Al Qaeda is losing in Saudi Arabia
David Ignatius:
...Ignatius is still buying into the regional conference hope that is being touted by those who want to boogie out of Baghdad. Meanwhile al Qaeda thinks the Democrats victory is their victory. While this should be an embarrassment for the Democrats they do not seem to be blushing. In fact I don't think anyone in the media has even asked them about this. Why is that? Does the media not want to face the question or does it agree with al Qaeda?
... it's easy to forget that bin Laden has failed utterly in his strategic goal in the Sept. 11 attacks, which was to topple the ruling monarchy in his home country of Saudi Arabia. The oil kingdom, the real prize in the region, is stronger and more secure than it was five years ago.
Saudi Arabia is, to be sure, not exactly a rock of stability, but its gains are highlighted in a recent study by Nawaf Obaid, a clear-headed Saudi analyst who advises his government. He noted that since May 2003, Saudi security forces have foiled more than 25 major terrorist attacks; they have captured or killed 264 al-Qaeda operatives and arrested 845 other people with links to al-Qaeda. Of the 26 terrorists on the Saudi most-wanted list, all but one have been captured or killed.
Perhaps more important, the Saudis have begun to crack the network of religious extremists that gave al-Qaeda a platform. The Saudi Interior Ministry, once a hidden source of support for the jihadists, now oversees what Obaid calls an "ideological reeducation program" supervised by religious scholars and university professors. More than 400 people have been released from this program, Obaid says.
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What are the lessons in Saudi Arabia's move back from the brink of potential disaster? The most important is that the Saudis decided to take charge of their own security rather than relying on an America that many in the kingdom resented. After 2003 the Saudis realized that they faced a deadly terrorist threat and began to fight it aggressively: They focused on national solutions; they reduced the visible, humiliating presence of American troops; they pursued political reforms; they increased oil production.
How does this apply to Iraq? Like the Saudis, the Iraqis will have to save themselves, working within the authentic political framework of their culture, religion and region. The more we try to substitute our will for theirs, with more American troops or exhortation, the more we enfeeble them. As in Saudi Arabia, we must move slowly but deliberately out of the spotlight and into the shadows, with a sustainable mission of training and advising Iraqi troops.
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