Getting a grip on Iraq--violence in perspective
The reporting on events in Iraq has often been substandard too bad. Such is the case now where the violence between the Shia and Sunnis has breathlessly been described as a "civil war." As John Keegan and Bartle Bull point out the action in Iraq does not meet the definition of a civil war.
Beyond the semantic argument there is another more obvious reason why this conflict is not much of a civil war. The opposing forces are no military threat to the government. The Sunnis who have lost their battle to regain power in Iraq continue their cockroach strategy of trying to make a mess, but they cannot carry off the house. The Shia militia are not a military threat to Iraqi army forces, though they have apparently penetrated the Iraqi police. But as a military force they could not sustain battle against Iraqi army units much less US forces.
While it can be argued that al Qaeda has successfully executed its strategy of starting a civil war between the Shia and Sunnis, it has in fact been a strategic defeat, because the battles being waged are still not a military threat to the government. They are a potential political threat to the government, i.e. if the Shia withdrew its political support it could require the parliament to select new leaders. But this is the same threat that every parliamentary democracy faces and it can hardly be called a civil war when governments change hands in this fashion. While it is possible that the Iraqi parliament may not be able to reach agreement on a new leader, it is pretty clear that the Sunni insurgents would not be better off with any resulting government. Because of the Shia factions being equally divided, it is also unlikely that Sadr could seize control.
Most of the media has misread the military insignificance of the enemy forces and its attacks on non combatants. The situation now is that you have two or more factions making militarily insignificant attacks on non combatants. These punitive attacks on the non combatant civilian population have not achieved their purpose, i.e. the capitulation of the opposition.
Because they have not achieved their purpose the Sunni factions have tried to ratchet up the violence in the vain belief that if they are more abusive the other side will capitulate. There is zero evidence to suggest that ratcheting up the violence will achieve that objective.
There is some evidence that it will lead to greater abuse of the Sunni population. However the reality is none of these factions has the military capacity to seize the government. They do have the capacity to continue to be cockroaches, and the government is not yet strong enough to prevent the infestation. It is still important to remember that cockroaches still cannot carry off a house.
Beyond the semantic argument there is another more obvious reason why this conflict is not much of a civil war. The opposing forces are no military threat to the government. The Sunnis who have lost their battle to regain power in Iraq continue their cockroach strategy of trying to make a mess, but they cannot carry off the house. The Shia militia are not a military threat to Iraqi army forces, though they have apparently penetrated the Iraqi police. But as a military force they could not sustain battle against Iraqi army units much less US forces.
While it can be argued that al Qaeda has successfully executed its strategy of starting a civil war between the Shia and Sunnis, it has in fact been a strategic defeat, because the battles being waged are still not a military threat to the government. They are a potential political threat to the government, i.e. if the Shia withdrew its political support it could require the parliament to select new leaders. But this is the same threat that every parliamentary democracy faces and it can hardly be called a civil war when governments change hands in this fashion. While it is possible that the Iraqi parliament may not be able to reach agreement on a new leader, it is pretty clear that the Sunni insurgents would not be better off with any resulting government. Because of the Shia factions being equally divided, it is also unlikely that Sadr could seize control.
Most of the media has misread the military insignificance of the enemy forces and its attacks on non combatants. The situation now is that you have two or more factions making militarily insignificant attacks on non combatants. These punitive attacks on the non combatant civilian population have not achieved their purpose, i.e. the capitulation of the opposition.
Because they have not achieved their purpose the Sunni factions have tried to ratchet up the violence in the vain belief that if they are more abusive the other side will capitulate. There is zero evidence to suggest that ratcheting up the violence will achieve that objective.
There is some evidence that it will lead to greater abuse of the Sunni population. However the reality is none of these factions has the military capacity to seize the government. They do have the capacity to continue to be cockroaches, and the government is not yet strong enough to prevent the infestation. It is still important to remember that cockroaches still cannot carry off a house.
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