The importance of the Iraqi tribes to defeating al Qaeda

Trudy Rubin:

One of the most promising - and most tricky - developments in Iraq has been growing opposition by Sunni tribal leaders to al-Qaeda in Iraq.

Over past months, a tribal coalition has sharply reduced violence in Anbar province, the Sunni region that once hosted the terrorist group. News stories claim this coalition is crumbling. But new tribal alliances are being organized to fight al-Qaeda, along with hard-line Baathist insurgents (known as "Saddamists").

This is some of the best news out of Iraq, at a time when there is little good news to be had.

These new alliances are emerging not only in Anbar but also in troubled areas around Baghdad, where al-Qaeda and Saddamists fled when pushed out of Anbar.

One example: Shiite members of the tribe known as the Bani Tamim are mobilizing in Diyala province east of Baghdad - in cooperation with Sunni tribes. This is an area where U.S. troops are conducting an offensive. Leaders of the Bani Tamim have 5,000 names of tribesmen willing to fight and to protect vital oil pipelines. They want help from the Americans to do the job.

Another important example: I recently met Sheikh Ali Hatem Suleiman, who has been acting head of the Dulaim confederation, the largest tribal grouping in Anbar. Last week, he met with 200 tribal leaders in Ramadi, where they formed the Council of Sheikhs in Anbar, which wants to work with the Americans against al-Qaeda.

...

Why did the tribes once tolerate al-Qaeda? The short answer: gross mistakes by the Bush administration. In 2003, U.S. officials labeled Iraqi tribes an impediment to democracy. They failed to grasp that tribes provide a basic social network for many Iraqis. Instead of using that network, the Americans rebuffed tribal leaders.

Anbar tribes became even angrier when the Americans disbanded the Iraqi army, which employed many locals. "Because of American behaviors," says Ali Hatem, "Anbar people allowed al-Qaeda to come in."

But al-Qaeda eventually alienated the tribes (despite the cash it disbursed). It assassinated clerics and sheikhs, demanded local women as brides, and tried to impose its extreme form of religion. No longer composed mainly of foreign fighters, the group recruited the worst elements of the tribes.

So, over the last year, the tribes began to fight back, helped with American money and arms.

...

Sure, it's risky to support tribal leaders. But most seem to be fighting for survival, not just American aid. They know the local terrain, and they want to make their territory safer.

If the U.S. goal is to break al-Qaeda and pound the Saddamists, Iraqi help is badly needed, and Iraqi security forces still can't cut it. That means it is essential to encourage the tribes.

We are finding what Saddam discovered every time he was in trouble. The power in Iraq is controlled by the tribes. When Saddam was losing in his war with Iran, he finally had to turn to the tribes to get the manpower he needed to keep fighting. Also, after the Kuwait fiasco when the Kurds and the Shia were rebelling he again turned to the tribes to save him. He learned what we are now learning about the weakness of a central government in Iraq. While we now have most of the tribes on our side in the fight with al Qaeda, we also need to get them to influence the legislature to move toward the reconciliation agenda.