident which caused the US and UN withdrawal.
I would add that an intervention in Sudan and Darfur would have similar consequences, because the famine is also man made. Any intervention in such a situation should be with a well supplied force that would be adequate to defeat the warring party that is creating the famine.
In Chechnya the Russian faced irregular forces with "a social structure that generates an informal military hierarchy and decentralized fighting organization, local commanders with legitimacy and authority to impose discipline on their soldiers and a capacity to mobilize rapidly." Like most of the tribal units described in the book they have a knack for strategic ambushes that were capable of destroying Russian units who blundered into the traps.
In Afghanistan hitting supply columns was one of their more devastating tactics.Between 1985 and 1987 the Mujahideen conducted more than 10,000 ambushes many in the same locations. The book notes how the tribal societies of Afghanistan fought each other until an outside force invaded. They immediately joined together to fight the outside force. The descriptions of the failed British efforts and that of the Soviets differs mainly by the route of invasion and retreat.
The decentralized character of the insurgency made it impossible for the Soviets to concentrate on command and control.
One of the more interesting aspects to me, that is not really covered in the book directly, is that the Taliban are employing the same tactics and strategy but it is not working this time. Against US or NATO forces the Taliban ambushes usually wind up leading to a lot of dead Taliban. The Taliban has had some success in using non combatants as human shields, but even that tactic is alienating the population from the Taliban with the villagers not wanting them around.
The section on Iraq probably gives the clearest explanation of the factions fighting the insurgency. The media should read it and get a better idea of the dynamics that is currently underway with the surge. One of the interesting facts is that Saddam was losing his war with Iran until he went to the tribal leaders to get help recruiting people to fight. He also turned to the tribal leaders after the Gulf war to help him hold off the forces trying to overthrow his rule.
These tribal leaders have been described by the US military as "Iraqi rejectionist." The other major groups are the Former Regime Elements, i.e. Saddam's enforcers, and al Qaeda. One of the reasons it sometimes appeared that we were fighting several different factions was because the Iraqi rejectionist were made up of several different tribes operating independently. It should be noted that these are the people who have been rallying to the side of the US against al Qaeda starting last fall in Anbar province and now spreading through out the Sunni areas.
It should also be noted that there are two Shia factions that have been a factor at times especially after the bombing of the mosque with the gold dome. I would note that they were not really fighting against the Iraqi government, but were usually going after Sunnis perceived to be part of the insurgency. This led many in the media and some politicians to call the fighting in Iraq a civil war. If it was it was a rarity for civil wars since none of the forces were actually attacking government forces on any organized basis.
The book concludes that in planning interventions in societies like those described in the book the following considerations are required:
... (1) armed groups found in traditional societies have long-standing methods of combat and ways of organizing to fight outsiders; (2) their members are well versed in these modes of fighting and are prepared for wartime roles; and (3) these traditional concepts invariably take protracted, irregular, and unconventional forms of combat.From my reading if the book I would think that the intelligence officers in such operations should have some background in anthropology in order to comprehend the enemy "order of battle." In all of these wars, it is important to have an adequate force to space ratio so that you can control real estate you deem important. You will be fighting an enemy who will primarily rely on raiding and retreat. As we found in Iraq, it is also important to make allies of tribal leaders who know the score with the enemy you are fighting.
If you are interested in winning the wars we are currently fighting, you will want this book in your library.
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