Iraqis still don't get it

John Burns, NY Times:

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They say they see few policy options that can turn the situation around, other than for Iraqi leaders to come to a realization that time is running out....

Many of the proposals appear to be based on an assumption that the White House memo itself calls into question: that Prime Minister Maliki can be persuaded to break with 30 years of commitment to Shiite religious identity and set a new course, or abandon the ruling Shiite religious alliance to lead a radically different kind of government, a moderate coalition of Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish politicians.

The memo’s assessment of Mr. Maliki tracks closely with what his American and Iraqi critics in Baghdad say: that six months after taking office, he has still not shown that he is willing or capable of rising above Shiite sectarianism.

These critics say, in effect, that the 56-year-old Iraqi leader has failed, so far, to meet the test set by Mr. Bush when the two men met for the first time in Baghdad in June. At that meeting, the American leader told Mr. Maliki he had come to “look you in the eye” and determine if America had a reliable partner here.

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... it is hard to imagine Mr. Maliki approaching Ayatollah Sistani to win approval “for actions that could split the Shia politically,” as the Hadley memo suggests. Shiite leaders, who are tiring of Mr. Maliki, appear to be thinking of replacing him with another Shiite religious leader, and not of sundering the alliance and surrendering the power the Shiites have awaited for centuries.

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For the Iraqi leader, the challenge presented by Mr. Sadr and the Mahdi Army amounts to a zero-sum game. If Mr. Maliki moves too fast against the militia, he risks losing Mr. Sadr’s support and splintering the Shiite bloc. If he moves too slowly, he will alienate the Sunni Arabs whose cooperation is crucial to any hope of reining in the insurgency.

Meanwhile, Mr. Maliki is in a vexed relationship with the United States. The Iraqi government needs the United States for the protection its 150,000 troops afford. At the same time, he has felt compelled to push back publicly against American pressures, partly to gain credibility among those in his power base who oppose the American presence, particularly the staunchly anti-American Mr. Sadr. Among other things, he has demanded effective control of Iraq’s new 140,000-man army, which remains under overall American command.

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Maliki's alliance with Sadr has made him a weak ineffective leader just like the man he replaced. He has to have the courage to defy Sadr and survive or he will not survive at all. At some point a leader has to do what he thinks is right and let the chips fall where they may. At this point Maliki has shown little that would earn him a profile in political courage.